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Racial Diversity on the Bench:
Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence
Sherrilyn A. IfiU*
The lack ofracial diversity on our nation's courts threatens both
the quality and legitimacy ofJudicial decision-making. Traditional
arguments emphasizing the "role model" value ofblackjudges and
the needfor blackjudges to help promote "public confidence" in the
justice system have turned our attention awayfrom the most impor-
tant justification for judicial diversity: Diversity on the bench can
enrich judicial decision-making by including a variety ofvoices and
perspectives in the deliberative process. In this Article, the Author
advocates racial diversity among judges as a critical means of
achieving cultural pluralism in judicial decision-making.
Judicialdiversityadvocates havefailedspecificallyandprecisely
to connect the demand for cultural pluralism in judicial decision-
making to racial diversity efforts. Fear of tackling the myth of
judicial impartiality and the failure to recognize the representative
function ofjudges has resulted in an over-emphasis on the symbolic
rather than the substantive value ofJudicial diversity. The Author
ultimately concludes thatourdiversityefforts shouldfocus on ensur-
ing that judges who can and are willing to represent the values and
perspectives ofminority communities are represented on the bench,
rather than focusing exclusively on the race of a judicial aspirant.
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When oppressed [the Negro] can bring an action at law
but they willfind only white men among their judges.
-Alexis de Tocqueville, DF.mocRAcYINAMRApi, p. 343.
Introduction
Despite the robust and often nuanced public debates that focus onthe need
for racial diversity in the legislative and executive branches of government,1
1. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, GOP Moves to Restrict Caucus Funds, Some Women,
Blacks, Hispanics CryFoulWASH. PosT, Dec. 7,1994, atAl (discussing congressional move to
cut caucus funding); Rick Delvecehio, VoterApathyDidin Carson 'sSenateBid, SANFRANCIscO
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calls for diversity on the bench rarely move beyond identifying the need for
minority role models and for increased public confidence in the judicial
system 2 But the need for diversity on the bench has become as compelling
as the need for diversity in the other two branches of govermment. The
judiciary remains "a powerful tenured institution that is overwhelmingly
white, male, and upper-middle class."3
Judges have a more direct and irrevocable impact in the lives of many
Americans than local or even national legislators.' This is particularly true for
CHRON., Sept 9,1998, atA13 (describing how low votertumout affected candidate running on
diversity platform); Multiculturalism in the Legislature, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept 14,
1994, at 6B (presenting multiple letters regarding diversity in legislature); see also, e.g., Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (stating that classification of citizens based solely on race
threatens to stigmatize individuals and incite racial hostility); Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
50-51 (1986) (discussing how voting district reorganization relates to dilution of black citizens'
votes); United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,155-56 (1977) (concluding that use ofracial
criteria in delineating voting districts does not violate Fourteenth or FifteenthAmendment).
2. See, e.g., R. William Ide II, Eradicating Bias in the Justice System, A.BA J., Mar.
1994, at 8 (discussing minorities' lack of faith injustice system); H.T. Smith, Toward a More
Diverse Judiciary, A.BA J., July 1995, at 8 (calling for increased focus on judicial diversity);
see also, e.g., Interview with Judge Constance Baker Motley in BLACKJUDGES ON JUSTICE 127,
133-34 (Linn Washington ed., 1994) (discussing struggle to achieve judicial diversity); Justice
Ming W. Chin, Fairness or Bias?: A Symposium on Racial and Ethnic Composition and
Attitudes in the Judiciary,4 ASIANL.J. 181,191-92 (1997) (discussingways to increase diversity
in judicial system); Henry J. ResnkeA Report Card on Clinton 'sJudgesABA J.,Apr. 1994,
at 16 (examining amount of diversity among Clinton judicial appointees); Mark R. Chesire, What
Price for Diversity on Maryland's Bench?, DAILY REC., (April 24, 1998) at 10a; Tony Mauro,
Wider Courtroom Diversity Urged, USA TODAY, Feb. 25,1999, at 3A (reporting that president
of American Bar Association called for greater diversity in court system "to win back the
confidence ofminorities").
3. Maryka Omatsu, The Fiction ofJudicialImpartiality, 9 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 3-4
(1997) (discussing Canadian judiciary and calling for greater diversity). Omatsu's observation
about the Canadian judiciary is equally applicable to the U.S. judiciary. African Americans
comprise only 3.3% of the judges on our nation's federal, state, and local courts. Over 90% of
all federal appellate judges are white. Only one judge among all of the federal circuit courts is
Asian American. See MAEs TO GO: PROGRESS OF MINORMES IN TM LEOAL PROFESSION 9
(ABA Comm. on Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession ed., 1998) (reporting statistical
information regarding minorities in legal profession). On the federal Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which covers the states of Maryland, Vrginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, and
North Carolina, all the judges are white, yet the states that comprise the Fourth Circuit together
contain the largest black population - 22% - of any federal circuit See Debra Baker, Waiting
and Wondering, A.BA J., Feb. 1999, at 52, 53 (discussing sloth of political process in confirm-
ing judicial appointees). At the state level, the figures are disturbingly similar. African Ameri-
cans comprise only 8% of the judges in our nation's state courts. See Barbara Luck Graham,
JudicialRecruitment and RacialDiversity on State Courts: An Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28,
32 (1990) (offering statistics about judicial diversity on state benches). The majority of these
African Americanjudges sit on courts of limited rather than general jurisdiction. Id. at 30-31.
4. See generalyA. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.,SeekingPluralism in JudicialSystems: The
American Experience and the South Afi'can Challenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028 (1993) (discussing
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African Americans,5 who are disproportionately involved with the judicial
system. Given this reality and given the increasingly widespread belief that
problems with prejudicial United States judiciary as they relate to South Africa). Judge Higgin-
botham observed:
In a democratic society, the judiciary occupies a unique position of extraordinary
power. Judges are involved in the affairs of all the people. By their decrees they
determine who will live and who will die in capital punishment cases, dictate how
vast amounts of resources will be allocated through civil verdicts and corporate
reorganizations, and define the duties and obligations individuals will have with
regard to one another in day-to-day life.
Id. at 1058. Judge Higginbotham is among the few commentators in this area who have explic-
itly recognized the connection between cultural pluralism in judicial decision-making and
diversity on the bench. Id. at 1029-30.
5. Throughout this paper I usethe term "AfricanAmerican" interchangeablywith "black."
See CHICAGO MANuALOF STYLE (1993), at 7.35. I use the term "white" to refer to Caucasian or
predominantly European-descended peoples. I do not view these terms as having biological
significance. Instead, I use these terms in reference to the culturally, economically, and socially
constructed racial communities in the United States. Although in this paper I refer almost
exclusively to African Americans, I believe that my arguments regarding the need for racial
diversity on the bench are similarly applicable to other "marginally ascriptive groups." I borrow
this term from Professor Melissa Wilson, who describes marginally ascriptive groups as those
for whom
(1) patterns of social and political inequality are structured along the lines of group
membership; (2) membership in these groups is not usually experienced as volun-
tary, (3) membership in these groups is not usually experienced as mutable; and
(4) generally, negative meanings are assigned to group identity by the broader
society or the dominant culture.
MELISSA S. WILSON, VoicE, TRUST, MEMORY 15-16 (1998).
I have represented African American voters in their efforts in several states to secure their
right to an equal opportunity to elect judicial candidates of their choice to state courts. See, e.g.,
Houston Lawyer's Assoc. v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991); Chisom v. Edwards, 501 U.S.
380 (1991); Robinson v. State, No. 91-C-468-B (N.D. Okla June 10, 1993) (consent decree);
Hoskins v. Hannah, Civ. Ac. No. 0-92-12 (S.D. TexAug. 19,1992) (consent decree).
6. For example, African Americans are disproportionately subject to searches by law
enforcement personnel. See John Lambeth, Driving While Black, WASI. POST, Aug. 16,1998,
at C1 (stating results of surveys performed in Baltimore, Maryland and on New Jersey Turn-
pike). In a suit that African American motorists filed in the state of Maryland, records revealed
that although African Americans constitute only 17% of the motorists along Interstate 95, 70%
of the motorists stopped and searched along that highway were African American. These
searches have resulted in arrest in only 20% of the time. Id. In April, 1999, the governor of the
state of New Jersey publicly acknowledged that New Jersey State Troopers systematically
engaged in racial profiling, which disproportionately targets minority motorists for stops and
searches. See David Kocieniewski, Whitman Fails toAppease Critics of Troopers'Action, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at B5 (discussing Governor Whitman's plan to stop officers' racial
profiling); Owen Moritz, Whitman to Put End to Racial Profiling, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 21,
1999, at 8; Paul Butler, Walking While Black; LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23 (describing
experience of being stopped and questioned by white police officers while walking in middle
class neighborhood where he lives in Washington, D.C.). If convicted of criminal offenses,
African Americans are disproportionately imprisoned, and receive harsher sentences than
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our judicial system denies equal treatment to racial minorities,7 any calls for
racial diversity on the bench should find support in arguments that describe
how diversity will benefit judicial decision-making and promote fairness in
the justice system.
Ironically, reliance on the role model and public confidence rationale to
support diversity on the bench has seriously undermined the strength of
judicial diversity efforts. Both rationales fail to explain why racial diversity
on the bench is not just important symbolically but also important for improv-
ing the legitimacy and quality ofjudging.' In fact, the most important benefit
similarly situated white convicts. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CRISIS OF THE YOUNG
AFRICANAM UCANMAE AND THE CRIMINALJUSTiCE SYSTEm 6-7 (Apr. 15-16,1999) (report
prepared for U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights). See generally Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersec-
tion of Injustice: Experiences ofAfrican-American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM.
U.J. GENDER & L. 1 (1995) (discussing relationship of African American women with criminal
justice system). This disparity is particularly true in the wake of "tough on crime" measures
enacted during the past 10 years, which have resulted in a sharp increase in the arrest, convic-
tion, and incarceration of individuals for drug-related offenses. See Timothy Egan, Less Crime,
More Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,1999, § 4, at 1; Timothy Egan, War on Crack Refreats,
Still Taking Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, §1, at 1. Though mandatory sentencing and
"zero tolerance" policing policies have increased the power of police officers and prosecutors,
see Angela I. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13,17 (1998) (examining prosecutorial discretion as major cause of racial
inequality) [hereinafter Davis, Prosecution andRace]; Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 427-28 (1997) (discussing discriminatory nature of policy
action) [hereinafter Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops],judges continue to exercise overarch-
ing control in the criminal justice system.
Judicial control in the lives of African Americans extends beyond the criminal context.
See, e.g., Barbara Vobjda, Revamping ofFoster Care BringsSurge inAdoptions, WASHL POsT,
Apr. 13, 1999, at A3 (reporting that in furtherance of policies promoting adoptions to move
children out of foster care in District of Columbia, judges are waiving rights of biological
parents when they determine "that it [is] the best option for the child"). For a disturbing
description of the historical role of judges in controlling black families, see PEGGY COOPER
DAVIS,NEGLECED STORMs: THE CONSTrTUTIONANDFAMfiY VALUES 147 (1997) (describing,
for example, power of local judges in Maryland during Reconstruction to place "black children
in the care and service of white people if placement was deemed 'better for the habits and
comfort of the child'").
7. See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the
"Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1269-71 (1996) (discussing
public cynicism toward criminal justice system); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal
Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. 3. COMP. L. 871,
872-75 (1997) (reviewing what is known about public dissatisfaction with judicial process); Joe
Urschel, Poll: A Nation More Divided, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1995, at 5A (revealing racial
divide on results of O.J. Simpson trial).
8. The concept of the "racial role model" has been the subject of some criticism by
critical race scholars. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 WiS. L. REV. 539, 574-75
(critiquing minority "role model" as one who by "project[ing] an assimilated persona that is...
unthreatening to white people ... help[s] to contain demands from below for further structural
changes"); see also Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKEMY WOMEN'S L.J. 22,41
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ofjudicial diversity is its potential to improve judicial decision-making. First,
the creation of a racially diverse bench can introduce traditionally excluded
perspectives and values into judicial decision-making. The interplay of
diverse views and perspectives can enrich judicial decision-making.9 Because
they can bring important and traditionally excluded perspectives to the bench, 10
minority judges can play a key role in giving legitimacy to the narratives and
values of racial minorities.
(1991) (cautioning against reliance on role model argument for hiring black female law
professors). Professor Allen's article identifies the weaknesses of the role model argument and
focuses on the substantive contribution black female professor can make to legal academia. For
a critique of the "role model" theory applied to African American elected officials, see Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting RightsAct and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1104-09 (1991). Nevertheless, the minority "role model
judge" is an image that continues to have some currency as a rhetorical tool
9. Justice Thurgood Marshall made this kind of contribution to Supreme Court delibera-
tions. See Sandra Day O'Connor, ThurgoodMarshall: The Influence ofa Raconteur, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1217,1217 (1992) ("Justice Marshall brought a special perspective."); Byron R. White,
A Tribute to Justice ThurgoodMarshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215,1215-16 (1992) (discussing
how Justice Marshall's experiences altered Supreme Court conferences). According to his
colleagues on the Court, Marshall used "stories" from his life experiences to inform the Court's
deliberations on matters relating to racial discrimination, the application of the death penalty, and
the lives of poor people. Justice White wrote that Marshall's life as a black man and his
experience as a civil rights lawyer enabled him to bring to the work of the Court "experience that
none of us could claim to match." Id. at 1215. In a personal interview, Justice Powell referring
to the contribution of Justice Marshall to the work of the Court stated "that a member of a
previously excluded group can bring insights to the Court that the rest of its members lack."
BARBARAA.PERRY,A"REPREsElTATIVE"S REECOURT?: THEIMPAcTOFRAcE,REuGION,
AND GENDER ONAPPoInTmENrS 137 (1991). As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has observed, "A
system ofjustice will be the richer for diversity of background and experience. It will be the
poorer in terms of appreciating what is at stake and the impact of its judgments if all of its
members are cast from the same mold." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks by President
Clinton and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at Swearing-In Ceremony (Aug. 10, 1993), in U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 10,1993.
10. Here I do not assume that there is a monolithic "black perspective" that all black judges
can represent. Instead, I endorse the Supreme Court's sense, expressed in the jury impartiality
cases, that the exclusion of blacks, women, or any other discrete group from participating in
juries will necessarily exclude the perspectives and experiences that these individuals might
bring into jury deliberations. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (holding that
systematic exclusion of women from jury panels violates Sixth Amendment); Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (holding that state cannot, as matter of due process, subject defendant to
indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury that has been selected in arbitrary and discrimina-
tory manner). Diverse viewpoints enrich deliberations by ensuring that the administration of
justice includes an array of viewpoints. Justice O'Connor has suggested that "the distorting
influence of race is minimized on a racially mixed jury." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,68
(1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Several excellent articles have explored the danger of
essentializing the views ofmarginalized groups. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory andAnti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 139, 166 (1989) (analyzing
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Second, racial diversity on the bench also encourages judicial impartial-
ity, by ensuring that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial
decision-making." I advanced the argument that judicial diversity promotes
impartiality in an earlier article. 2 There I argued that the impartial judge
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment requires both the impartiality of
individual judges and structural impartiality on the bench.1 3 Courts achieve
structural impartiality when judicial decision-making includes a cross-section
of perspectives and values from the community. 4 The balance of these
diverse perspectives ensures that no one perspective dominates legal decision-
making and lessens the opportunity for bias to taint judicial decision-making. 5
antidiscuimination from combined feminist and black perspectives); Angela Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588-89 (1990) (arguing that
gender essentialism is dangerous to feminist legal theory and often ignores experiences of black
women).
11. Efforts to promote racial diversity on the bench also offer opportunities to re-examine
flawed judicial selection systems that have resulted in nearly all-white benches in many states.
Since the early 1980s, judicial selection systems that deny minority voters an equal opportunity
to elect judicial candidates of their choice have been the subject of litigation in numerous states.
In this sense, increasing racial diversity is essential to promoting the legitimacy of the bench.
The justice system derives its legitimacy from the public's participation in the making, enforce-
ment, and interpretation of the laws that govern the society. See Note, The Case for Black
Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 531 (1970) (discussing interrelation of legitimacy ofjudicial process
and integrated juries). By contrast, the appeal to symbolism of both the role model and public
confidence rationale for promoting racial diversity on our courts may negatively affect judicial
selection reform efforts aimed at achieving diversity by casting racial diversity as a "feel-good"
noble exercise, rather than as an imperative that basic democratic principles compel.
12. See generally Sherrilyn A. 11111, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversit, Impartiality
and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95 (1997).
13. Id. at 98-99 (concluding that persistent presence of all-white bench violates Fourteenth
Amendment). In advancing this argument, I borrowed from the Supreme Court's reasoning in
cases requiring racial diversity injury venires, see generally Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975); Peters v. Kifl 407 U.S. 493.(1972), I argued that the impartial judge mandate of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires racial diversity on the bench. See Ifill, supta note 12, at 119-
28. I borrowed the term "group impartiality" from Scott Howe, who used the term to describe
the requirement of diversity on jury venires in his article, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality
Array? A Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate; 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173
(1995).
14. The Due Process Clause entitles litigants to appear before an impartial tribunal. See
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("It certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
and deprives a defendant.., of due process of law to subject his liability... to the judgment
of a court... which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclu-
sion against him in his case."). Due process also prevents judges from hearing cases in which
there is an appearance of impartiality. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)
(stating that "justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice").
15. See Omatsu, supra note 3, at 5-9 (asserting that judicial bench on which nearly all
judges are of same race, class and gender may result in"systemic blindspot" that excludes
alternative perspectives and values from judicial decision-making). Decision-making in which
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Because the Fourteenth Amendment compels structural as well as individual
impartiality, I argued that a racially diverse state trial bench is an essential
component of a fair and democratic justice system."6 In this sense, diversity
promises real and concrete returns for both African American and white com-
munities and also for the bench.
Yet all of these justifications for promoting diversity on the bench flow
from the assumption that minority judges can include racial perspectives in
their judicial decision-making. Although the premise that African American
participants in traditionally all-white environments will bring different per-
spectives and views to the table is fhirly standard in diversity discourse,17 this
assumption raises particularly difficult questions when applied to judges.
First, due process and indeed our entire system of justice requires impartial
judges must explicitly consider alternative or opposing perspectives is more corrective of bias
than are "demand-laden exhortations to be fair ... and unbiased." Charles G. Lord et al.,
Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategyfor Social Judgement, 47 J. PERSONAITY &
Soc. PsYCHOL. 1231,1239 (1984). Justice Cardozo believed that "[tihe eccentricities ofjudges
balance oneanother." BENIAMINCARDOZOTHENATUREOFTEJUDICIALPROCESS 177 (1921).
Although Justice Cardozo may have had in mind appellate court deliberations when he envi-
sioned this balancing of views, see Jerome Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 L.
& CONTEmP. PROBS. 369, 372-73 (1948) (reviewing Cardozo's extra-judicial writings and
analyzing his philosophies), trial court judging also provides opportunities for interaction within
the culture of the courthouse. Ifill, supra note 12, at 138-40.
16. Id. at 101-04. In that article I intentionally focused on the need for racial diversity on
state trial courts. I continue to believe that the need for racial diversity is crucial on state trial
courts. Nevertheless, I now urge that our discourse about the need for racial diversity on the
courts must include state appellate and federal courts as well. The debate about judicial diversity
is often publicly played out in the nominations of federal circuit court judges and Supreme Court
Justices. The nomination and confirmation process for judges on these courts would benefit
from a more coherent understanding ofthe need for diversity as it relates to judicial officers.
17. The Supreme Court endorsed this assumption in some of its diversity jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,552 (1990) (upholding FCC policy awarding
radio and television contract to minority controlled firms to promote diversity in broadcasting);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (identifying state interest in
ameliorating or eliminating "disabling effects of identified discrimination"). The Court has
moved away from this reasoning in subsequent cases. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647
(1993) (denouncing creation of majority-minority congressional districts). Diversity as a means
of enriching substantive discourse has been used as a rationale for supporting diversity on law
faculties. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-ConsciousPedagogy
in LegalEducation, 11 NAT'LBLACKL.J. 1,2 (1989) (describing efforts of minority law students
to press for hiring of minority law professors in order to change "substantive dynamic" of law
school classroom); see also Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action
in LegalAcademia, 1990 DUKEL.J. 705,730 (supporting hiring oflawprofessors of color in part
because "scholars with ties to subordinated communities are uniquely situated in respect to these
ideological resources, and more likely than white scholars to mobilize them to contribute to our
understanding of law-in-society"). But see Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, TellingStories Out
of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 846 (1993) (disputing that
women and minorities are in unique position to transform legal scholarship).
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judges." Does the constitutional judicial inpartiality requirement preclude
African American judges from consciously engaging minority community
perspectives and values in their decision-making? Second, judges - including
black judges - are subject to significant professional influences, which shape
their approach to legal problem-solving. 9 Are such legal decision-makers
capable of authentically representing diverse community values? This Article
attempts to answer these questions.
We must confront these issues if we are to realize the full power of
diversity to transform judicial decision-making. Symbolic forms of racial
diversity may result in the appointment or election of some minority judges,
but without a diversity discourse that both confronts restrictive conceptions
of representation and challenges existing definitions of judicial impartiality,
minority judges may feel constrained from articulating viewpoints and values
that reflect those of minority communities.2" In order to realize the potential
of diversity to transform and improve the bench, advocates of increased
judicial diversity must be prepared to explore more carefully and to promote
more openly the potential of racial diversity to affect actual decision-making,
rather than just the appearance of the bench.
18. See supra note 14 (discussing due process requirements).
19. Justice Cardozo identified the "restrictions" that "hedge and circumscribe [a judge's
actions]" as including "the tradition of the centuries... the example of other judges, his prede-
cessors and his colleagues... the collective judgment of the profession and... the duty of
adherence to the pervading spirit ofthe law." CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 114; see J. Woodford
Howard, Jr., Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 39 J. POL. 916,
917 (1977) (describing "professional values ... as essential controls" on federal courts).
20. lMinorityjudges also may feel isolated and exposed when only a small number serve
in their jurisdiction. Studies ofjurors have shown that a jury needs at least three minority jurors
to overcome the group pressure of the majority. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and
the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1698 (1985) (discussing racial bias in criminal jury
trials). Similar research involving female law students has shown that "the larger the numbers,
the greater the likelihood that previously excluded groups will perform well, both in terms of
traditional achievement and in their ability to innovate." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded
Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession MakingNew Voices in the Law, 42 MAMI L. REV.
29,44 (1987).
Obtaining the full benefits of a diverse bench in which black judges feel themselves
legitimately able to represent black communities will require a richer form of diversity beyond
mere tokenism. Future empirical studies on race and judicial decision-making will tell us if
black judges on integrated benches are more likely to explicitly represent minority community
perspectives and values. In several jurisdictions where minority voters have successfully
challenged discriminatory voting practices, voters proceeded for the first time to elect significant
numbers of blackjudges. See, e.g., Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285,302 (M.D. La. 1988)
(concluding that "use of multimember election districts and circuit wide election districts...
affords black citizens 'less opportunity.., to elect representatives of their choice'"); Hunt v.
Arkansas, No. PB-C-89-406 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 7, 1991) (consent decree) (reporting election of
nine African American trial judges after change in election system). These jurisdictions may
provide appropriate venues for empirical study in the future.
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In so doing, diversity advocates need not, and indeed should not, argue
that the African American community is monolithic in its configuration, views,
or values, or that only one "black perspective" exists. Essentializing African
American communities or judges denies the richness and complexity of Af-
rican American political thought." Nevertheless, critics of "color blindness"
remind us that ignoring the potential relevance of race carries dangers for
subordinated groups.' In a society still deeply fractured along racial lines,
"color blindness" can merely entrench existing racial inequity.'
Moreover, denying the significance of race denies that the perspectives
and values of African Americans can contribute to our understanding and
analysis of law. Including the distinct and often unique perspective and values
of African Americans in legal decision-making brings additional and impor-
tant analytical resources to the judiciary. The exclusion of African Americans
from judicial decision-making, like the wholesale exclusion of men or women
from judging, removes critical analytical -resources from judicial decision-
making. Seeking diversity on the bench acknowledges the ways in which the
different experiences of many blacks and whites can contribute to our inter-
pretation and understanding of legal doctrine.
Pursuing judicial diversity need not rest on the belief that all African
American judges are either obligated or always suited to represent the values
of African American communities.24 I do not seek to trade in one kind of
21. Black political thought has always been diverse and multilayered. Anna Julia Cooper,
W.E.B. DuBois, Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and Ida B. Wells Barnett are among
the many black leaders who differed vehemently, and often publicly, in their conceptions of the
best route to black advancement. For a critical analysis of the different and often conflicting
strains of black political thought, see generally JoY JAMES, TRANSCENDING THE TALENTED
TNm BLAcK LEADS AND AMERICAN INTEILECTUALS (1997). For a critique of the "black
perspective" theory as resulting in an excessive focus on race to explain the plight of blacks, see
William Julius Wilson, The Urban Underclass in Advanced Industrial Society, in THE NEW
URBAN REATY 129, 131-33 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985).
22. SeePATRIcIAJ.WILLAMS, SEEING COLORBLINDFUTURE: THEPARADOXOFRACE 4-5
(1997) (discussing modem status of racism and its possible future resolution); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff,A CaseforRace-Consciousness, 91 COLUIM. L. REV. 1060,1078 (1991) (criticizing
notion that race is arbitrary factor in modem world); Neil GotandaA Critique of "Our Constitu-
tion Is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1991) (arguing that Supreme Court's use of"color-
blind constitutionalism" fosters white racial domination).
23. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility
and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICE. L. REV. 901, 910 (1997) ("Colorblindness
does not erase subordination, colorblindness perpetuates it").
24. Nor do I suggest that black judges have no obligation to represent the values of the
black community. That discussion is simply beyond the scope of this paper. My discussion
focuses instead on supporting the ability of those black judges who wish to serve such a repre-
sentative function, to do so free from charges of bias or partiality. More importantly, I continue
to press the view that the representation of diverse community perspectives in judicial decision-
making will strengthen judicial decision-making on the whole, not just for traditionally excluded
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tyranny for another, creating a "tyranny of expectations" for black judges in
exchange for freedom from the tyranny of racial majoritarianism on the
bench.' Some African American judges will be unfamiliar with or unwilling
to engage the values and perspectives of African Americans in their judicial
decision-making. While these judicial aspirants may make excellent judges
and receive support if they are qualified to serve, they cannot satisfy the goals
of diversity. Minority judicial candidates who are explicitly promoted to
fulfill diversity objectives, however, must offer more than their racial "face"
to demonstrate that they can bring diversity to the bench.
This Article contains four sections, each of which engages aspects of the
issues set out above. In Part I, I argue that judges, like all other social actors,
are members of racial communities and are influenced by racial narratives.
In Part II, I focus specifically on how racial diversity on the bench affects the
way courts may decide discrimination cases.
In Part III, I examine the perceived conflict between judicial impartiality
and efforts to bring diversity to the bench. For this discussion, I return to
cases in which white litigants have challenged the impartiality of black judges
and to cases brought by minority voters who have challenged judicial election
methods that prohibit them from electing judges of their choice.26 In the voter
communities. However, for a compelling argument that African American judges have an
affirmative obligation to work towards advancing the interests of the black community, see
generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Clarence Thomas from a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992). For an argument describing the moral
obligation of black corporate attorneys to advance the interests of the African American commu-
nity, see generally David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?: The Role of Legal
Education in Shaping the Values ofBlack Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993).
25. I borrow the term "tyranny of expectations" from Professor Anthony Appiah. See K.
ANTHONYAPPIAH&AMYGUTrMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS 99 (1996) (regarding imposed notions
of monolithic black identity as form of tyranny adopted by many blacks during the 1960s and
1970s to restore the loss of dignity engendered by tyranny of racial oppression). Other scholars
have identified and analyzed the dangers of essentialism. See supra note 9.
26. See, e.g., Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646,648-49 (1991) (discussing how Louisiana
voting procedures violated Voting Rights Act); Davis v. Chiles, 139 F3d 1414, 1426 (11th Cir.
1998) (ruling that districting plan based on race was clearly erroneous), cert denied sub nom.
Davis v. Bush, 119 S. Ct. 1139 (1999); League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council v.
Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter LULAC IV] (weighing evidence
of vote dilution against Texas's interest in maintaining jurisdictional linkages); Chisom v.
Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1065 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that challenge of at-large voting system
stated claim of racial discrimination under Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). I focus
specifically on LULAC v. Clements. See infra Part MIL B. In that case the Fifth Circuit found
that minority voters' challenges to the at-large method of electing trial judges in 10 counties in
Texas threatened the impartiality of the judiciary. In reviewing subsequent cases brought by
minority voters under the Voting Rights Act challenging judicial election schemes, almost all
appellate courts have adopted the LULAC decision in some form. I served as counsel to the
African American voters in LULAC, as well as other Voting Rights Act challenges to judicial
election practices. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, No. 91-C-468-B (N.D. Okla. June 10, 1993)
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cases, although the United States Supreme Court held that elected judges are
representatives subject to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 7 appellate courts
have insisted that minority voters' efforts to elect judges of their choice to the
bench would threaten individual judicial impartiality. These cases have
challenged diversity advocates to take on the question of whether requiring
judicial diversity conflicts with judicial impartiality. Beginning to resolve the
perceived tension between judicial diversity and impartiality, therefore, is a
critical step in advancing efforts to bring substantive rather than cosmetic
racial diversity to the bench. I contend that the role model/public confidence
argument for diversity, avoids this important task.
In Part IV, I describe how judges can be impartial representatives. Unlike
legislative representatives, judges cannot and need not decide cases based on
constituent opinion. The representative role ofjudges requires only thatjudges
give constituent communities the opportunity for the expression of their values
and views in public policy. Judges as representatives, therefore, should seek
to include and engage the multiple and competing perspectives of the commu-
nities they serve in the process of judicial decision-making. Thus, judges
exercise their representative function in the judicial decision-making process,
not merely through decisional outcomes. In order to understand the potential
for judges to be both impartial and representative I contend that we must
examine more closely opportunities for expression injudicial decision-making.
Finally, despite the importance of increasing the number of blacks on the
bench, I conclude in Part V that diversity efforts also must be targeted more
specifically at identifying judicial candidates who are capable of and willing
to represent the perspectives and values of minority or other marginally ascrip-
tive groups in their judicial decision-making. I argue that white judges who
demonstrate these abilities also can serve to promote diversity on the bench. In
this part, I view the nomination and confirmation of Judge Clarence Thomas
to the Supreme Court as exemplary of the consequences of our failure to look
beyond the "racial face" ofjudges to satisfy diversity. Thomas's performance
in the pre-Anita Hill phase of his confirmation hearings demonstrates how the
idea of diversity can be manipulated by the promotion of black role models.
I also look at the 1996 experience of a white federal district court judge, Judge
Harold Baer, who faced a national firestorm when he articulated and endorsed
the perspective of poor, minority men in a decision granting a motion to
suppress drug evidence. Judge Baer's initial opinion articulating and crediting
(consent decree); Hoskins v. Hannah, Civ. Action No. G-92-12 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 1992)
(consent decree); Hunt v. Arkansas, No. PB-C-89-406 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 7,1991).
27. See Houston Lawyers' Assoc. v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 421 (1991) (holding
that state judicial elections must comply with Voting Rights Act); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 384 (1991) (concluding that state judicial elections are subject to Voting Rights Act);
Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646,653 (1991) (concluding that minority voters had met minimum
standards for enjoining Louisiana elections); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (West 1997).
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the perspective of young African American men who interact with police in
one New York City neighborhood reveals that white judges as well can play a
key role in bringing diversity to judicial decision-making.
I. Race and Judging: Does the Race of the Judge Matter?
A. The Enduring Power of Racial Constructs
The intuitive sense that minority judges can bring traditionally excluded
perspectives to the process of legal decision-making is consistent with the
prominent role race plays in shaping the perspectives and values of blacks and
whites. I deliberately speak here of both perspectives and values. Perspec-
tives might be defined as "ways of looking at the world" or the eyes through
which blacks "see" and "interpret" events, symbols, or people." Because
perception is the lens through which judges make decisions,' the inclusion of
multiple perspectives in judicial decision-making is a critical focus of diver-
sity. Values are also critical to judicial decision-making. Values are the rules
or standards by which a community, based on its perceptions, organizes and
assigns worth. Values reflect "an enduring belief that a specific mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable."3"
Values are the principles which undergird our laws and legal doctrine. Judges
interpret law based on their perception of our core societal values. Both
perspective and values can strongly influence legal decision-making.31
By now it is incontrovertible that race influences how Americans see the
world. Although "race and racial categories are not natural [but] ... are social
constructions created by culture, politics, and ideology,"32 the power of race
28. See Richard Delgado, Storytlingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narra-
tive, 87 MIcE. L. REV. 2411,2413 (1989) (describing cultural mindset as "eyeglasses we have
worn a long time .... [W]e use them to scan and interpret the world and only rarely examine
them for themselves").
29. This is particularly true for trial judges who, as Judge Jerome Frank noted, decide
"what the facts are." The ability of trial judges to perceive the demeanor and credibility of
witnesses is the principal rationale for appellate court deference to a trial judge's finding of fact.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52; Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (requiring
deference to trial court's findings subject to clearly erroneous standard).
30. MILTON ROKEACH, TBE NA1M OF HtMAN VALUES 5 (1973).
31. The fact that many black jurors, for example, view police testimony with great skep-
ticism reflects the common perspective of many blacks that police are often corrupt and/or racist
By contrast, the decision by black jurors to nullify and acquit a black criminal defendant who has
committed a nonviolent drug offense, however, may be an expression of values. In such cases
black jurors may value the maintenance of human resources in the community above "zero
tolerance" for nonviolent crimes. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (encouraging black jury
nullification as a means of social change).
32. CHARIESR.LAWRENCEiH&MARIlJ. MATSUDA, WEWON'T GOBAcic MAIGNGTHE
CASE FORAIFIPMATIVE ACTION 127 (1997).
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to influence values and perception cannot be underestimated. The catastrophic
history of slavery as well as the history and current reality of racial subordina-
tion binds African Americans. In this sense, African American identity is an
identity born first of racial subordination and oppression.33 African American
identity continues to exist both in spite of and because of racial subordination
and oppression. Black identity is at once cultural, political, and social. 4 Like
other ethnic groups, common cultural practices related to music, styles of
communication and expression, worship, food, and family structure tie blacks
together. 5 Through these cultural practices, blacks often demonstrate an
affirmative desire to maintain a "black" identity.36
33. Id. at 225 (arguing that "[tihe identities of people of color are constructed by Amer-
ica's racism even as we embrace, or more accurately reconstruct, those identities to fight racial
subordination").
34. Blacks share "distinctive styles and modes of expression, attitudes and beliefs about
political and social issues, customs and practices, that are recognized and understood (if not
always agreed with or followed) by a broad range of blacks across geographic and social lines."
David B. Wilkins, Introduction to APPIAH & GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 3, 22-23. See
generally THOMAS KOCHMAN, BLACK AND WITE STYLES IN CoNFuIcT (1981) (discussing
communication differences between blacks and whites and how they lead to racial tension); THBE
REAL EBONICs DEBATE (Lisa Delpit & Theresa Perry eds., 1998) (examining controversy
sparked by Oakland's recognition of Ebonics, or "black English," as valid linguistic system).
35. For a study of the role of the church in maintaining common cultural bonds among
blacks, see generally C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAwRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH N THBE
AFRICANAM cANEXPERIENCCE (1990), and Michelle M. Simms Parrs, Comment WhatDoes
It Mean to See a Black Church Burning?: Understanding the Constitutional Significance of
Hate Speech, 1 U. PA. 3. CONST. L. 127 (1998).
African Americans and whites often have distinct values, which shape approaches to
family structure. The deliberate disruption of the African American family during slavery, when
slave holders could separate children from parents by death, work, sale, or "hiring out" contrib-
uted to a tradition of family in the African American community that values and recognizes
single mothers, grandmothers, aunts, cousins, and even non-blood-related "family" as primary
care givers. See Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism & Public Policy, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 345 (1996) (describing effects of slavery on structure of black families). The
need for relatives and friends to step in for murdered, sold, or working parents, created a
definition of "family" that defies the nuclear family that middle-class white norms value. See
generally REMEmBER1NG SLAVERY (Ira Berlin et al. eds., 1998) (collecting testimonials of"ex-
slaves"). See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 92 (describing "network of surrogate care givers" who
filled parental role during slavery). Professor Peggy Davis's excellent work further documents
the unique and overwhelming pressures slavery imposed on the family life of blacks. Her study
ultimately reveals how the stories of black slave families can "enrich our interpretations, in
constitutional theory and in public debate, of the value and place of family." DAVIS, supra note
6, at 251. Retained African traditions also reflect a more communal approach to child-rearing
within African American families than the standard nuclear family model. African Americans
families continue to reflect this tradition.
36. See Alex Johnson, Bid Whist Tonk & United States v. Fordice: WhyIntegrationism
FailsAfican-AmericansAgain, 81 CAL.L. REV. 1401,1403 (1993) (arguing that integration can
be achieved only through acknowledgment and accommodation of unique African American
culture); Isabel Wilkerson, Middle Class ButNot FeelingEqual: BlacksReflect on LosAngeles
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Nevertheless, as Charles Lawrence and Mar Matsuda correctly point out,
although "[o]ur culture, our identity, is not entirely of our own making,"" black
self-identification also can reflect a highly conscious choice. For example,
while historically the "one drop rule" (which declared that anyone having "an
appreciable" amount of"black blood" was black)38 purported to set the bound-
aries for black identity, blacks have always found ways of exercising power
over the terms and limits of community membership. The decision of some
blacks who were sufficiently light-skinned to "pass out" of the black commu-
nity in order to better their economic and social life chances in the white world
demonstrates how some blacks subverted imposed racial identity. Others who
could have passed as white affirmatively chose to remain within the black
community - some using their white appearance to infiltrate white communi-
ties and expose racist practices.39 Black identity also can be a political
choice.4" Contemporary battles over the creation of "multiracial" categories
Strife, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at A20 (explaining that many in black middle class have
"turned inward" in effort to maintain sense of identity); see also Holding on to a Language of
Our Own: An Interview with LinguistJohn Rickford, in THEREALEBONICSDEBATE,supra note
34, at 59 (discussing relationship of Ebonics and socio-economic status of blacks in America).
37. Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 32, at 225.
38. See F. JAMEs DAVIs,WHO Is BLACK? 4-6 (1991) (defining and examining "one drop
rule" for racial classification); Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Ob-
servations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1,13-15 (1994)
(discussing relationship ofancestry and appearance to racial classification).
39. Walter White, executive director of the NAACP, was so fair-skinned that he was able
to infiltrate southern white communities to report on lynchings. See WALTER WHITE, ROPE AND
FAGGOT (photo. reprint 1969) (1929) (providing detailed account of lynchings in 1930s and
1940s).
40. The political dimension of black identity was an important part of national and inter-
national liberation struggles duringthe 1960s and 1970s. See STOKELYCARMECHAEL& CHARLES
V. HAMiLTON, BLACKPOWER44-45 (1967) (calling for black unity as means of improving black
life). In Britain during this period, immigrants from former British colonies in the Caribbean as
well as India and Pakistan politically identified themselves as black. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER,
TOWARDS TBEABOLrYIONo WHiTENESS: ESSAYS ONRACE, PoIrlcs, AND WoRKING CLASS
HISTORY 4 (1994) (discussing ways social construction of race enters politics); A. SIVANANDAN,
ADFEENT HUNGER: WRuNGs ONBLACKREmSTANCE (1982) (discussing Black Power and
international struggle against racism). For members of the Black Consciousness Movement in
South Africa in the 1970s, to be black was to be among "those who are politically, socially and
economically discriminated against, and identified as such." MAMHELA RAMPHELE, ACROSS
BOUNDARmS 59 (1997). Steve Biko, the murdered leader of the Black Consciousness Move-
ment, argued that "[b]eing black is not a matter of pigmentation - being black is a reflection of
mental attitude." STEVE BIKO, I WRrTE WHAT I LIKE 48 (1978). Political consciousness has
influenced the ethnic identity of other communities as well. Gloria Anzaldua has said that
Chicanos became "a people" after Cesar Chavez led the farm workers' movement BORDER-
LANs/LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MEsTnzu 63 (1982) (stating that "something momentous
happened to the Chicano soul - we became aware of our reality and acquired a name and a
language [Chicano Spanish] that reflected that reality").
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reflect the continuing role of choice in shaping black identity."
It must also be recognized that despite common cultural connections, great
diversity exists within the African American community as well. 2 Blacks
often split over the best means of addressing issues of common interest. 3 Al-
though conflicts withinthe black community are frequently portrayed as indica-
41. See generally Tanya Kateri Hemandez, 'Multicultural"Discourse: Racial Classifica-
tions in an Era of Color-BlindJurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REv. 97 (1998) (critiquing multiracial
category movement and proposing alternative); Deborah Ramirez,MulticulturalEmpowerment:
It's NotJustBlack and WhiteAnymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995) (arguing that policies that
rely on racial classifications are dividing minority groups).
42. A significant percentage of the black population, particularly in large urban areas, are
immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa. Because Caribbean and African immigrant groups
face discrimination as blacks, these communities are connected by their resistance to racial
discrimination. Two recent police brutality cases in New York demonstrate this phenomenon.
Following the brutal police attack of a Haitian immigrant in 1997, the Caribbean American
community in New York mobilized with the African American community to protest police
abuse and violence. See Merle English, For Cops, It Was Tough Duty, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug.
30, 1997, atA05 (describing multi-ethnic demonstration against police brutality). In 1998, the
West African community in New York responded similarly to the killing of an innocent
unarmed West African immigrant, who was shot at 41 times by New York City police. Robert
D. McFadden with Kit R. Roane, U.S. Examining Killing ofMan in Police Volley, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 6, 1999, at Al. The assault and killing of a Caribbean American man, whom a mob of
white youths chased into highway traffic, ignited the 1986 Howard Beach, Queens case that
mobilized the largest civil rights protests of the 1980s in New York. Robert D. McFadden, 3
Youths Are Held on Murder Counts in Queens Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1986, at Al.
Caribbean and African immigrant communities also suffer from unique forms of discrimination
such as anti-immigrant bias, and the wave of anti-Haitian bias that occurred in the early 1980s
when the Center for Disease Control incorrectly listed Haitian immigrants as a target population
for the AIDS virus. See Cristine Russell, Haitians No Longer Listed as Known AIDS Risks;
Action by Disease Control Centers Unexplained, WASH. PoST, Apr. 9, 1985, at A3 (reporting
that Centers for Disease Control eliminated Haitians from its weekly report of patient groups
with known risk for AIDS).
43. For example, blacks vary in their views of how best to address the problem of crime
in inner-city black communities. In a recent case, blacks filed amicus briefs on both sides of
a pending Supreme Court case that challenged Chicago's anti-gang loitering law. Compare
Amicus Brief of Chicago Neighborhood Organizations In Support of Petitioner, Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121) (urging Supreme Court to uphold Chicago's anti-
loitering law) with Amicus Brief of Chicago Alliance For Neighborhood Safety et al. In Support
ofRespondents, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121) (urging Supreme Court
to strike down Chicago's anti-loitering law). Chicago's ordinance prohibited residents from
loitering "for no apparent reason" and required citizens to "disperse and remove themselves
from the area" upon police order. Black communities on both sides of the issue had unique
perspectives which reflected the challenges facing their communities. The Supreme Court later
held the ordinance unconstitutional. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (holding
that law was impermissibly vague, in violation of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause). For an excellent analysis of the disparate opinions in the black community on
questions of crime and punishment, see generally Regina Austin, 'The Black Community, "Its
Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. RLrv. 1769 (1992) (analyzing
discord created in black community by black lawlessness).
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tive of the black community's increasing fragmentation, they reflect long-
standing diversity in black political thought. The black community has never
been monolithic in its view of how best to advance its collective economic,
political, and social interests.' Inthe 1920s, followers of Booker T. Washing-
ton differed from Garveyites, who in turn saw themselves in conflict with allies
ofW.E.B. DuBois.45 Yet all remained committed to the idea of black advance-
ment, and all perceived the urgent need to overcome racism. in America's white
political, economic, and educational institutions. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the black community divided between those who adhered to traditional
Civil Rights movement methods of fighting racial oppression, and those who
adopted the more confrontational, aggressive stance ofthe Black Panthers and
otherblacknationalistgroups.46 Similarly, while AfricanAmericans todaymay
endorse different approaches to* resolving the scourge of crime, joblessness,
educational deprivation, and incarceration that continues to plague the lives of
African Americans in many communities, African Americans believe virtually
unanimously that racism - either overt or institutional - remains a significant
barrier to overcoming these problems." Furthermore, most African Americans
share a sense of urgency about the resolution of these problems.
As David Wilkins has argued, what ultimately connects blacks is a sense
of shared destiny. According to Wilkins, "[B]lacks are inextricably linked to
each other in a manner that makes it predictable that the actions of individual
Blacks will affect the fate of the black community as a whole, and that ties the
opportunities available to any individual black, to the progress ofthe group.
'48
44. See JAMES supra note 21, at 4 (discussing historic lack of cohesion among groups
within black community). See also Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YAIE L.J. 470, 482, 485
(1976) (describing conflicts between NAACP Legal Defense Fund and some black parents in
school desegregation cases in Atlanta and Boston).
45. See JAMES, supra note 21, at 21 n.16 (explaining how DuBois differentiated himself
from Washington). For a synopsis of the differing views of Washington, Garvey, and DuBois,
see Floyd B. McKissick, Sr., Black Leadership in America: The Legacy and the Current
Crisis, 30 How. L.J. 1083, 1088-92 (1987), and see also VOICES OF A NATION: PoI.rCAL
JOURNAI.sMINTHE HARLEmRENAISSANCE (Theodore G. Vincent ed., 1973).
46. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 128-37 (Dell 1992) (1968) (critiquing Amer-
ican culture of early 1960s); ALEx HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 306-27
(Ballantine, 1992) (1964) (outlining Malcolm X's relationship with Civil Rights movement);
JUANWIt.AMS,THRGOOD MAMIHA1 AMMEcANREvOLUT[ONARY342-43 (1998) (discuss-
ing Marshall's criticism of Black Power movement).
47. See generally Joint Center National Survey Reveals Sharp Opinion Differences Be-
tween Blacks and General Population on Social Issues, U.S. NEWsWIRE, Apr. 17, 1996,
available in Westlaw, U.S. Newswire Database (revealing sharp differences of opinion between
African Americans and general population on social policy issues).
48. David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the FirstAmendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030,1041 (1995).
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Individual African Americans cannot help but be aware of the history that
links all African Americans to one another. Nor can African Americans deny
the reality that present day racism continues to connect the collective future
of all African Americans.
49
To identify the strong ties that bind African Americans to one another
does not deny the fundamental "Americanness" of blacks. In describing the
double identity of blacks, W.E.B DuBois has said that an African American
"ever feels his dual identity - an American, a Negro."5° While existing in a
separate subculture, African Americans at the same time are an essential
component of the larger American culture.5 Indeed, there is no "American"
identity or culture without African Americans.52 Whatever "American cul-
ture" is, its very existence has been shaped by its nearly four-hundred year
relationship with its African-descended population. 3 In this sense, "American
culture is anything but white.1
54
49. See generally Austin, supra note 43. For these reasons, most remain convinced that
"[t]here exists out there, somewhere, 'the black community.'" Id. at 1769.
50. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACKFOLK 3-4 (1931).
51. For a searing historical examination of the relationship between the culture of white
violence in back country South Carolina in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and genera-
tions of violence within one modem-day African American family, see generally Fox
BUTIEFIEWD,AILGoD'S CHILDREN: THEBOSETFAMILYANDTEAMERICANTRAD1MONOF
VIOLENCE (1995). African American culture is both fully American and an amalgam ofAfrican
influences, survival strategies formed in a racially oppressive slave society, religious, geograph-
ical, and countless other influences. See KOCHMA, supra note 34, at 7-15 (exploring influence
of cultural factors on communication between blacks and whites).
52. See generally TONIMORRISON, PLAYINGINTHE DARK (1992) (discussing role of race
in American literature). Nobel Prize winning novelist Toni Morrison compellingly makes this
argument in the context of African American influence on white literary tradition. In her
excellent analysis of the "Africanist" influence on seminal white literature, Morrison refutes the
"more or less tacit agreement among literary scholars, that, because American literature has been
clearly the preserve of white male views, genius, and power, those views, genius, and power are
without relationship to and removed from the overwhelming presence of black people in the
United States." Id. at 5. Instead, Morrison finds that "a real or fabricated Africanist presence
was crucial to [the] ... sense ofAmericanness" of the great American writers. Id. at 6.
53. See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECnVE ON RACIAL INEQUAITY (1995) (postulating that differences
between black and white wealth explain racial inequality in America). The very best that
American culture has to offer inevitably is tied to the worst of America's historical interaction
with its African American population. America's economic traditions are one example of this
connection. In Black Wealth White Wealth, Oliver and Shapiro provide an excellent empirical
study of the "intimate connection between white wealth accumulation and black poverty." Id.
at 5. Historian Robin Kelley has described slavery as "one of the essential legs upon which
modem capitalism was built" Robin 0. Kelley, Foreword to REMEMBERING SLAVERY, supra
note 35, at viL
54. David R. RoedigerIntroduclion to BLACK ON WHITE: BLACKWMTrERS ON-WHATIT
MEANS TO BE WHI=E 18 (David R. Roediger ed., 1998).
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Yet "whiteness" is a constructed group identity as well, although as one
prominent historian has observed "why people think they are white and
whether they might quit thinking so [is] the most neglected aspect of race in
America."55 Historian David Roediger has described the creation of whiteness
as "a dramatic and an American choice."56 This country almost from its incep-
tion has constructed, maintained and insisted on "whiteness" as an identity, a
cultural marker, a form of currency, and a badge of citizenship. 7 "American-
ness" immediately merged with whiteness as a national identity."' As an iden-
tity, "whiteness" served as a unifying feature for a nation comprised of immi-
grants, transcending even traditional ethnic divisions among white groups.
Studies demonstrate that "most White ethnic groups in America have...
assimilated into what is considered to be mainstream American culture, and
have consequently become more identified with the dominant White American
middle-class culture than a particular ethnic group or culture.159
White racial identity also has carried with it economic benefits. The
decision of some light-skinned blacks to "pass for white" was in many, if not
most, cases motivated by the desire to obtain access to the jobs and financial
stability that whiteness promised.' Whiteness has also been described as a
55. RoEDIGER, supra note 40, at 12.
56. Id. at21.
57. See Susan K. Lce,Racial Construction Through Citizenship in the US., 6 ASIANAM.
POL'Y REV. 89, 89 (1996) (examining ways that United States has used exclusivity of nation-
state-based citizenship to push racial minorities to margins).
58. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (concluding that state's refusal to
enroll Chinese Americans at white-only public school did not violate Fourteenth Amendment);
In re Thind, 268 F. 683, 684-85 (D. Or. 1920) (discussing immigration law that authorized
naturalization of "fre white" aliens). Attaining whiteness may also be tied to "becoming
American" in less formal ways. Writer Toni Morrison contended that "[i]fthere were no black
people here in this country, it would have been Balkanized. The immigrants would have torn
each other's throats out, as they have done everywhere else. But in becoming an American from
Europe, what one has in common with that other immigrant is contempt for me." Bonnie
Angelo, The Pain of Being Black, TIME, May 22, 1989, at 120, 120 (recalling interview with
Toni Morrison following publication of her Pulitzer Prize-winning novel Beloved); see also
Camille 0. Cosby, America Taught My Son's Killer to Hate Blacks, USA TODAY July 8, 1998,
at 15A (claiming that "racism and prejudice are omnipresent and eternalized in America's
institutions, media and myriad entities").
59. BLACK AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY 106 (Janet Helms ed., 1990). The political
behavior of white voters bears out this thesis. For example, ethnically diverse white voters will
coalesce behind a white candidate when that candidate faces an African American opponent
who challenges the existing white political order. See John Citrin et al., White Reactions to
BlackCandidates, 54 PUB. OPINIONQ. 74,94 (1990) (analyzing mayoral race offormer Chicago
Mayor Harold Washington). Thus, as one scholar has observed, "For all practical purposes,
Whites of all classes and ethnicities now prefer to present a common front." ANDREW HACKER,
Two NATIONS 12 (1992).
60. See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness asProperty, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709,1710-14(1993)
(describing her light-skinned grandmother's experience "passing" as white during the day while
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"vested interest" in privilege.61 Even today, whiteness persists as a key factor
in obtaining access to social and economic opportunity.62
Perhaps the most important and elusive benefit of white racial identity is
the ability of whites to deny the existence of whiteness at all. Thus, an
important privilege of whiteness may be the ability to think of oneself without
regard to race - to see oneself instead as neutral, unbiased, or impartial.' To
the extent that whiteness is synonymous with majoritarian values, perspec-
tives, and ideals, our culture masks it as the norm.' In this sense, color-
blindness, neutrality, and indeed impartiality may be terms steeped in "white-
ness" - the whiteness that is unseen because of its deeply imbedded place in
our nation's normative values.
B. Differing Perspectives Among Blacks and Whites
The existence of a persistent racial divide between the response of
African Americans and whites to important social, economic, political, and
cultural issues evidences the enduring power of racial constructs. In count-
less surveys, African Americans and whites reveal sharply different perspec-
tives, particularly in response to issues that explicitly refer to race. For
example, blacks and whites disagree about the meaning and power of discrim-
ination.65 Because many issues not explicitly racial in nature carry a racial
she worked at major Chicago department store to earn money for her family). Whiteness also
may offer benefits that are less concrete, yet perhaps more important For example, WE.B.
DuBois has described the "psychological wage" paid to white laborers during the post-Recon-
struction period. The acceptance of this benefit by economically disadvantaged whites during
that period and in many instances thereafter often helped to undermine the possibility of strong
worker coalitions between whites and blacks.
61. Harris, supra note 60, at 1725 (asserting that giving whiteness legal status converted
it from identity to property).
62. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY& NANCYA. DENTONAMERCANAPARTHED 2-16 (1993)
(describing importance of whiteness in accessing essential and nonessential social benefits).
Massey and Denton demonstrated that racial segregation in housing denies to blacks of all
socioeconomic conditions the full range of available societal and economic benefits. Access
to good schools, municipal services, and asset accumulation through strong property values
depends on housing location. Residential segregation keeps even middle-class blacks from
enjoying these social and economic benefits. Middle-class whites, by contrast, experience
tremendous opportunities for upward mobility as a result of residential housing advantages. Id.
63. Id. (identifying "unacknowledged whiteness of facially neutral criteria of decision").
64. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now ISee": White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) (discussing
"transparency phenomenon" of whiteness).
65. See An American Dilemma, 7 PuB. PERST. 19, 19-42 (FebJMar. 1996) (compiling
survey answers from blacks and whites on social issues). For example, only 38% of whites
compared to 68% of African Americans polled believe that racism in our society is a big
problem. Id. at 20. Similarly, while 71% of African Americans associated past and present
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sub-text," African Americans and whites also express different views about
ostensibly nonracial issues such as increasing aid for social programs, 67
downsizing of the federal government,'s raising taxes,69 and giving control of
welfare to the states?
0
Blacks and whites also differ in their responses to criminal justice
issues.71 A majority of African Americans tend to believe that racial bias
characterizes the justice system.72 Most whites do not.73 African Americans
also sharply differ from whites in their views on how to deal with crime. 4
racial discrimination as the cause of many of the economic and social problems facing African
Americans, only 36% of whites shared that view. See Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F.
Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (D. Me. 1991) (discussing need for reasonable black man standard when
analyzing cases and allegations involving discrimination).
66. See Andrea StonePolitics ofRace Taking on More Subtle Shades, USA TODAY, Nov.
2, 1994, at 8A (asserting that modem debates over proper function and scope of social welfare
programs have racial subtexts).
67. SeeANAMERICANPROFLE: OINIONS AND BEHAVIORS: 1972-89at572,710,729
(Floris W. Wood ed., 1990) (showing differences in white and black responses to questions
concerning government's provision of aid to the poor, welfare, and solutions to big-city
problems); see also THOMAS B. EDSAIL&MARYEDSAI, THEIMPACr OFRACERIGHTS AND
TAXES ON AMERICAN PoliTIcs, 47-48, 59, 258 (1992) (citing data that revealed that 77% of
blacks favor increased spending for public services, compared to 50% of whites).
68. See Stone, supra note 66 (arguing that blacks are only group in United States that
likes big government).
69. See An American Dilemma, supra note 65, at 27 (surveying blacks' and whites'
opinions on proper role of government). Although in numerous polls both African Americans
and whites have expressed a desire for decreases in personal taxes, when asked whether they
would pay more taxes if the federal government provided more services, 62% of African
Americans replied in the affirmative, in contrast to only 35% of whites. Id. at 19.
70. See Richard MorinADistorted Image ofMinorities: PollSuggests That What Whites
Think They SeeMayAffectBeliefs, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,1995, atAl (discussing poll results that
demonstrate that whites are misinformed about black life in America).
71. See Bill Boyarsky, The Spin/Bill Boyarsky; Simpson Murder Case; In "Just the
Facts" Tones, Detectives Woo Tough Audience, LA. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A24 (stating that
black Los Angeles residents are more suspicious of police testimony than white residents).
Contrary to a majority of whites, most African Americans do not support efforts to permit juries
to convict criminal defendants with non-unanimous verdicts. See Reynolds Holding, Unani-
mous JuryRule Is Unpopular, SANFRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 12,1995, atA13 (discussing poll
finding that 71% of all participants favored allowing non-unanimous verdicts in non-death
penalty cases but only 24% ofAfrican Americans supported concept).
72. See Maria Pueute, Poll: Blacks' Confidence in Police Plummets, USA TODAY, Mar.
21, 1995, at 3A (reporting nationwide poll showing that 66% of blacks think justice system is
racist, while only 37% of whites perceive bias).
73. See id. (same).
74. See Barbara Linkin Menkele, Race Major Factor in Views About Crime, Survey
Finds, Hous. POST, Mar. 21,1995, atA15 (reporting that 44% ofAfrican Americans, compared
to 76% of whites, support efforts to increase classification of more crimes as capital offenses).
In October 1995, Texas passed a law permitting the carrying of concealed weapons. In Texas,
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This disparity persists despite the fact that African Americans disproportion-
ately are victims of violent crime. 5 A majority of African Americans also
favor strong criminal sanctions for those guilty of criminal conduct. However,
the historical reality of racist law enforcement practices in the United States,
which permitted lynching to flourish virtually unchecked in the first half of
the twentieth century 6 and which today results in the disproportionate arrest
and incarceration rate for African Americans," strongly influences the collec-
tive sense of skepticism among African Americans about the efficacy and
fairness of the justice system in addressing crime. As a result, African Ameri-
cans persistently articulate an interest in racial fairness in the justice system
that is coequal with the desire to remove violent crime from their communi-
ties. The disparate response of African Americans and whites to capital
punishment also reflects African Americans' heightened concern for racial
fairness in the justice system. In general, African Americans do not support
capital punishment, while an overwhelming number of whites do.7" Black
while a majority of whites support laws permitting licensed gun owners to carry concealed
weapons, only 35% of African Americans support such a law. Id. African Americans are also
less likely than whites to support "three-strikes you're out" or other mandatory sentencing
measures. See Jesse Jackson, Crime Bill IsDiscriminatory: Sentencing Falls Most on Minori-
ties, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 1994, at 13A (asserting that crime bill with "three strikes and you're
out" mandatory minimums and new death penalties is racially discriminatory); Stephen W.
Potts, The Last Bastion of Racial Preference, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 11, 1999, at B
(discussing racial discrimination in California's criminal justice system).
75. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1994) (positing that violent crime constitutes most
lethal danger African Americans face).
76. See generally ALH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS (1962) (documenting
racial atrocities in America through collection of newspaper articles reporting lynchings);
WArrE, supra note 39 (studying economic forces, racial prejudice, religion, sex, politics,
journalism, and theories of racial superiority at play in lynchings).
77. See Lori Montgomery, 1 in 3 Young Black Men Jailed, Paroled or on Probation,
Hous. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995, at 7 (examining exploding rates of black incarceration); see also
supra note 6 (discussing prevalence of racial profiling as well as disparate sentences for
possession of crack versus powder cocaine).
78. See Pete Donohue, No GrayArea in Death Penalty Vote, N.Y. DAILYNEWs, Mar. 12,
1995, at 6 (reporting that vote on death penalty statute in New York legislature split down racial
lines); Lee Hancock, Jury with Blacks Called Unlikely in Jasper Trial, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 5, 1999, at 37A (reporting that court excused more than half of potential black
jurors in Jasper trial because they opposed death penalty); Allan Turner, Some in Jasper Urge
"Eyefor an Eye, "Hous. CHRON., Feb. 25,1999, atAl (reporting that some black Jasper, Texas,
residents' expression of pro-death penalty views was atypical of most African Americans who
generally oppose death penalty). The opposition of black potential jurors in East Texas
reflected the position of a majority of blacks with regard to the death penalty. Latino jurors
have expressed a similar unwillingness to impose the death penalty. Brian P. Hill, Judicial
Response to Changing Societal Values on the Death Penalty: Must the Method Chosen Be the
Most Humane?, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 409,417 n.57 (1995).
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opposition to the death penalty is likely premised to some degree on the
racially disparate application of the death penalty.79
The emergence of a broader black middle class in the past twenty-five
years8" has done little to close the racial perspective-gap between blacks and
whites. Although some political observers, scholars, and cultural critics argue
that as a result of class disparities among blacks there is no "black commu-
nity,'81 class differences appear only nominally to effect the perspective of
most blacks, particularly with regard to racial discrimination.82 The reasons for
79. Texas leads all states in the number of convicted inmates on death row. Death Row
U.S.A.,NAACP LEGALDEFENsE AND EDuc. FUND (Fall 1999). Ofthe 458 people on death row
in Texas, 291 are African or Mexican American. Id. Many blacks also oppose the death penalty
on religious and/or moral grounds. See Jack Douglas, Jr. & Jeff Claasen, Few Whites Executed
for Black Deaths, FORT WORTH STAR-TEGRAM, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1 (reporting findings of
University of Florida professor Michael Radalet).
80. See James Ragland, Climbing the Economic Ladder, DALLAS MORN]NGNEws, Apr.
26, 1998, at 13 (reporting that today one-third of black households are middle-income but only
10% or black households qualified as middle income 30 years ago).
81. See Frontline: The Two Nations of BlackAmerica, (PBS television broadcast, Feb.
10, 1998) (discussing division of blacks in America). In an autobiographical look at race and
class mobility in his life, which aired on public television, Professor Henry Louis Gates
dramatized his sense of class disconnection by acerbically disparaging the views of a young,
poor, black man. The young man was not described or identified, but sat in a shadow during
the interview. When he described his desire to "make money" and his refusal to try to make it
working at Kentucky Fried Chicken, Professor Gates responded in a voice-over that the young
man "seemed like a Martian to me." Professor Gates went on to describe his sense of commu-
nity in class rather than racial terms, calling "Harvard Square" his "home." Id.
This expression of racial disconnect is not limited to academics. African American
comedian Chris Rock expressed a similar view on his Emmy-winning cable television special
"Bring Home the Pain." Bring Home the Pain (HBO television broadcast, June 1,1996). In the
most popular and most disturbing routine of his act, Rock distinguished between his "love [for]
black people" and his hatred of "niggaz." In his ensuing description of "black people" and
"niggaz," Rock made what amounted to a class distinction between those blacks with whom the
comedian feels a sense of connection, and those he "hates." Critics have hailed this sequence as
evidence of Rock's honesty and brilliance. See David Kamp, The Color of Truth, Vanity Fair,
Aug. 1998, at 124, 127 (touting Rock's comedic talents). In a subsequent interview Rock
indicated that he believed that blacks are unified in ways that transcend class. See Eric Bogosian,
ChrisRockHasNo Timefor Your Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct 5,1997, at 56. When asked
what do "[a] welfare mother in Brownsville, a Nigerian selling watches on Fifth Avenue, an
upper-middle-class Atlanta suburbanite, [and] a nanny from Jamaica... have in common other
than skin?" Rock replied, "If it all goes wrong with each one of these people, they'd end up
living in the exact same neighborhood. That's reality." Id.
82. See Isabel Wilkerson, Middle-Class But Not Feeling Equal, Blacks Reflect on Los
Angeles Strife, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at A20 (interviewing 70 well-to-do blacks in Los
Angeles about riots that followed verdict in Rodney King beating trial). The strong connection
between African Americans persists in the face of geographic, class, and gender differences.
See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrIY (1994) (describing how African American
voters submerged in majority white districts in North Carolina regarded Harlem Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell as their "representative" in the 1960s rather than white representative
428 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 405 (2000)
this are likely two-fold. First, middle class status, by and large, does not
insulate blacks from overt or covert forms of racial discrimination.83 Blacks,
therefore, remain connected through the common reality of racial subordina-
tion. Second, the term "middle class" may obscure the realities of life for
blacks who have escaped poverty. For blacks, class lines tend to be more
porous, and middle-class status is a much more precarious state than it is for
whites. Most blacks who fall into the middle class by virtue oftheir income do
not possess the other indicators of middle-class stability such as property
ownership, manageable debt, and savings.84 Instead, "blacks' claim to middle-
class status is based on income and not assets.""5 In addition, middle-class
status does not afford blacks access to the same resources and benefits that are
available to whites. 6 Referring to middle-class status among blacks as if it
elected from their district); James B. Johnson & Philip E. Secret, Focus and Style Representa-
tional Roles of Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucus Members, 26 J. BLACK STUD. 245,
258-59 (reflecting that black and Latino members of Congress say that black and Latino voters
outside their districts expect minority caucus members to represent "national constituency" of
blacks and Latinos). Nevertheless, the general effect of class disparities on the values and
perceptions of blacks should not be ignored. See generally John Calmore, Exploring the
Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REV. 201 (1982)
(asserting that black poor are discrete minority from black middle class); Steven Gregory, The
ChangingSignificance ofRace andClass in an African-American Community, 19 AM. ETHNOL-
OGST 255 (1992) (examining effect of political empowerment of black middle class on "Black
community"); Shelby Steele, On Being Black and Middle Class, 85 CoMMENTARY 42, 46
(1988) (discussing effect of middle class status on black identity). There is some indication that
middle-class blacks, because of their greater interaction with whites and with racism in the
workplace, express greater pessimism about racial issues than do poor blacks. See generally
ErLs COSE, RAGE OFA PRiVIIEGED CLAss (1993).
83. See John GibeautMarkedfor Humiliation, ABA. J., Feb. 1999, at 46,46 (discussing
fact that black women traveling internationally are disproportionately searched for drugs at U.S.
airports); Norris West, An Early Lesson About 'Triving While Black," BALT. SUN, July 25,
1999, at 6B (relating author's personal experience of police stop for "driving while black"); see
also PAUL M. BARRETr, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999)
(relating story of black attorney who, despite efforts to portray himself as a "good black" to his
white colleagues, was nevertheless denied partnership at white law firm); CosE, supra note 82
(examining cause of black, middle-class rage); JILL NELSON, VOLUNTEER SLAVERY (1993)
(presenting blackjournalists firsthand encounters with racism in journalism world); WILLIAMS,
supra note 22, at 38-41 (discussing racist response of mortgage lender when he discovered that
law professor seeking mortgage was black).
84. OLVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 95 (noting important role that dual wage earner
couples played in helping black families attain middle-class living standards). "[Although] 65%
of white middle-class households possess a large enough nest egg to maintain their present liv-
ing standard for at least one month... only 27 percent of the black middle class has enough...
to keep up present living standards for one month." Id. at 97.
85. Id. at 95.
86. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 62, at 151-52 (arguing that blacks are less able
to convert their socioeconomic gains into residential contacts with whites and thus remain cut
off from benefits distributed through housing markets).
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were synonymous with that term as it has been understood and applied to white
families ignores the distinctive role race plays in defining economic position.'
Moreover, given the fact that a large percentage ofthe black population contin-
ues to comprise the poor and working poor, it should be remembered that
middle-class status - even precariously balanced middle-class status - eludes
many African Americans.8
Indeed, the reality of life for blacks and whites continues to be marked
by sharply disparate socioeconomic indicators, suggesting that life-conditions
for blacks and whites are worlds apart. In income, wealth, health, and life
expectancy, the opportunities for most blacks is far below those of whites.89
Thus, what blacks can expect from life in the United States is vastly different
from what most whites can expect.' In many urban areas, nearly one-third of
young black men are likely to live under the supervision ofthe criminal justice
system.91 Similarly, the conditions that exist within black communities are
often quite different from those in white communities. For example, black
communities - regardless of the income of their residents - are significantly
more likely than white communities to be located near an environmentally
hazardous industrial facility. 2 Blacks also continue to feel the effects of overt
87. WLLTAMS, supra note 22, at 56 (arguing that "race often defines class in the American
context. There is no lower class than being black").
88. SeeJonathanD.GlaterBlackandWhiteBecomeGrayAreas inLoanStudy; ToCrities,
"CulturalAffinity" Is Code for "Bias," WAsiL POST, July 18, 1995, at DI. Despite the clear
economic upward mobility experienced by many blacks since the Civil Rights movement, the size
and stability of the black middle class should be kept in proper context Despite a dramatic
increase in the size of the African American middle class in the last 20 years, AfricanAmericans
and whites continue to be characterized in general by a broad socioeconomic gap. For example
in 1993, only 9% of whites lived below the federal poverty level, while 31% ofAfricans Ameri-
cans lived below the poverty level In 1994, only 12.9% of African Americans had attained a
bachelor's degree or more advanced degree, as compared to 22.9% of whites. While a majority
of whites in the U.S. own their own homes, only 42.5% of African Americans are homeowners.
Whites continue to earn 60% more thanAfricanAmericans. The average white family's income
has increased 9% since 1969, while that ofAfrican Americans has remained stagnant Id.
89. See Earl Lane, U.S. Life Expectancy HitsAll-Time High/Gap Between Whites, Blacks
Narrows, NEWSDAY, July 30,1998, atA24 (reporting that mortality rate for black infants is twice
that of'white infants); Ramon G. McLeod,Black Couples 'Income Closing Gap with Whites, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept 25, 1992, at Al (citing statistics showing that blacks generally do not
earn as much as whites even when working same jobs and exhibiting same levels of education);
Marilyn Milloy, Grim Forecast on Health-Care Reform, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1993, at 17 (noting
that 22.4 percent of blacks are uninsured compared to 14.7 percent of blacks).
90. For a disturbing and compelling account of the unequal educational opportunities
available to black inner-city children as compared to white suburban children, see generally
JONATHANKOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUAUfTIES: CHILDRENINAMERICA'S SCHooLS (1991).
91. See MARC MABR?,RACETO INCARCERATE 118 (1999) (asserting that race, crime, and
criminal justice system are "inextricably linked").
92. See COMMISSIONFORRAcIALJUSTIcE,UNrrED CHURCH OF CHRT, Toxic WASTES
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racial discrimination in housing opportunities,'m mortgage lending,94 access to
employment, 95 treatment in the criminal justice system,96 and educational
opportunities. Almost all economic indicators reveal wide disparities be-
tween the economic conditions of similarly situated blacks and whites.9'
The persistence of residential racial segregation plays a key role in the
perpetuation of the distinct social, cultural, and political orientation of blacks
and whites. Despite the elimination of legal barriers to residential segrega-
tion, blacks and whites continue to live in racially homogenous communities.
Practices such as racial steering and redlining' ensure that segregation exists
within middle-class suburbs as well as in the inner-city.l"e Segregation
ensures that blacks and whites rarely interact in ways that might transform
firmly-held racialized perspectives or views.''
ANDRAcEINTEUNITED STATES: ANATIONAL REPORT ONTBERACIALAND SOCIO-ECONOMIc
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNTEs wrT HAzARDOus WASTE SITEs 13 (1987) (reporting that
percentage of minority ethnic groups in community was stronger predictor of level of hazardous
waste activity in community than household income).
93. See Alan J. Hearns, Pervasive Discrimination an Ugly Foe of Community, BALTI-
MORE SUN, Jan. 3, 1999, at SM (stating that housing discrimination exists in real estate indus-
try).
94. See Glater, supra note 88 (remarking that lenders are twice as likely to deny credit for
home loans to African-American applicants as to white applicants); Mitchell Zuckoff, Bias
Inquiry Seen Focusing on 36Banks, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 1993, at 8.
95. See Margaret L. Usdansky, College Doesn't Close Blacks' Pay Gap, USA TODAY,
Sept. 16, 1993, at 3A (reporting that gap in pay between college-educated blacks and whites
results from blacks working in lower paying occupations).
96. See Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffc Stops, supra note 6, at 427-32 (1997) (discussing
discretionary naturb of pretextual stops and their discriminatory effect on African-Americans
and Latinos).
97. See Tamara HenryMinorityAcademic ProgressFalters, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 1996,
at 1D (stating that blacks lag behind whites in academics because blacks have less access to
good instructors and adequate educational resources); Greg Stanford, Narrowing the Education
Gap, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept 7, 1996, at 10 (reporting that blacks and whites now have
equal high school graduation rates but gap remains in education quality).
98. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 91 (concluding that "in stark, material
terms... whites and blacks constitute two nations").
99. See Jane McGrew et al., Fair Housing: An Agenda for Washington Lawyer's Com-
mittee for CivilRights, 27 How. L.J. 1291, 1304-06 (1984) (discussing redlining and refusal
of lenders to invest in minority communities).
100. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir. 1988)
(addressing housing experts' testimony about white flight and "tipping" phenomena). More-
over, "white flight" from inner cities and neighborhoods where black presence has reached a
"tipping point" demonstrates the propensity of many whites to resist actively residential integra-
tion. See WLIAMS, supra note22, at 40.
101. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 62, at 165-82 (discussing differences between
white and black cultures). Residential segregation has even more serious consequences for
African Americans. Because of the connections among spatial location, high property values
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Geographic segregation tells only part ofthe picture. The chasm between
blacks and whites is often wider than the physical distance that separates
segregated communities. Although black and white communities may be
physically separated by only a railroad track or a river, the breadth of the
racial divide in values, interests, and perspectives is often wide and deep."°
Even when racially integrated experiences occur, they are often brief, dynamic
experiences lacking in complex or consistent interaction across racial lines."03
Blacks and whites move within their own racial communities, experiencing
only brief, compelled forays into integrated environments. Blacks continue
to work and play in "a 'black' social milieu," while studies show that whites
are the least likely to engage in social experiences outside their own racial
group.
10 4
C. Judges as Racially Situated Actors
Judges are no more immune to the community experiences that help
shape racial views, perspective, and values than are other members of society.
As Judge Cardozo reminded us, "The great tides and currents which engulf the
rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judge by."'05 The
and access to good schools and municipal services, racial segregation in housing keeps blacks -
even middle-class blacks - from access to the social and economic benefits associated with
upward mobility. Id. at 149-53.
102. See, e.g., ALEx KOTLOWriz, THE OTHER SIDE OF TBE RjVER: A STORY OF TWo
TOWNS, A DEATH, AND AMERICA'S DILEMMA (1998) (chronicling story of twin cities - one
predominantly white and one predominantly black).
103. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46, 49-51 (1991) (describing refusal of two white
women to board elevator in "luxury condominium" with "five well-dressed Black women in
their thirties and forties"). See generally Isabel Wilkerson, Study Finds Segregation in Cities
Worse Than Scientists Imagined, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1989, at Al (reporting findings that 10
Northeastern and Midwestern cities evidenced more segregation than researchers expected).
104. Melvin L. Oliver, The Urban Black Community as Network- Toward a Social
NetworkPerspective, 29 Soc. Q. 625, 642 (1988). African Americans and whites also continue
to show sharply different interests in television viewing, reading, and other forms of entertain-
ment See Jervis Anderson, Black and Blue, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996, at 64
(reporting survey showing African Americans most frequently read Ebony, Jet, and Essence
magazines among periodicals); John Carmody, The TVColumn, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at
D4 (comparing top-rated television shows in black and white households); Richard Huff, DAILY
NEWS, May 2, 1996, at 8; Jon Jeter, Alarm over TV Time Highlights Viewing Habits ofBlack
Children, WASH. POST, June 23, 1996, at A8 (stating that black children watch television at
three times rate of their white counterparts); Kevin Sack, Gore Denounces Gap in Access to
Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at A18 (reporting that "digital divide" has left African
Americans with unequal access to computers and Internet); see also THE BLACKBOARD;
AFRICAN AMERICAN BEST SELLERS INC. (booklist publishing best selling books at black-owned/
black-operated bookstores in popular black magazines such as Essence and Emerge).
105. CAMDOZO, supra note 15, at 168.
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mere act of ascending the bench does not strip a judge of his or her preexisting
values and deeply imbedded cultural responses."° Instead, judges are "situ-
ated actors"" who like other members of society see the world through the
lens of their own knowledge and experiences. Yet, a judge can declare his
intention to "strip down, like a runner,"' 8 without provoking serious questions
as to how he might undertake this enormously complicated task" or whether
such a dramatic act is even necessary." °
In fact, because perception is a critical part of the judicial function,
judges cannot simply jettison the experiences and knowledge that under-
gird their "sense of justice.""' The public expects judges to rely upon their
knowledge, experience, and "sense of justice" to interpret statutes, to decide
on the constitutionality of state conduct," 2 to evaluate the credibility of wit-
106. Judge Jerome Frank once observed that "[m]uch harm is done by the myth that,
merely by putting on a black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be
human and strips himself of all predilections, and becomes a passionless thinking machine."
In re J.P. Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (citations omitted). Instead, judges
decide cases within the context of their own views of the world and of the law's role in ordering
society.
107. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can JudgesAvoidSerious
MoralError?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1956-57 (1991) (arguing thatjudges, like all of us, exist
within "constructed reality").
108. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to BeAssociate Justice on the Supreme Court
of the United States, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1:203 (1993) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings]. Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas offered this assurance to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in response to questions about how his conservative views would
affect his judging. See id.
109. See generally GORDON W. AI ORT, THE NATUlE OF PREUDICE (1979) (suggesting
that mentally "stripping down" is extremely difficult task that must be undertaken deliberately
and forcefully in order to be successful). This is particularly true because most biases are
subconscious. See Charles R. Lawrence, I, TheId, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987) (arguing that most biases are
subconscious).
110. See Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking andActing- Part I -
Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIz. L. RLrV. 539, 541-42 (1994)
(stating that "[n]o one would expect that Ruth Bader Ginsberg would ignore what she has learned
about discrimination against women - both in her personal experience and as an advocate for
other women."). As Judge Jerome Frank remarked: "An 'open mind,' in the sense of a mind
containing no preconceptions whatever, would be a mind incapable of learning anything, would
be that of an utterly emotionless human being, corresponding roughly to the psychiatrist's
descriptions ofthe feeble-minded." In re J.P. Linahan, 138 F.2d at 652 (citations omitted).
111. See CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 167-69 (relating difficulties in throwing off preju-
dices).
112. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Clarence Thomas, N.Y. REv. oF BOOKS, Nov. 7,
1991, at 41, 43 (stating that "any particular [Supreme Court] Justice's [constitutional] interpre-
tation will be dominated by his convictions about what an ideal democracy would be like"); see
also MORTON HORWrrZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JusTicE 29 (1998)
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nesses,13 to determine whether to convict and sentence a criminal defendant,
1 1 4
to consider whether to impose the death penalty, 5 to choose which of two
divorcing parents should receive custody of a child," 6 or to conclude whether
ajury award is excessive and should be reduced."' In essence, a judge must
draw on his "conception of social needs'"'" in making judicial decisions.
("[C]onstitutional principles, like all legal principles, are inevitably created by judges in
accordance with their conceptions of moral values and social needs.").
113. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing appellate court's deference to
trial judge's assessment of witness's credibility).
114. In several states, judges may hear criminal cases without ajury. See, e.g.,N.Y. CPIM.
PROC. LAW 340.40 (McKinney 1994) (permitting criminal defendants to waive right to jury
trial); TEx. CIM. P.CODEANN. § 1.14 (West 1997) (same). For example, thejustice system has
long accepted that sentencing "is the routine work ofjudges." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
476 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even mandatory sentencing
laws have not entirely removed sentencing discretion from trial judges. State courts issue most
criminal convictions, and generally federal mandatory sentencing guidelines do not apply. While
many states also have mandatory guidelines, judges still maintain sentencing discretion for most
criminal cases and have limited discretion even in mandatory sentencing cases.
115. Colorado, Nebraska, and Arizona are among a group of states that require judges rather
than jurors to decide whether to impose death sentences. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(3)
(2000) (requiring judge to hold separate sentencing hearing to determine whether to impose
death penalty); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103 (Supp. 1996) (mandating that three-judge panel
conduct hearing on imposition of death penalty or life sentence); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522
(1995) (requiring judge or judges to impose life sentence or death penalty). In Colorado,
supporters of legislation giving judges sentencing discretion apparently anticipated that judges
would more readily impose the death penalty than Colorado juries, who return death sentences
in only a fraction of cases in which prosecutors seek capital punishment Supporters ofjudicial
panels for capital sentencing argued that lone "hold-out" jurors were subverting the will of the
majority of Coloradans, who reportedly supported the death penalty. See Ginny McKibben,
Death-P enal4' Panel MayDelay Justice, More Judges WouldBe Tied Up, LegalObserversSay,
DENv. POST, May 21, 1995, at CI (weighing arguments over giving panel of judges power to
impose death sentence).
116. See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Fed-
eral Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682,1747-51 (1991) (describing federal court abstention from
"domestic disputes"). State courts enjoy almost exclusive jurisdiction over family law disputes.
Thirty-eight states utilize laws that require minors seeking abortion without parental consent to
obtain permission from a local judge. See CENTER FOR REPROD. L. & POL., REPRODUCTIvE
FREEDOMIN THE STATS: RESTICIONS ONYOUNGWOMEN' SACcESS TOABORTION SERVICEs
(1996).
117. See Henley v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 995172 (Sup. Ct Cal., S.F. County, Apr. 6,
1999) (Munter, J.) (reducing by half $50 million jury verdict award againsttobacco company for
addiction and smoking-related lung cancer of individual). For a more comprehensive examina-
tion ofjudicial exercise and abuse ofjudicial power in reducing jury verdicts, see generally Eric
Schnapper, JudgesAgainstJuries-Appellate Review ofFederal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis.
L. REv. 237 (arguing that appellate courts act as super-jurors and subvert Seventh Amendment
by reversing or reducing jury awards in majority of cases in which plaintiffi prevail).
118. CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 12.
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Although it is clear that a judge's values and perceptions influence judi-
cial decision-making and that race influences values and perceptions, observ-
ers have focused little attention on the likelihood that racial homogeneity on
the bench may limit the depth and scope ofjudicial decision-making. Instead,
racially homogenous courts at the both the federal and state level remain the
norm in the United States, even in jurisdictions with large minority popula-
tions."' Unfortunately, nothing inherent in legal training or practice dimin-
ishes the force of racial perspectives or trains judges to identify and engage
alternative perspectives. Thejudicial system neither requires judges to engage
in any formal training as a prerequisite to serving as a judge nor does it
routinely instruct sitting judges in how to identify and examine their racial,
gender, or class "situated-ness."120
Judges, like all lawyers, carry the same "cultural baggage" as other
members of society."' A recent American Bar Association/National Bar
119. Compare AMmcAN BAR Ass'N JUD. Div. TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE
JUDICIARY, THE DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES IN THE UNiTED STATES (1997) (listing all
African American federal and state court judges in United States) with NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE CTS., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTCS 95-96 (1996) (listing total number of state
trial court judges of general and limited jurisdiction).
120. In most jurisdictions, the formal training offered to most new judges merely consists
of familiarizing the new judge with the administrative tasks of their new formal offices. For
example, a recent workshop for judges on the Fourth Circuit focused primarily on updates in
areas of federal law such as ERISA, the Commerce Clause, and environmental law (unpublished
workshop manual on file with author). See generally ORIENTATION SEMINAR FOR NEWLY
APPOINTED DISTRICT JUDGES, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Oct 1994). Ofcoursejudges may
participate voluntarily in training that focuses on cultural biases and diversity at conferences
held by specialized judicial groups or other private law groups concerned with judicial decision-
making. Several of these programs are impressive in their approach and rigor. The Foundations
in Pluralism Project, conducted by the Alabama Judicial College, for example, immerses judges
in the study of literature by black authors to give judges a sense of differing racial realities. See
Terry Carter, DiMded Justice, A.BA. J., Feb. 1999, at 45 (describing judicial education
programs focusing on racial bias). The National Association of Women Judges also provides
an array of programs aimed at promoting judicial education about gender issues.
Even if such training were mandatory (and it should be), it is highly unlikely that any
adult can entirely and consistently "strip down" and divest him or herself of culturally rooted
perspectives. Other noted scholars in this field share my skepticism. See, e.g., Judith Resnick,
On the Bias: FeministReconsideration oftheAspirationsfor Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1877,1943 (1988) (stating that impartiality is impossible); Lawrence, supra note 109, at322-23
(noting that most biases are subconsciousness). Justice Cardozo concluded that "[n]o effort or
revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of... [a judge's]
subconscious loyalties." CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 175. At best, we should train judges to
recognize and to acknowledge their stance and should require them affirmatively to consider
and to engage alternative perspectives in their judicial decision-making.
121. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The MissingElements in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 377 (1997) (arguing that failure of
most clinical practitioners and scholars explicitly to identify and address value differences
RACLAL DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
Association poll showed sharply different responses among black and white
lawyers to questions about the existence of racism in the justice system 22 For
example, 45% of white lawyers believe that less racial bias exists inthe justice
system than in the rest of society, while more than 90% of black lawyers feel
that racism in the justice system is either the same as or greater than in other
segments of society.1" Black and white lawyers also differ in their responses
to the propriety of criminal procedures that have a different racial impact.
While only 17.8% of black lawyers favor the police use of suspect profiles to
combat crime, 48.6% of white lawyers support the use ofprofiles' 24 Although
a majority of both black and white lawyers believe that race should not be a
factor in police profiling, 91.2% of black lawyers disfavor racial profiling, as
compared to 67.9% of whites." These responses are consistent with the
findings of many state bias commissions, whose studies reveal that black and
white lawyers see and interact in the legal profession quite differently. These
studies also suggest that the shared process of legal training among black and
white lawyers does little to eliminate or close the gap between the perspectives
and values of blacks and whites. Indeed, black and white law students often
experience legal education differently. 26
among white clinical law professors, their students, and the black clients they represent can
undermine effectiveness of clinic's legal services and representation).
122. See Carter, supra note 120, at 42-43 (polling 1,002 lawyers on racial bias in judicial
system).
123. Id. In one of the most telling contradictions in the ABAINBA study, an overwhelm-
ing majority of white lawyers polled stated that they did not believe that a great deal of racial
bias exists in the justice system, and more than 80% of white lawyers claimed they had not
witnessed racial bias in the justice system in the past three years. However, 80.7% of these
same white lawyers hoped that the justice system would be able to eliminate racial bias in the
future. One wonders how racism in the justice system could be eliminated when most white
lawyers claim not to see it.
124. See John Gibeaut,MarkedforHumiliaion,A.BA J., Feb. 1999, at49 (polling white
and black lawyers about racial profiling).
125. Id.
126. See generally Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BEIKELEYWOMEN's
L.. 93 (1990-91) (relating author's experience as black, female law student); Paula Lustbader,
Teach in Context: Responding toDiverse Student VoicesHelpsAllStudentsLearn, 48 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 402 (1998) (recognizing need for professors to acknowledge students' differing realities
in order to educate entire classes). Minority and women law students often find law school
norms alienating. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 17 (addressing problems that minorities face
in legal classrooms); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
PoLirIcs OF THE LAW: APRoGr sIvE CRrIQUE 40, 56-57 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (discussing
law school curricula and non-curricular activities "that train students to accept and participate
in the hierarchical structure of life in the law"). Professor Crenshaw explained "that what is
understood as objective or neutral is often the embodiment of a white middle-class world view"
Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 3. As a result, in law school "when the discussion involves racial
minorities, minority students are expected to stand apart from their history, their identity, and
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Racial segregation continues to flourish in the legal profession. The
American Bar Association reported that "the distribution of minority lawyers
remains substantially different from that of whites:" African American
lawyers are more likely to enter government or public interest work, while
white attorneys are more likely to enter private practice." Racial minorities
continue to comprise a minute fraction of partners and associates at the na-
tion's elite law firms - the very firms from which many federal judges tradi-
tionally have been selected." Racial minorities comprise only 3.5% of
tenured law professors."
Given these levels of racial segregation in the legal profession, most
judges are likely to have practiced law in a racially segregated environment.
Unless they serve on a racially diverse bench, most judges will continue to
live and work in a racially segregated world.130 As products of their legal
training and experience judges, therefore, may be as deeply entrenched in
their racialized perspectives as nonlawyers.1' For example, one recent survey
of federal judges reflected the same disparities in perception among white and
black judges that exists among white and black lawyers. In that study, 83%
of white judges surveyed believe that black litigants are treated fairly in the
justice system, while only 18% of black judges share that belief.32 This
means that judges are as deeply racially divided as lawyers and average
citizens about the role the judicial system plays in perpetuating racial inequity.
In sum, judges are as racially "situated" as everyone else in society.
sometimes their own immediate circumstances and discuss issues without making reference to
the reality that the 'they' or 'them' being discussed is from their perspective 'we' or 'us."'
Kennedy, supra, at 56-57.
127. See Executive Sunmary, in MILES TO GO, supra note 3, at vi.
128. The firms in the study were the top-paying law firms in Chicago, Los Angeles, New
York and Washington, D.C. Id. at n.48. In 1990, African Americans constituted 0.8% of
partners and 2.6% of associates at the nation's "elite firms." Id. at 5. By 1996,1.2% of partners
at the nation's largest 250 law firms were African American and 3.7% of associates at those
firms were black. Id. African Americans at these firms report "that they are isolated from
internal social networks for developing majority business" and lack access to clients. Id. at vi.
129. Id. at 12. Asian Americans make up only 1% of all law faculty. Id. Minority law
professors have a remarkably higher attrition rate than white professors. Id. at 11.
130. See Tony Mauro, Court Faulted on Diversiy, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 12A
(discussing lack of black clerks at Supreme Court); see also WULIAMS, supra note 46, at 278
(pointing to Alice Stovall as first black secretary in Second Circuit).
131. Jerome Frank insisted that the influence of "uniformity in legal education and in the
professional experience of lawyers who become judges "does not "penetrate deep enough" to
get at the "sub-threshold biases and predilections" ofjudges. JERoME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND xxiii (1949).
132. KEVINL. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERALDISTRICT COURTS INTHEPOLITCAL
PROCESS 21,237 (1997).
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The fact that most judges share middle-class status does not significantly
alter their racially situated stance. Middle-class status for black judges is
often just as precarious as that of most middle-class blacks.133 Whatever their
current economic status black judges tend overwhelmingly to have grown up
in financially impoverished families or families of modest financial means.'
Even when black judges identify their family background as middle-class,
their self-identification often reflects a more complex sense of class than
traditional class designations may impart. In one study, for example, black
judges who were surveyed often described their background as middle class
because their parents emphasized hard work and education. Yet the actual
economic status of the judges' families corresponded more accurately with
lower or working economic status. 35
Most important, middle-class or even upper-class status appears not to
insulate black judges from overt displays of discrimination and racism.136 As
Justice Marshall said in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
"[R]acism in our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth
or position, has managed to escape its impact. 137 Because combating racism
continues to be a unifying experience among blacks without regard to class,
geography, or ideology, the existence of racism itself tends to keep many
blacks close to shared values and traditions that relate explicitly to race. As
Professor Angela Harris has argued, '"hat well-to-do as well as poor black
people are unable to catch taxis at night, are stopped by the police, and suffer
133. Like Thurgood Marshall before him, Justice Clarence Thomas remains the Supreme
Court Justice with the least accumulated wealth. See Marshall's Salary Continues for Life,
ATLANTA CONST., June 28,1991, atA7 (stating that continuing salary and benefits are important
to retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall, Court's poorest justice). Compare Tony Mauro, Two High
Court Justices Top $1Million Benchmark, USA TODAY, May 17,1990, at 2A (estimating Justice
Marshall's net worth between S50K and $100K and pointing to savings account as only asset
other than home) with Tony Mauro, If Confirmed, Hell Be Richest Justice, USA TODAY, July
12, 1994, at 6A (listing Clarence Thomas, with net worth of approximately $275K, as least
wealthy of current Justices). This wealth disparity remains true despite the fact that Marshall and
Thomas took very different career paths to the Court. Justice Marshall served as counsel at the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund for nearly 30 years before his appointment as Solicitor General and
then to the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals. Justice Thomas worked in the congressional office
of Senator John Danforth (R-MO) and as head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion before accepting appointment to the Court ofAppeals for the District of Columbia.
134. See MICHAEL DAVID SMrm, RACE VERSus ROBE: THEDILEMMAOFBLACKJUDGES
33 (1983) (discussing social backgrounds of black judges).
135. Id. at 34.
136. As one black judge who was surveyed in the early 1980s said, "Black folks are gener-
ally discriminated against, and it's no different for judges." BRUCE WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES,
Wmrn JusICE 84 (1987).
137. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (978) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
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from random racist violence has contributed to a sense of solidarity among all
black people, based on the sense that color prejudice serves as a brutal leveler,
erasing distinctions of class and status." '
Black judges, despite their elevated professional status, live within this
reality. For example, in a widely reported incident in 1993, police publicly
handcuffed and arrested a fifty-three year-old African American judge in a
Newark, New Jersey department store at an upscale shopping mall. 39 The
police claimed that they detained the judge on suspicion of using a stolen
credit card. Despite the judge's protestations of innocence and production of
identification, police took him into custody and chained him to a wall in the
police station. They did not release him until store clerks convinced the
police that the judge bore no resemblance to the young suspect sought.
Several weeks after the incident the judge remarked that "until all persons of
color are looked upon with respect, none of us are going to be. And it doesn't
matter whether you're a lawyer or a judge or a prosecutor."
1 40
In this sense, middle-class, African American judges often maintain a
critical and rich experiential tie with average African Americans - the reality
of unequal treatment. Perhaps in part because ofthe precarious nature oftheir
middle-class status, black judges often retain strong ties to their communi-
ties. 4 ' This connection often continues to exist even when black judges no
longer physically reside in majority black communities.
Moreover, anecdotal accounts demonstrate that black judges have unique
and distinctive experiences as blackjudges 42 Litigants, colleagues, and the
media often challenge black judges in ways that are distinct from the chal-
lenges facing their white colleagues. In effect, it is evident that race shapes
the experiences of black judges on the bench.
138. Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. HarrisAflerward Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit
Theory and the StickyMess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585,1601 (1997).
139. See David Margoick,At the Bar, N.Y. TIMs, Jan. 7,1994, atA23 (describing events
surrounding Judge Claude Coleman's arrest on suspicion of using stolen credit card).
140. Id.
141. See Interview with Judge Veronica McBeth in BLAcK JUDGEs oN JUSTCE, supra note
2, at 44 (stating: "there's one thing about Blackjudges, no matter how far we've moved up the
ladder of success, and no matter where we may live now, we always go back at some point to
the Black Community.... We go there for church or our mother lives there, so we never sever
our roots."); see also Harlon Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 435,439-
40 (1987) (describing "unshakeable sense of community" that lives within African Americans).
But see WILLIAMs, supra note 46, at 303-04 (describing Justice Marshall's increasing distance
from more radicalized posture of blacks in 1960s).
142. For some biographical and autobiographical accounts of the experiences of black
judges, see generally BLACK JLDGES ON JUSlICE, supra note 2; CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY,
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1998); WAIIAMS, supra note 46; and
WRIGHT, supra note 136.
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D. Racial Narratives and Legal Decision-Making
The starkly different viewpoints and experiences of African Americans
and whites "are not just different points of view; they produce different
realities; different worlds." '143 As a result, differences in public opinion among
blacks and whites should not be perceived merely as personally-held view-
points. They reflect the powerful influence of different cultural "narratives"
that describe the social and political reality for black and white communities.
These cultural narratives are "the stories that are familiar in our culture; stories
about how things happen and how things are. 144 Stories or "narratives" may
function as truths for a community and may permeate all aspects of a commu-
nity's interpreted reality. 45 Cultural narratives also contain the accumulated
historical account of that community's relationship to other communities and
express the community's values. As expressions of community values, cul-
tural narratives can neither be ignored nor dismissed. Narratives function at
a deep psychological level. They are the cultural equivalent of the schemata,
which help us process what we see.146 Both African Americans and whites are
exposed to "stories" that help us interpret racial stimuli. 47
Describing legal, social, and political rules as "narrative" is a highly pro-
vocative and potentially disruptive act - one that critical race scholars have
undertaken with vigor and precision. 4 " Their work demonstrates that rules,
143. Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 1957, 1957 (1988).
144. See Peggy Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 REc. ASS'N B. CrrY N.Y. 7, 11 n.15
[hereinafter Davis, Proverbial Woman]; see also Aleinikoff supra note 22, at 1085. A society
as deeply divided along racial lines as our own should view cultural stories, often called
"narratives," with some suspicion. See Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 1085. Aleinikoff cautioned
that "[e]very group will have reasons for constructing narratives that reflect well on it and
poorly on its perceived oppressors." Id. Narratives can be transformed into "prejudice," for
example, when we refuse to modify or reject preconceived ideas even in the face of contrary
information or logic. See Peggy C. Davis, Law asMicroaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559,1568-
71 (1989) [hereinafter Davis, Law as Microaggression] (recounting black juror's experience
of white jurors ignoring his expertise when assessing guilt of defendant); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH- L. REV. 1611, 1628 (1985) (describing willing-
ness of white jurors to convict black defendants).
145. Cultural narratives also contain the accumulated historical account of that commu-
nity's relationship to other communities and express the community's values. As expressions
of community values, cultural narratives can be neither ignored nor dismissed.
146. Schemata are the categories our minds develop to help us process the millions of stim-
uli we confront each day. Rather than consciously perceiving each piece of stimuli we confront,
the brain develops schemata that "allow us to structure and give coherence to our general
knowledge about people and the social world, providing expectations about typical patterns of
events and behavior." Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1,10 (1994).
147. See generally Davis, Proverbial Woman, supra note 144. Cf generally Davis, Law
as Microaggression, supra note 144.
148. See generally CRMIICAL RACE THEORY: THE CurTENGEDGE (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995) (compiling work of critical race scholars).
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values, and norms thought of as stable truth are merely accounts driven by the
perspective of the group empowered to impose its rules on the larger society.
Critical race theorists, along with critical feminist and the critical legal studies
movement before them, have unmasked the role of narratives in shaping law
and legal analysis. 4 9 Critical feminist writers and critical race theorists, in
particular, have shown how racial and gender narratives undergird legal doc-
trine. Often masquerading as "neutral principles," racial and gender narratives
have informed and shaped the construction and interpretation of legal princi-
ples such as merit, 5° discrimination,' colorblindness,5 2 property, parental
autonomy,5 3 individual rights,"s and reasonableness.'
Alternative racial narratives reveal different and important ways of re-
conceiving those same principles. The introduction of outsider "narratives"
into legal, political and social rule-making undermines the force of dominant
group narratives by suggesting alternative visions of reality. Competing
cultural narratives have been described as "master narratives" and "counter-
narratives."' 56 Master narratives dominate the public consciousness to such an
149. For some examples of critical feminist scholarship in this regard, see generally
CAT-ERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); DEBoRAHL. RHODE, JUSTICE &
GENDER: SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); and Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHL L. REV. 1 (1988). The work of scholars in the critical legal studies move-
ment has influenced much of the work of critical feminist writers and critical race scholars. For
an overview of critical legal studies, see generally POLrIcS OF THE LAW, supra note 126; and
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
150. See Delgado, supra note 28, at 2418-22 (examining use of "merit" in denial of hiring
of black law professor as shield or pretense for discrimination); Harris, supra note 60, at 1771
(stating that "merit is a constructed idea, not an objective fact").
151. See Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School. A Reply to Farber and Sheny,
46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 671 (identifying majoritarian stories such as "without intent, there is no
discrimination"); Flagg, supra note 64, at 981-85 (discussing unconscious race discrimination);
see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993) (challenging voter reapportionment plan as
discriminatory effort to segregate voters on basis of race).
152. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 22, at 2 (arguing that "Supreme Court's use of color-
blind constitutionalism... fosters white racial domination"); see also Aleinikoff, supra note
22, at 1060.
153. See generally DAVIS, supra note 6 (arguing that way in which law has historically
impacted black families provides opportunity to re-examine basic tenets of family law).
154. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 60, at 1761 (describing how interpretation of constitu-
tional law subordinates racial groups by denying history and refusing to recognize "group"
rights); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICM. L. REV. 1971, 1982-90 (1990) (analyzing
Supreme Court's majoritarian political function).
155. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussing Doe v. Linder Construc-
ion, Inc., 845 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. 1992)). The imposition of dominant values subordinates
groups in ways that are not explicitly racial or gendered as well. See generally JAMES B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND AS SUMPTIONS INAmERICANLABORLAW (1983) (exploring how cultural
values of employers rather than workers shape labor decisions).
156. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the CulturalPerformance: Native Hawai-
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extent that they assume a kind of super-legitimacy.15 7 They are transformed
from stories to truth. The dominant group often describes an outsider group's
counter-narrative, which may conflict with or question that "truth," as "nar-
row," "biased," or "special interest," 55 and rarely accords the counter-narrative
the kind of legitimacy it reserves for dominant group master narratives.159
Society builds the values embodied in our laws, for example, upon a set
of accepted and legitimized narratives. Indeed the law is one of the principal
means of effectively managing the imposition of dominant narratives."6 In
general, the dominant community's narratives form the basis of our approach
to legal doctrine, theory, and practice."' When white men were the only
group permitted to offer and legitimate narratives in the legal process,162
master narratives could function virtuallyundisturbed as unassailable truths.163
But since the abolition of legal barriers to the participation of women and
racial minorities as witnesses, litigants, jurors, lawyers, law teachers, scholars,
ians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1994).
According to the authors, master narratives provide "a principal lense through which group-
ings of people in a community see and interpret events and actions." Id. at 21. A counter-
narrative "challenges those assumptions and the vantage point from which they are made." Id.
at 22.
157. See Delgado, supra note 151, at 670-71 (claiming that "[m]ajoritarians tell stories...
with the conviction that they are not stories at all, but the truth").
158. Id.
159. Indeed, by their very nature, "outgoing" narratives "subvert... ingroup reality."
Delgado, supra note 28, at 2413.
160. SeeRICHARDPOSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE129 n.8 (1990) (observing
that "the official norms are prescribed by the top of the hierarchy ... [a]nd it is the official
norms that courts enforce").
161. See Delgado, supra note 151, at 674 ("All the general rules, presumptions and inter-
pretations reflect [empowered groups] and their understandings.").
162. See generally Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (granting African Americans
right to attend state law schools); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (securing right
of African Americans to serve on juries); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (granting
women right to practice law); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 339 (1854) (barring Chinese from testify-
ing against Caucasians in court).
163. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29,43 (1987) ("[F]eminism has asked
us to question every thing as we recognize that what we know has largely been imposed on us
as 'truth' by a particular class of truth creators and interpreters."). The efforts of women, racial
minorities, and other "outsider" groups to introduce their "narratives" into the administration
ofjustice are exemplified in far more cases than this article can cite. For a discussion of such
cases, see generally MARYFRANcEs BERRY, THE PIGFARMER'SDAUGtRI AND On:IERTALES
OFAMEmCANJUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM INTHE COURTS FROM 1865 TO THE
PRESENT (1999); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities andDifferences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1990); andA. Leon I-igginbotham, Jr. et
al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit
for Racial Justice, 1990 JLL. L. REV. 763.
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and judges, sharply different counter-narratives have come into competition
with long-accepted master narratives. 1"
In a multi-cultural jurisdiction, competing cultural narratives battle for
legitimacy in the places where cross-cultural interactions occur. The court-
house is one of these places, and litigation often involves a battle between
master narratives and counter-narratives.165 Legal decision-makers play a key
role in legitimizing narratives. Whether jurors or judges, they "interpret the
meaning of social phenomenon," in effect constructing and defining societal
norms.166 We charge judges like other legal decision-makers with deciding
which reality to legitimate within the context of a particular dispute. 67 By
legitimating one story over another, legal decision-makers do more than
simply resolve disputes. They convey messages to the public that signal
which values are worthy of receiving the law's imprimatur."
A fair and effective system of legal decision-making ultimately must
reconcile competing narratives. This means that the project of diversity on the
bench should not focus on attempting to prove the accuracy of one set of
narratives as compared with another. All narratives must be viewed with some
skepticism.1 69  By ensuring that competing narratives interact in legal
decision-making, however, we decrease the opportunity for bias and for one
set of narratives to dominate judicial decision-making.
164. See POSNER, supra note 160, at 128 (citing increased diversity in legal profession
since the 1950s as one of the causes "of the decline of consensus in our law"); see also Beverly
J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at the Law of Rape,
100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 857 (1996) (crediting increasing numbers of women in legal profession
for achieving needed reforms in law of rape). Richard Delgado described how Justice Marshall,
in his dissent in Citv ofMemphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), provided a counter-narrative
to the majority's perspective to explain how a black community might perceive the significance
of the City's erection of a traffic barrier between a wealthy white neighborhood and a black
neighborhood. Delgado, supra note 28, at 2425 n.42.
165. See BERRY, supra note 163, at 6 ("Courts are a theatrical venue where disparate
stories interact"); Yamamoto et al., supra note 156, at 17 (citing Gerald Torres, Translating
Yannondio byPrecedentandEvidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKEL.J. 625,628).
Torres described the courthouse as a place "where most of the activities making up social life
within... society simultaneously are represented, contested, and inverted." lad
166. Lawrence, supra note 109, at 359.
167. See League of United Latin American Citizens Council v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
631 (5th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter LULAC 11], rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991) (describing judges as "the referees in our majoritarian
political game"); infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text (discussing LULAC).
168. See Phoebe Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BIL RTS. J. 29, 60-61
(1994) (describing adjudication as "defining public values").
169. See Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 1085 (cautioning that groups create narratives that
are favorable to themselves). Outsider narratives can perpetuate responses to majority group
oppression that are themselves oppressive. See MACKINNON, supra note 149; West, supra note
149.
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The persistent exclusion and de-legitimation of one community's values
from consideration and recognition in legal decision-making carries grave
consequences for multiracial communities. First, and most obviously, it under-
mines the ability of communities whose reality is best described by counter-
narratives to be authentic participants inthe administration ofjustice. Instead,
either minority communities must reject their own values, as well as the
history, experience, and wisdom that often creates these values, or such com-
munities must accept-their role as outsiders - irrelevant to a system that is self-
legitimating. Both of these scenarios contemplate preserving the subordinate
status of African Americans in our justice system. 7°
More importantly, by persistently minimizing the values held by the
African American community, the justice system loses the participation of that
community in upholding the societal structures that support even those values
and community institutions shared by African Americans and whites.' Once
the minority community perceives that the larger community is "callous" to
the values it holds, that community loses its incentive to look for commonality
or shared values with the larger community.'72 For the minority community,
the result is an increasing reluctance to rely on existing legal structures to
resolve disputes and to vindicate rights." Instead, excluded communities
increasingly will seek alternative means to impose value-recognition on the
larger society."7 " Likewise, the white community is also damaged when it
170. Aleinikoff surmised that "the power of a dominant culture may well reside in large
part in its ability to convince subordinated groups that the stories told about them are true."
Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 1085.
171. In her excellent work on representation and race, Melissa S. Williams argued that
opportunities for expression are essential for ensuring the cooperation of groups in a democracy.
See generally MELsSA S. WILUAMS, VOICES, TRUST, MEMORY MARGNALZED GROUPS AND
THE FAILINGS OF LiBERAL REPIESENTATION (1998). Suppression of disparate voices causes
minority groups to withdraw from working cooperatively for the common good of the polity.
Id. at 51.
172. See Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy
Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1560 (1988) (discussing how losers in judicial process
may be more accepting of losses if they do not perceive society as callous to their values).
173. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall J., dissenting)
(warning that when Supreme Court fails to prohibit discrimination in accordance with Constitu-
tion, "it cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political channels of seeking
redress").
174. The destruction and burning of neighborhood stores and business establishments
during the urban riots in Los Angeles in 1992, following the acquittal of police officers accused
of beating African American motorist Rodney King, might be one example of the excluded
minority community's withdrawal from upholding societal structures that benefitted the entire
community. A similar uprising in Liberty City, Florida following the acquittal by an all-white
jury of a white police officer in the slaying of an African American motorist may be yet another
example of this phenomenon. It is significant that both these uprisings occurred after the justice
system failed to produce a result reflective of the values the minority community held. These
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engages in an unhealthy form of self-legitimization in that it loses its incentive
to try to balance competing values within the community. Maintaining the
status quo becomes more important than creating an effective and fair justice
system."' The inevitable result is a sharply polarized community and an
inefficient and unjust judicial system.
Finally, a legal system that excludes the legitimacy of counter-narratives
relinquishes access to potential alternative problem-solving techniques and the
opportunity to better understand and improve existing legal doctrine and
practice. Because whites and African Americans often identify with opposing
narratives, an all-white judiciary is particularly troubling in that it excludes
minority community values from playing a role in deciding vital questions of
law that apply to the entire community. Judge A. Leor Higginbotham, Jr.
observed that "the danger of a homogenous court is that there is no 'outsider'
within the court to challenge the biases the dominant group accepts as 'self-
evident' trths."' 6 The challenge of diversity is to include all voices in the
process of legal decision-making. As Mary Frances Berry reminded us, "if we
want to insure justice we must give voice and power to previously silenced
narratives, remembering that what the law does is a part of everyone's stories.
Otherwise the law has no validity and is an illegitimate exercise of power.
177
1. Judicial Response to Racial Narrative
As situated actors, judges also respond to familiar narratives, which can
affect their approach to legal decision-making.1 78  Delgado and Stefancic
argued that for judges in particular, "society's dominant narratives will seem
unexceptionable and 'true' - demanding no particular improvement or expan-
sion."179 Judges may even be more susceptible thanjurors to an unquestioning
acceptance of master narratives. Jurors, who serve only once a year or every
two years at most, may be better able temporarily to suspend familiar stereo-
types and judgments about facts than can judges."' Judges, especially trial
rebellions might be properly viewed as protests against the persistent exclusion of minority
community's perspectives from full participation in the justice system. See Charles L. Linder,
Riots as a Response to the Law, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 23,1993, at 15.
175. See BERRY, supra note 163, at 6 (observing that "White Americans, who have the
power to control most legal decisions, only reluctantly credit stories that differ radically from
their own"). Berry chairs the United States Civil Rights Commission.
176. Higginbotham, supra note 4, at 1041.
177. BERRY, supra note 163, at 19.
178. As Jerome Frank observed, "[Minute and distinctly personal biases are operating
constantly" as judges listen to witnesses and hear evidence. FRANK, supra note 131, at 114-15.
179. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 107, at 1957.
180. However, race influences how jurors perceive evidence and decide cases. In fact,
"the race of prospective jurors has become an important determinant in the outcome of a trial."
HIROsI FuKuRAi ET AL., RAcE AND TBE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
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judges who face an overloaded docket of cases each day, may be more likely
unconsciously to fall back on the stereotypes and stories, which we all use as
a shorthand to categorize people and events in our lives.' Criminal court
judges in many urban centers, in particular, may face case after case in which
99% of the defendants are African American and more than 80% of the cases
are drug-related.'" The phenomenon may be particularly true in jurisdictions
where judges administer specialized dockets - like a "drug docket."'83 In such
an environment, battle-fatigued judges might unconsciously rely on the
"culturally embedded" stories that help us "simplify" the world we live in.
Professor Peggy Davis has noted that racial "cognitive drifts" in the
thinking of legal decision-makers may affect a judge or juror's response to
the defense of a black parent charged with child neglect; the claim that the
potential and quality of a black life has been impaired by a white person's
negligence; the defense of a black accused of malpractice; the credibility of a
black witness; the worth of the opinion of a black expert; the merits ofablack
tenant's request for a stay of eviction [or]; a black woman's claim of rape. '
Racial disparities in criminal sentences are one indication that judges
respond to racial narratives. For example, the fact that sentences for defen-
dants convicted of rape tend to be harsher when the victim is white... may
suggest that judges are responding to long-standing racial narratives about
white and black women. Narratives that positioned black women as sexually
promiscuous, immoral, tough, and overbearing, and white women as virtuous
SEARCHFORJUSTICE 193(1993). This is true in both civil and criminal cases, as well as in cases
in which race is not at issue. Ic.; see Davis, supra note 144, at 1569 (describing juror delibera-
tions in 1987 New York trial of so-called "Preppy Murderer" Robert Chambers, who was
convicted of killing white fernale acquaintance, Jennifer Levin, during episode of "rough sex"
in Central Park). Perhaps no more stark example of how white and black jurors respond to
familiar racial narratives exists than the verdicts of the predominantly black criminal and
predominantly white civil juries in the O.J. Simpson murder and subsequent wrongful death
civil trials. An exploration of juror response to racial narratives is beyond the scope of this
piece, and other scholars have ably explored the topic.
181. See ALLPORT, supra note 109, at 20-23 (identifying human mind's need for "catego-
ries"); see also Albert . Moore, Trial By Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37
UCLA L. REV. 273, 280 (1989) (stating that "when an event exhibits more details than we can
attend in the limited time available, we fill in details that we have not actually observed...
based on preexisting schemes"); Ronald A. Farrell & Malcolm D. Holmes, The Social and
Cogn itive Structure ofLegalDecision-Making, 32 Soc. Q. 529, 536-38 (1991).
182. See generally TH SENTENCING PROJEcT, supra note 6 (describing "sea of black and
brown faces" sitting at defense table or shackled together on bus transporting prisoners in
criminal court systems throughout U.S.).
183. See Nugent, supra note 146, at 11 (describing "drug offender" schemas).
184. Davis, supra note 144, at 1571.
185. See Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Women's Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to
Support the Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 333 n.201 (1995) (citing studies showing harsher
sentences for defendants convicted of raping white women).
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and submissive may continue to influence judges' sentencing decisions."8 6
Even mandatory sentencing has not eliminated racial sentencing disparities.
Black criminal defendants continue to receive longer sentences than white
criminal defendants for crimes covered by mandatories, even when the nature
of the offense and the prior conviction record of the black and white defen-
dants are virtually the same."8 7 In fact, it appears from this data that the
disparity in sentencing between similarly situated black and white defendants
may have increased since the adoption of mandatory sentencing laws.'
Judge Theodore McKee of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals offered an
account of how a judge's response to the "racialized" narrative of a criminal
defendant might result in racially disparate application of strict mandatory
sentencing. 8 9 Judge McKee, who was a federal prosecutor and state judge
before his elevation to the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Pennsyl-
vania, contended that
it is easy for a judge to deviate from the standard sentence and give a white
middle-class defendant abreakby deviating below the sentencing guideline
because of all of the subliminal predispositions. But no break will be given
the Black urbanyouth. The circumstances that the judge would use to justify
the lighter sentencing ofthe middle-class defendant are all whatwe call racial
identifiers: he's from a good family, he is from a good neighborhood, goes
to a good school, has the influence of a good community on him, is active in
that community. But what about the kid who grows up in a public housing
project? What's good about the community influence in the projects?'"
Judge McKee then posed an intriguing question that demonstrates how an
alternative narrative could shape a judge's response to the same criminal
convicts facing mandatory sentences. Judge McKee asked,
[W]ho of the two is more salvageable? It may well be the kid in the projects
who has committed a first offense at the age of eighteen. He has escaped all
that negative stuff for a long time and has never been involved with drugs -
but then finally he makes a mistake. He is probably more salvageable than a
kid who has had all the opportunity in the world, all the breaks in the world,
and is out there screwing up. 9'
186. Moore noted that under the laws of many states, African American women could not
be raped because the law denied them "a presumption of chastity." Id. at 332. At the same
time, the law presumed sexual relations of any kind between an African American man and a
white woman to be rape. Id. at 331-36.
187. See DIANAR. GORDON, THE RETURNOF THB DANGEROUS CLASSEs: DRUGPROHIBI-
TiON AND POLiCy POLUTICS 148 (1994).
188. Id.
189. See Interview with Judge Theodore A. McKee, in BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE, supra
note 2, at 70. Judge McKee also served on the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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McKee's account of how judges might view sentencing of black and white
criminal defendants demonstrates that familiar racial narratives can play a role
in judicial decision-making, even when mandatory sentencing applies.
2. Lessons from Gender Diversity and Judging
The law also contains deeply embedded gender narratives. Judges may
be vulnerable to these narratives as well. Stories about the physical strength,
emotionalism, vulnerability, virtuousness or wantonness of women can influ-
ence how legal decision-makers evaluate cases involving women litigants,
witnesses, lawyers, and judges. Feminist scholars have described how
women's narratives can affect legal decision-making. 1' These scholars have
explored the unique role that gender perspectives play in the development of
legal theory and interpretation. In so doing, they have identified the male-
centered narratives that undergird legal norms and doctrine.
In one compelling feminist critique oftort law, for example, Leslie Bender
and Perette Lawrence examine the Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation
of"reasonably foreseeable" risk."9 Their critique demonstrates how principles
of tort law are interpreted through the lens of male experience. In Doe v.
Linder Construction, Jane Doe sued the developer, construction company, and
realtor of her housing development after she was raped by two men who used
a duplicate key to gain entry to her house. '94- The duplicate key was in the
unlocked office of the on-site superintendent of the housing development. 95
One of the rapists was the superintendent's son, who had been hired by his
father to do repair work in the homes."9 The Tennessee Supreme Court
192. See supra note 149 (citing work of Catherine MacKinnon, Deborah Rhode, and Robin
West); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WoMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982). In her empirical study of problem-solving among boys and
girls, Gilligan advanced the theory that women seek to solve problems in ways that preserve
relationships, while men place a premium on non-interference and preserving individual
autonomy. Gilligan has suggested that men and women might approach legal disputes differ-
ently because of the differing values men and women place on preserving relationships and
protecting autonomy. Id. at 22. Gilligan's work has been the subject of considerable criticism
by feminist scholars for its inherent essentialism and for its failure to identify women's emphasis
on relationship as a manifestation of subordination and powerlessness. See, e.g., MACKINNON,
supra note 149, at 38-39 & n.29; West, supra note 149.
193. See Leslie Bender & Perette Lawrence, Is Tort Law Male?: ForeseeabifityAnalysis
and Property Managers' Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHL-KEN'T L. REV.
313, 319 (1993) (analyzing Doe v. Linder Construction Co., 845 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. 1992)).
For Bender's more comprehensive feminist critique of tort law, see generally Leslie Bender,
A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort Law, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988).
194. Doe v. Linder Construction Co., 845 S.W.2d 173,175 (Tenn. 1992) (concluding that
construction company was not responsible for plaintiff's rape).
195. Id. at 176.
196. Id.
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affirmed the trial court's ruling that Doe's injury was not foreseeable." As
such, the defendants had no duty-to protect against the possibility of Doe being
raped. 1' Bender and Lawrence ask,
What kind of world view would one have to have to believe that rape was a
not a reasonably foreseeable risk ofimproperhousekeyhandling? To seethe
world from this perspective, the viewer would have to be someone who does
not think or worry about the possibility of rape on a regular basis.1
Ultimately, Bender and Lawrence conclude that "the problem... is not with
the concept of foreseeability itself, but that this central concept ... ends up
meaning 'what is foreseeable to reasonable men.'
200
The bench needs gender diversity to introduce and to legitimate women's
narratives in legal decision-making.20' When asked if she thought that the
presence of two female justices on the Supreme Court would change the way
the male justices looked at the law, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reportedly
replied that the female justices would compel the men to "[1look at life
differently."2' Justice O'Connor also explicitly has identified the importance
of female legal decision-makers to broadening the range of perspectives
brought to legal decision-making. °3 In the context of gender, therefore, it is
almost universally recognized that the "situated" stance of legal decision-
makers will affect their "sense of societal need." This does not mean that the
value of a female judge is limited to her gendered perspective anymore than
a male judge can be qualified to serve based solely on his gendered perspec-
tive. As Judge ShirleyAbrahamson ofthe Wisconsin Supreme Court has said,
"[N]obody is just a woman or a man. Each of us is a person with experiences
that affect our view of law and life and decision-making."' ° Nevertheless as
"'outsiders' in the American legal system,"205 women judges are uniquely
197. Id. at 184.
198. Id.
199. Bender & Lawrence, supra note 193, at 318.
200. Id. at 320. Justice Martha Craig Daughtrey wrote a powerful dissent, finding that a
reasonable jury could find that the defendant's illegal conduct was the "foreseeable" result of
improper key handling. See Linder Construction, 845 S.W.2d at 203 (Daughtrey, 3., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14
GOr.DEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 495-97 (1984) (calling upon women judges to attempt to
diversify and to improve legal system); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,Essay: An Open Letter from
One Black Scholar to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Or, How Not to Become Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, 1 DUKE . GENDER L. & POL'Y 21,35 (1994).
202. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sworn in at Supreme Court Justice (CNN television broadcast,
Aug. 10,1993).
203. See JEB v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that "like race, gender matters" in juror decision-making).
204. Abrahamson, supra note 201, at 494.
205. Id.
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positioned to recognize, engage, and legitimate outsider narratives in the
deliberative process.
ff. Connecting Judicial Diversity with Diverse Judicial Decision-Making
A. The Potential Value of Judicial Diversity in Judging
Discrimination Cases
1. Viewing Discrimination from Multiple Perspectives
Nowhere is the role ofjudges in bringing racial perspectives and values
into judicial decision-making more relevant than in discrimination cases. In
these cases the court's adherence to majority narratives and values can influ-
ence both the legal analysis the court utilizes and the ultimate result the court
reaches. Observers should not dismiss the value of diversity to judicial
decision-making in discrimination cases as a narrow or marginal concern.
Civil rights cases constitute a sizable percentage of the federal court civil
docket. For example, civil rights cases constituted 22% of all private civil
cases in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the one year period between
September 1997 and 1998.2' Yet all of the judges on the Fourth Circuit are
white."° In the Seventh Circuit, which also has no African American judges,
one-third of all private civil cases filed during the same one-year period were
civil rights cases.208 Thus, white federal appellate judges decide a large
percentage of the nation's federal civil rights cases.
For obvious reasons, the benefits of a racially diverse bench may be most
clearly manifested in these cases. As the preceding section demonstrates,
black and white Americans often have "different racial narratives."209 As a
result, their "perception of racial issues" may be different. 1 ° When 83% of
white judges believe that African Americans are treated fairly in the justice
system, and only 18% of black judges share this view, one must wonder
206. SeeADMamTRATWEOFF.OFTBEU.S.CTs.1998ANNUALREPORTOFTEDiRECTrO,
JUDICLALBUSNESS OF TBE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table B7, at 126-27. These figures do not
include prisoner civil rights cases and civil rights cases filed by the United States. Id.
207. Recent efforts to bring racial diversity to the Fourth Circuit reportedly have met with
resistance from both the Chief Judge ofthe Fourth Circuit and from North Carolina Senator Jesse
Helms. See Debra Baker, Waiting and Wondering, A-B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 52, 52-53 (reporting
on nomination of African American federal district judge James A. Beaty, Jr. to Fourth Circuit).
Although nominated by President Clinton to fill a vacancy on the Fourth Circuit three years ago,
the Senate Judiciary Committee never has reported out Judge Beaty's nomination. Two white
judges have been nominated by Clinton, approved by the Judiciary Committee bench, and
confirmed to the Fourth Circuit since President Clinton first nominated Beaty. Id.
208. Id.
209. TwilaL. Perry, The TransracialAdoption Controversy: AnAnalysisofDiscourse and
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CE[ANGE 33,47-48 (1993-94).
210. Id. at48.
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whether this perception-disparity might also reflect white and black judges'
perceptions of discrimination claims brought before them.
In a work specifically focused on the role of the judiciary in privileging
majority perspectives, Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas argues that cases involv-
ing intergroup conflict - such as discrimination cases - especially need to
include minority perspectives." The judiciary's failure to include these
perspectives, according to Lazos Vargas, has resulted in ajurisprudence which
de-legitimizes the reality and experiences of minorities. In race discrimination
cases, for example, Professor Lazos Vargas argues that the Supreme Court's
insistence on proof of "intent" in Keyes v. School District No. I212 and Wash-
ington v. Davis21 "fails to acknowledge the experience of racial minorities"
and ultimately "reinforc[es] the myth of White racial innocence. 2 4
Adherence to "master narratives" can impoverish judicial decision-making
in other inter-group conflict cases as well. In analyzing the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,"1' Professor Lazs Vargas argues that "the
[Court's] rendition of the supposedly relevant facts and rationale" for the
decision engages only the perspective of those not involved in same sex
relationships.216 The "implicit and explicit adoption ofthe view that homosex-
uals... are inherently deviant" is an assertion by the Court of what Professor
Lazos Vargas calls a "majority group epistemology."21 Professor Lazs
Vargas calls for judges to reach out to include minority or outsider epistemol-
ogies in their judicial decision-making.21 Lazos Vargas makes a strong and
compelling argument that judicial decisions must include and ultimately must
reconcile competing voices to resolve effectively intergroup conflict cases.219
211. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role
ofthe Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150,214 (1999) (arguing that, in cases of inter-
group conflict, majority judges should weigh minority perspectives coequally with their own).
212. 413 U.S. 189,193,197-98 (1973) (finding that in de facto segregation cases, plaintiffs
must show "segregative intent").
213. 426 U.S. 229,241 (1976) (finding disparate racial impact of police testing insufficient
to show discriminatory purpose).
214. Lazos Vargas, supra note 211, at 169, 175. Many other scholars have critiqued the
"intent" standard as unduly focused on the conscious mindset of the victimizer. See, e.g.,
MACKINNON, supra note 148, at 63-64 (stating that requiring intent "keeps the definition of
victimization in the victimizer's hands"); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review, in THE PoLmcs OF THE LAW: A PROGREsVE CrrIQUE, supra note 126, at 107
(positing that Court, by requiring discrimination to be evident, adopted perpetrator's perspective
though this requirement seems "illogical" and "disregard[s] ... the history and contemporary
reality of racial oppression"); Lawrence, supra note 109, at 352-55 (arguing that, regardless of
intent, court must address stigmatizing effect);.
215. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding state's criminalization of sodomy constitutional).
216. Lazos Vargas, supra note 211, at 179.
217. Id. at 180,184.
218. Id. at 155.
219. Id. at 214-15; see also Patricia Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist
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The need for inclusive judicial decision-making, especially in cases
involving inter-group conflict, speaks directly to the efforts to diversify the
bench. The judiciary must itself include judges capable of understanding and
articulating majority and minority epistemologist, in order to give multiple
perspectives legitimacy in judicial decision-making. In this sense, African
American judges are needed to give African American counter-narratives
force and legitimacy in judicial decision-making.
Minority judges' ability to bring to the bench particular perspectives to
help understand racial bias and discrimination should be conceived of as a
valuable asset to judicial decision-making. The concept of discrimination is
a difficult one, one which has been constantly shaped and re-interpreted over
the past thirty years. In the absence of racial diversity on the bench, white
judges are left to interpret and to analyze discrimination in the absence of
input and analysis by legal decision-makers who can conceptualize legal dis-
crimination from the perspective of the victims of discrimination.
Critical race theorists have identified and described how relying on dif-
fering racial narratives can affect a judge's approach to analyzing race dis-
crimination cases.' Their work demonstrates how the wholesale adoption of
majority community values has shaped and created federal discrimination
jurisprudence. Their work further demonstrates how the inclusion of minority
community values radically alters both the analysis and the outcome of dis-
crimination cases.
An even more complex set of narratives exist at the intersection of race
and gender. 1 Here critical race feminists have demonstrated how judicial
reliance on race and gender majority narratives has undermined the discrimina-
tion claims of black women. Professor Regina Austin has offered a thoughtful
examination 2 ofthe values clash that underlay the decision of a trial court and
Theory &Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945,1954 (1988) (stating that "what we want from our
judges is a special ability to listen with connection before engaging the separation that accompa-
nies judgment").
220. See generally, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WEL.: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); David ChangDiscriminatorylmpacA AffirmativeAction, and
Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790
(1991); Gotanda, supra note 22; Lawrence, supra note 109. For a collection of some critical
race writings, see, e.g., KIMBERLE CRENSHAWETAL., CITICALRAcE THEORY: THE KEY WRrr-
INGS THAT FORMED Tim MOVEMENT (1995).
221. See Paulette U Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives in the Intersection ofRace and
Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365,376 (discussing "interlocking system of oppression based on race
and gender that operates to the detriment of all women and all blacks"); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionalit, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1991) (arguing that neither antiracist nor feminist
theory alone offers satisfactory explanation of situation of women of color); Harris, supra note
10, at 585 (stating that gender essentialism is dangerous to feminist legal theory and often
ignores the experiences of black women).
222. See Austin, supra note 8, at 549-58.
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the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club.' In
that case, the Girls' Club's decision to fire African American arts and crafts
teacher Crystal Chambers, and the court's affirmation of that decision, re-
flected majoritarian values about female sexuality and children born out of
wedlock. Although similar taboos may exist in African American commui-
ties, the sense of punishment and rejection pursued by the Girls Club and
upheld by the court is not consistent with the approach of most African Amer-
ican communities to a young woman such as Ms. Chambers or her child.34
The court's deference to the Girls' Club's decision that Ms. Chambers's
out-of-wedlock pregnancy rendered her unfit to be a role model failed to
account for the possibility that a viable, and perhaps more accurate, alternative
view would have positioned Ms. Chambers as precisely the kind of role model
the Girls' Club soughtto promote. Under this alternative view (a view perhaps
more consistent with the values of the communities of the girls who utilized
the Club)" 5 Ms. Chambers's decision to carry her pregnancy to term, to raise
her child and to work to support her family, demonstrated a young woman
who reflected the ability to "achieve goals and overcome obstacles in her
life.
"226
Similarly Professor Paulette Caldwell inA Hair Piece demonstrates how
the court's unquestioning acceptance of the dominant-culture conception of
beauty discriminates against black women.' In reviewing employment
discrimination cases in which black women have been fired or reprimanded
for wearing braided hairstyles, Professor Caldwell describes how controlling
the appearance of black women has social, political and economic conse-
quences.' The decision by almost every court to uphold the right of employ-
ers to outlaw braided hairstyles for black women in the workplace is yet
another example of how the law and judges express and give force to domi-
nant culture values. More importantly, both the Girls Club and the "braids"
cases are most relevant to the question of diversity in the judges' failure to
223. 834 F.2d 697, 705 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding Girls Club's firing of unwed pregnant
women not discriminatory).
224. The black community most often does not respond to out-of-wedlock pregnancy by
ostracizing the teen or rejecting the baby. See Austin, supra note 8, at 554 (describing tolerance
that teenage mothers receive in black community); see also Martha M. Dore & Ana O. Dumois,
Cultural Differences in the Meaning ofAdolescent Pregnancy, FAMS. IN SOC'Y: J. CONMIMP.
HUM. SERvIcs 93, 94 (1990) (noting general acceptance of both child and mother among
extended black families). Latino communities are similarly disinclined to reject such young
women and their babies. Id. at 95.
225. See Omaha Girls Club, 834 F.2d at 698 (noting that 90% of club's 1500 members
were black).
226. Id. at 698 n.1 (noting this goal as stated mission of Girls Club).
227. See Caldwell, supra note 221, at 376-81.
228. Id.
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explicitly "take account" of the alternative perspectives and values that
Professors Austin and Caldwell fully and persuasively described.
2. Some Empirical Evidence: Race Matters
Empirical studies of judicial decision-making during the past twenty
years have shown nominal differences in the outcomes of cases decided by
white and minority judges.' For several reasons, we must view empirical
studies of this sort with skepticism. First, the size of these studies' samples
limits most ofthem?30 Second, most studies only focus on case outcomes, not
the process ofjudicial decision-making itself. Case outcomes is only one area
in which judicial diversity may play a role. Other important indicators might
include changes in the culture of the courthouse, the diversity of court person-
nel, and the fair treatment of women and minority litigants, lawyers, wit-
nesses, and observers in the courtroom." ' Moreover, by focusing on case
outcomes, many studies appear to ignore the range ofpre-trial decisions which
can determine the outcome of a case.232 Additionally, no empirical study has
attempted to determine whether racial diversity on the bench influences the
way white judges decide cases. In other words, the interaction between white
and black judges on a racially diverse bench, may change the way some white
judges approach aspects of legal or factual analysis.3
One recent empirical study of race and judicial outcomes which finds that
white and black judges respond differently to discrimination claims may signal
the beginning of a more explicit rift between the judicial decision-making of
229. See, e.g.,ABRAHAML.DAVIS,BLACKJUDGESINU-EFEDERALJUDICIARY91-92 (1989)
(presenting empirical study that finds no significant differences between decisions of black and
white judges); Susan Welch et al.,DoBlackJudgesMake a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCL 126,
133-34 (1988) (same); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the
FederalBench: Policy andProcessRamfications,47 J.PoL. 596, 599passim (1985) (reporting
on inconclusive studies about differences among majority and minorityjudges' decisions).
230. The bulk of the studies were conducted in the 1980s when there were very few
African Americans on the federal bench, most of whom had served only a short period of time.
President Jimmy Carter appointed most African American federal judges during his 1976-1980
term. See Jon Gottschall, Carter's JudicialAppointments The Influence ofAffirmative Action
andMeritSelection on Voting on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 173 (1983).
Most state courts were only beginning to have African American judges during this period.
231. See Ifill, supra note 12, at 13740 (noting importance of judge's role in areas other
than substantive decision-making).
232. Such decisions might include whether to set bail, whom to appoint as counsel in a
capital case, evidentiary decisions suppressing or refusing to suppress evidence, deciding to
change the venue of the trial, whether to grant class certification or whether to award temporary
child support payments.
233. See Susan Maloney Smith, Comment, Diversifying the Judiciary: The Influence of
Gender and Race on Judging, 28 U. RICa. L. REv. 179 (1994) (discussing possible effects of
both racial and gender diversity).
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white and black judges. 4 The findings inthis study may illustrate how judicial
diversity can overcome majority-view domination in judicial decision-making.
This study, which focused on case outcomes in race discrimination cases in
federal court, found that: (1) black federal judges regardless ofpoliticalparty
affiliation decide cases in favor of plaintiffs in race discrimination cases at
statistically significantly higher levels than white male and female judges; and
that (2) black federal judges are more likely than even white female judges to
decide cases in favor ofplaintiffs in sex discrimination cases. 5 The data from
the study further reveals that an appellate panel of three white Republican
judges is likely to result in a verdict in favor ofthe plaintiff in a discrimination
case only 10% ofthe time."' The likelihood of drawing an appellate panel with
even one African American judge is only 20%."a Based on these findings, the
study author concludes that if "he number of blacks and whites on Appellate
Court[s] reflected their proportion in the nation,"... it would "make a differ-
ence in how race discrimination cases [would] ... be decided."' s The figures
in this study are startling. They suggest that the lack of full racial diversity on
federal appellate courts determines the outcome of discrimination cases at the
appellate level." 9 Given the significance of circuit court opinions in defining
legal understanding and interpretation of federal law, the results of the Crowe
study suggest that racial homogeneity onthe Circuit courts may be shaping the
development of federal anti-discrimination law.240 The empirical work of
Professor Crowe supports the weight of anecdotal evidence which suggests that
234. Nancy Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on
the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 1981-96 (1999) (unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with author) (demonstrating that race of judge, regardless of political party
affiliation, affects judicial decision-making in sex and race discrimination cases).
235. See id. at 110-25, 84. The study also found other trends among federal judges. For
example, white, male, Republican judges rule in favor of male plaintiffs in discrimination cases
21% of the time, but for female plaintiffs only 15% of the time. Id. at 127. While white, male,
Democratic judges decide cases in favor of plaintiffs in discrimination at a significantly higher
rate than white, male, Republican judges, the gender of the plaintiffs has a similar effect on their
voting patterns: white, male, Democratic judges rule in favor of male plaintiffs at a rate of 51%
as compared to 42% for female plaintiffs. Id.
236. Id. at 17. A panel with three white, Democratic judges will produce an outcome
favorable to the plaintiff49% of the time. Id.
237. Id. at 92.
238. Id. at 122.
239. Of course, they also suggest that political party affiliation significantly influences how
white judges decide discrimination cases. This is consistent with my view that race alone does
not tell us enough about ajudicial candidate to determine whether the selection of that candidate
furthers the goal of promoting diversity in judicial decision-making. The Crowe study may
demonstrate, however, that race is among the most telling characteristica for determining whether
ajudicial candidate is likely to promote diversity injudicial decision-making. Id. at 165.
240. In light of the vast reduction in the number of cases the Supreme Court has decided
to review on writs of certiorari, the decisions of federal appellate courts have taken on greater
significance.
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African American and white judges see racial bias differently.241 At the very
least, Professor Crowe's work demonstrates the potential importance ofjudi-
cial diversity to affect judicial case outcomes.
B. Diversity's Role in Other Cases
Moreover, the effect of racial diversity on judicial decision-making
should not be measured solely by looking at case outcomes in discrimination
cases. As the experience of jury deliberations reveal, racial perspectives can
affect how legal decision-makers hear claims and weigh evidence, even
in cases where race is not explicitly at issue. Similarly race may influence
how judges hear and examine legal arguments and evidence. Nor can we
measure the benefits of judicial diversity by focusing only on case outcomes.
Instead, as in the jury venire cases, the value of diversity should be measured
by its effect on the deliberative process. Even if black and white judges reach
the same outcomes, we should value racial diversity if it brings alternative
perspectives and analysis to the process and enriches the legal decision-
making.
At least one new empirical study, impressive in its scope and depth,
suggests that race can affectjudges' legal reasoning and analysis. The findings
on the connection between race and judicial reasoning confirms that society
must focus on judicial decision-making itself rather than merely on case
outcomes to assess fully the value of judicial diversity.242 The Sisk-Heise-
Morriss study analyzes the results of cases challenging sentencing guidelines
in federal court. The study found that white and minorityjudges differ greatly
in their willingness to find validity in claims raising due process objections to
the sentencing guidelines, revealing vast disparities between white and minor-
ity judges. Ninety percent of minority judges who addressed due process
claims in challenges to sentencing guidelines relied upon the due process
argument to strike down the guidelines, as compared to fifty-eight percent of
241. See BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 84 (discussing comments of Fred
Banks of Mississippi Supreme Court, who described unique perspective of African American
judges, as "born out of an experience that one has had growing up in a Black community as
opposed to a white community"). Judges from other minority groups also may have a height-
ened sensitivity to racial bias. See, e.g., David Margolick, Japanese-American Judges Reflect
on Internment, N.Y. TIME, May 19, 1995, at A27. Reflecting on the effect of his family's
internment during World War 11, Japanese American Judge A. Wallace Tashima reportedly
stated that the internment made him "keenly aware that the Government can make mistakes and
probably more conscious than I otherwise would have been of the persecution of minorities."
Id.; see also Justice Ming W. Chin, Keynote Address: Fairness or Bias?: A Symposium on
Racial and Ethnic Composition and Attiudes in the Judiciary, 4 ASIAN L.J. 181, 182 (1997)
(recounting childhood experiences of anti-Chinese bias).
242. See George C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the JudicialMind: An Empiri-
cal Study ofJudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1377, 1384 (1998) (stating that, while case
outcomes in sentencing guideline cases were similar, judicial reasoning of blacks was different
from that of whites).
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all judges.243 As a matter of statistical significance, the study authors found
that "RACE emerged as significant at the ninety-nine percent probability level"
for judges "who addressed the claim that due process guarantees a defendant's
right to an individualized sentence imposed by a judge with full discretion."244
This disparity is particularly salient because, according to the study
authors, mostjudges viewedthe "due process theory" as a "somewhat irregular
approach to the sentencing guidelines questions,""24 and some white judges
deemed it "weak" or "absurd."246 Sisk, Heise, and Morriss conclude that
minority judges demonstrate "a tendency to adopt a non-mainstream approach
[to legal analysis], even if these judges reached the same general outcome at
basically the same rate as white judges."'2 47 Thus even when they reached the
same outcome, black and white judges oftentook a vastly different path of legal
reasoning to reach their conclusions.
Although the authors ofthe study ultimately conclude that the race of the
judge only nominally affects outcomes on cases challenging the constitution-
ality of sentencing guidelines,24 the potential effect of racial diversity on
judicial reasoning should not be undervalued. The inclusion of alternative or
"non-mainstream approaches" in judicial decision-making can invigorate the
law with new and challenging approaches to decision-making and create
opportunities for better, richer judicial decision-making. In this sense, diver-
sity benefits not only minority litigants but the entire justice system. Focusing
narrowly on case outcomes obscures this potential benefit of diversity.249
The idea that judicial diversity may affect the process ofjudicial decision-
making in non-discrimination cases, and even where case outcomes remain
unchanged, is consistent with the description ofJustice Marshall's contribution
to the Supreme Court, by Justices O'Connor, White, and Powell. Each de-
scribed Justice Marshall's inclusion of "counter-narrative" in the Court's
deliberative processes." Marshall forced the other Justices to confront and
243. Id. at 1457.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1458.
246. Id. (quoting CHARLES FAMD, ORDERAND LAW 165 & 239 n.61 (1991)).
247. Id. at 1459. The authors also recognize, as I do, that "prior research focusing on out-
come and ignoring reasoning may have neglected underlying evidence of influence." Id.
248. Id. at 1457 (finding that "although minority judges invalidated the Guidelines by a
larger percentage than white judges (71% vs.60%), this difference was not statistically signifi-
cant" (citations omitted)).
249. It is also true that increased inclusive reasoning and judicial decision-making which
includes alternative viewpoints and theories also may ultimately result in statistically significant
differences in case outcomes.
250. See generally O'Connor, supra note 9, at 1220 (describing how Justice Marshall's
stories affected O'Connor's world-view as well as her view of cases); White, supra note 9, at
1216 (stating that Marshall "characteristically tell us things we know but would rather forget; and
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address the reality of life for the poor, for women, for African Americans, and
for other marginalized groups."5 By raising the perspectives of these groups,
Marshall forced the law to reckon with alternative realities. In so doing,
Marshall pushed the law and those judges charged with interpreting the law to
reconcile legal norms with outsider realities. 2 That process of reconciliation
presents opportunities for judges to transform or interpret law in ways which
can both broaden and narrow its scope. And the interaction of diverse perspec-
tives in legal decision-making may be the best wayto achieve judicial impar-
tiality. In this sense, the judiciary should affirmatively seek judges who can
bring contrasting perspectives to the bench.
iL. Reconciling Judicial Impartiality with Diversity
Yet the impartiality myth which surrounds judicial decision-making
severely hampers the potential for a racially diverse judiciary to bring diverse
perspectives to judging. Judges who bring outsider perspectives to the bench
are encouraged to believe that judges do and indeed must "strip down like a
runner" in order to execute faithfully the judicial oath. But impartiality in
reality has never meant that a judge must abandon all of the knowledge and
experience he has gained in his professional and personal life. Nor has it ever
meant that a judge lacks a "perspective" or view ofthe world which shapes his
decision-making. Tributes to some of our nation's most revered judges often
describe the judge's "voice" which can be felt and heard in the judge's written
opinions.3 The "voice" of a great judge is not only a style,' but it is also
that judge's own construction of reality which he conveys over time through
numerous opinions.2 s
Often minority judges and judicial candidates are cautious of, and quite
rightly, conscious of revealing an explicit racial voice. Revealing such a voice
he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of our own experience."); William.
J. BrennanA Tribute to Justice ThurgoodMarshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23,25 (1991) (recalling
that "Justice Marshall's voice was often persuasive, but whether or not he prevailed in a given
instance, he always had an impact .... [ie spoke for those who might otherwise be forgotten.").
251. See, e.g., Regina Austin, "Write on Brother" and the Revolution Next Time: Justice
Marshall's Challenge to BlackScholars, 6 HARv. BLACKLETER J. 79, 81-82 (1989) (discuss-
ing Marshall's opinions that challenged Court's notions of poor and blacks).
252. This is precisely the kind of judicial decision-making advocated by Sylvia Lazos
Vargas. See supra notes 211, 218 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Remembering Justice Brennan: A Eulogy, 37 WASHBURN
L.J. xix (1997); Richard W. RoseA Tribute toJudgeA. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.: Farewell to
a Giant, 4 RoCTER WAI/AMs U. L. REv. 387, 393 (1999); Nadine Strossen, Tribute to Justice
William J. Brennan, 60 U. PrT. L. REv. 315,320 (1999)
254. See Richard A. Posner, Special Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing: Judges' Writing
Styles (andDo They Matter), 62 U. CHL L. REV. 1421,1425 (1995).
255. Id.
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may mean sure defeat at the polls, scuttled nominations, charges of bias, or
recusal motions in racially sensitive cases. We cannot fully realize the bene-
fits of racial diversity on the bench, therefore, until the discourse about
judging accurately defines impartiality. In doing so, judicial commentators
must embrace the concept articulated by the Supreme Court, that the interac-
tion of diverse viewpoints best achieves impartiality." Thus judges and
judicial commentators must admit that experience, perspective, and values
constitute legitimate sources of authority for judicial decision-making.
A. Impartiality vs. Diversity: Challenges to Black Judges
Judicial diversity efforts premised on the desire to include diverse per-
spectives and viewpoints in judicial decision-making inevitably raise questions
about whether one can reconcile the individual impartiality requirement ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment with the effort to include identifiable perspectives in
judicial decision-making. Can judges at once represent excluded voices in
judicial decision-making and guarantee impartial decision-making? 57
It is perhaps no accident that some of the richest and most compelling
efforts to define the parameters of impartiality have been made by black
judges. Because they face unique challenges from white litigants, black judges
have particular contributions to make to the discourse about judicial challenges
to their impartiality." In resisting recusal motions filed by white litigants,
256. See supra note 13.
257. Attempting to reconcile substantive diversity in judicial decision-making with impar-
tiality highlights the appeal of the role model justification for diversity. So long as diversity is
promoted only to produce role models, the question of whether minority judges will be impartial
does not arise. The implicit assumption of the role model rationale, which values the inclusion
of black judges for the sake of appearances, is that black judges will exercise their judicial
function in precisely the same way as white judges. Blackjudges are valuable under this theouy
due to the visual signal they send to the populace. A diverse bench may encourage potential
minority judicial aspirants, or might be a signal to the minority and majority community that
they should have confidence in ajudicial system that includes minorities.
258. See, e.g., LeRoy v. City of Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Tex 1984), mandamus
denied, In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1984); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155 (ED. Pa. 1974); see also Shaun Assael, The
New YorkNewsday Interview with Bruce Wright, NEWSDAY, Jan. 19,1995, at A29 (responding
to criticisms of Judge Wright's propensity to grant bail and give light sentences to black
criminal offenders in New York City). There is some evidence that challenges to the impartial-
ity of minority judges may have increasingly international dimensions. In a widely publicized
case Judge Corinne Sparks, Canada's first African Canadian female judge and the only black
judge in Nova Scotia, was charged by the Crown with racial bias for crediting the testimony of
a young African Canadian criminal defendant over that ofa white police officer. The Crown
appealed Judge Sparks's decision acquitting the youth on the grounds that she was racially
"biased" in favor of the African Canadian defendant. The Canadian Supreme Court ultimately
upheld Judge Sparks's decision. See R.D.S. v. The Queen [1997] 151 D.L.R. 4th 193, 196
(Can.) (finding "contextualized judging ... entirely proper and conducive to a fair and just
resolution of the case." (L'Heureux-Dub and McLachlin JJ.)).
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black judges often face challenges to their racial impartiality. Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham and Judge Constance Baker Motley's decisions in Common-
wealth ofPennsylvaniav. Local Union 5442,"' andBlankv. Sullivan &Crom-
well,'e respectively, expose the sham of an impartiality definition that assumes
"whiteness" (and "maleness") as the standard for measuring judicial bias.26'
In those cases, Judges Higginbotham and Motley refused to grant the recusal
motions that defendants in employment discrimination cases262 filed challeng-
ing the impartiality of the judges. The challenges suggested that the race,
gender (in the case of Judge Motley), and the judges' professional back-
grounds as civil rights advocates rendered them incapable of impartially
deciding employment discrimination cases.263 The judges in each case rejected
the notion that an "appearance of bias" attaches to black judges deciding
discrimination cases. Instead, they insisted that determinations ofjudicial bias
must begin by first assuming that all judges have a race, a gender, and a
professional background.2 This means that if black and female judges are
suspected of bringing racialized or genderized perspectives to bear on issues
of discrimination, then we must assume that white and male judges also bring
race and gender perspectives to their decision-making.
259. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (refusing to grant motion for recusal).
260. 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to grant motion to recusejudge).
261. See, e.g., LeRoy, 592 F. Supp. at 424 (reflecting judge's denial of motion to recuse
based on her race); Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F.
Supp. 1017, 1021 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (denying party's motion to disqualify African American
female judge).
262. The federal system provides two avenues for judicial disqualification from a case. 28
U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 provide mechanisms forjudicial disqualification. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144,
455 (1994 & Supp. 1999). Section 144 requires that a judge be disqualified from a case
whenever a party submits an application which alleges with sufficiency that the judge "has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." 28 U.S.C. § 144
(1988). The judge against whom a § 144 motion and affidavit has been filed can pass on the
sufficiency ofthe affidavit. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22,30-31,32-36 (1921). The
facts alleged in the affidavit are taken to be true. Id. at 32-34. However, mere conclusory
allegations are insufficient to warrant recusal. Instead, the party seeking recusal must allege
specific facts showing "a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality ofjudgement"
Id. at 33-34. Section 455 provides the framework for those situations in which the judge, sua
sponte, believes recusal is necessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
263. Counsel premised its challenge to Judge Motley in the Blank case on perceived gender
bias and on her illustrious career as a civil rights lawyer. In Local Union 542, the challenge to
Judge Higginbotham stemmed from his race, his overt racial self-identification and his back-
ground as a civil rights advocate.
264. Judge Motley observed:
If background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds
for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others, by virtue
of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law
firm or public service backgrounds.
Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D-N.Y. 1975).
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Judge Higginbotham's decision denying the recusal motion is particularly
revealing because the motion itself was based in part on statements Judge
Higginbotham made in a speech about African American history. In the
address before a group of black historians, Judge Higginbotham espoused
efforts by blacks to obtain full and equal rights under the law. The recusal
motion specifically identified Judge Higginbotham's use of the word "we" in
describing black people in his speech, as evidence of his racial bias.26 In
rejecting the motion, Judge Higginbotham denounces the defendant's efforts
to impose an impartiality standard on black judges that would require them to
"disavow or not discuss the legitimacy of blacks' aspiration to full first-class
citizenship."2. Judge Higginbotham asserted for black judges the right to
positively identify themselves as black, as well as the right to articulate openly
their support for racial equality and full ctizenship for all blacks. The recusal
motions filed in Local Union 142, Blank, and subsequent cases demonstrate
that in cases where race is at issue parties may view black judges with suspi-
cion and can subject them to greater scrutiny.
Yet, every judge brings to the bench a range of professional and life
experiences which will influence his judicial decision-making. A judge may
be deemed "qualified" to serve based on his experience as a trial lawyer, as a
partner in a prestigious firm engaged in commercial law practice, as a govern-
ment lawyer, or as an esteemed legal academic. These experiences, and a
judge's "thinking" about law, are part of the bundle of qualifications a judge
brings to the bench.
Judges also bring an ideological background to the bench. In some
instances, as in the case ofthe partner at the law firm, ajudge's political ideol-
ogy may not be known publicly. But this does not mean that the judge does
not have an ideology. Judges - as mature, engaged, and powerful actors in the
legal profession - cannot be expected to have developed no ideological views
at all. Indeed, if a mature and experienced lawyer operating at the highest
levels of her profession has not developed ideas about important areas of law
and public policy, one might suspect that such a judicial nominee lacks the
requisite thoughtfulness and intellectual rigor to take on the difficult and
awesome task ofjudging.2"
At the very least, a judge should have developed a sense of how he or she
would like to order the world. A judge's "outlook on life" or "conception of
265. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp.
155,157 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
266. Id. at 178.
267. In Laird v. Tatum, Justice William Rehnquist remarked that "[p]roof that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." Laird v. Tatum, 409
U.S. 824,835 (1972).
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social needs" is the context in which a judge decides "where choice shall
fall."2" Given the enduring power of our socially constructed racial identities,
we should expect a judge's experience as a white man or black woman, for
example, to influence his or her "outlook on life" or "conception of social
needs." This means that we should expect both black and white judges to be
influenced in some part by their racial experiences. Yet, the challenges to
black judges in Local Union 142, Blank, and later cases suggest that white
judges may be enjoying a perception of built-in racial impartiality that parties
deny to black judges. 9 In this way, whiteness is ' t ransparent," appearing to
have no racial significance." Blackness, however, is equated with ideology,
bias and "special interest."
These cases tell us that the individual impartiality cannot require that
judges strip themselves of their racial or gender identity, unless we are pre-
pared to examine and challenge the impartiality ofwhite, malejudges. Seeking
a form of impartiality that is neither "raced" nor "gendered" is both impractical
and impossible. As Martha Minow cautioned sometime ago "[t]his aspiration
ofimpartiality... isjustthat- an aspiration ratherthan a description- because
it may suppress the inevitability ofthe existence of a perspective." '' Nor can
we demand that judges distance themselves from the legal or moral principles
in which they believeY2  Impartiality requires that judges keep their minds
open enough to be persuaded by contrary arguments or principles as applied to
a particularized legal conflict. Thus, individual impartiality leaves room for
judges to engage and to draw upon their multiple identities and experiences.273
In essence, the focus of impartiality - like diversity - should be on the process
of judicial decision-making rather than simply on case outcomes.
268. CARDoZO, supra note 15, at 12.
269. Other minority judges may also be subject to disproportionate scrutiny. See generally
United States v. EI-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying World Trade Center
bombing defendant's motion for recusal ofjudge because judge was an orthodox Jew).
270. See Flagg, supra note 64, at 953, 957 (describing the "transparency phenomenon"
which insulates white decision-making from challenge).
271. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 45 (1987).
272. Despite his contempt for critical race theory, even Richard Posner has conceded that
the "[l]itigation commonly involves persons at different social distances from the judge, and the
more proximate will garner the more sympathetic response regardless of actual desert" PosNEn,
supra note 160, at 412. In his searing critique of critical race theory Judge Posner refers to the
"core" writing of critical race theorists as "lunatic." Richard Posner, Beyond All Reason: The
RadicalAssault on Truth in American Law, NEW REPUBUC, Oct 13, 1997, at 40. 42. One
wonders whether a lawyer appearing before Judge Posner who writes in this area or who seeks
to advance critical race arguments on behalf ofa client, could successfully seek Judge Posner's
recusal on the grounds that the judge could not "impartially" decide the case.
273. One African American Baltimore City trial judge contends that "more than any other
job, I bring the sum total of all I've been, all I've done to my job as a judge." Interview with
Judge Mabel Houze Hubbard, in Baltimore, Md. (May 12,1996).
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B. Impartiality vs. Diversity: LULAC and the Voting Rights
Judges Cases
Nevertheless, despite the work of Judge Higginbothanm, Judge Motley, and
other judges, a racial double standard for determining impartiality continues
to plague judicial diversity efforts. The most concerted and far-reaching
application of this double standard has come from federal appellate courts
reviewing claims brought by minority voters who have challenged the judicial
election processes, primarily in southern states. In a series of these cases,
federal appellate courts have identified the need for judicial impartiality as a
principal rationale for denying minority voters' claims. 274 InLeague of United
Latin American Citizens v. Clements2" (LULACIB), the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals first advanced the argument that efforts of minority voters to elect
state trial judges of their choice would threaten the impartiality of the benchY 6
In L ULAC, the court held that the relief the plaintiffs sought would undermine
'The fact and appearance ofjudicial fairness."27 African American and Mexi-
can American voters in that case had challenged the countywide electoral
district for trialjudges. In Harris County, Texas, the largest and most populous
county in the state the countywide election system consistently had resulted in
an all-white bench, although 20% of the county's electorate was African
American and 22% Mexican American. The trial judge found that white
voters, voting as a bloc, consistently defeated the judicial candidate whom
African American voters favored when that candidate was also African Amer-
ican.2s The plaintiffs sought to change to a system of sub-districts for the
election of judicial candidates. The minority voters demonstrated that under
such a sub-district election scheme minority voters could elect between nine
274. See Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1026 (1999) (denying relief sought by African American voters because "altering the current
electoral schemes for the express purpose of electing more blackjudges... would be proclaim-
ing that race matters in the administration ofjustice" (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494,
1546 (1 th Cir. 1994))).
275. 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990).
276. See LULAC II, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nora. Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991) (holding congressional amendments to
Voting Rights Act to increase minority voting strength did not apply to election of judges).
Four appellate opinions were issued in the LULAC case over the five years that the case moved
up to the Supreme Court and back to the appellate court. Two of those opinions were en bane
decisions of the court. In each of those opinions, either the majority or concurring opinion
concluded that the plaintiffs' efforts conflicted with the State's obligation to maintain fair and
impartial courts. See generally LULAC I, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane); LULAC IV,
999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (discussing state interest in maintaining impartial
judiciary), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
277. LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 869.
278. LULAC, No. MO-88-CA-154, slip op. at 58 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8,1989).
RACIAL DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
and eleven of the fifty-nine trial judges then serving the county. In the altema-
tive, plaintiffs proposed that Texas use modified at-large election systems, such
as cumulative or limited voting, which would also give minority voters an
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to the bench. Although the
plaintiffs prevailed at trial, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's decision granting relief to the plaintiffs. In a panel and subse-
quent en banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the
ground that judges - especially trial judges - are not "representatives" and are
not therefore covered by the language of the Voting Rights Act.279
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation of
the word "representatives." Reversing the en banc Fifth Circuit in Houston
Lawyers, the Supreme Court held that both the elected appellate judges at
issue in Chisom and the trial judges in Houston Lawyers were "representa-
tives" within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act." ° Through these deci-
sions, the Court recognized that judges have a representative relationship with
the communities they serve. In holding that minority voters are entitled to an
equal opportunity to elect judges of their choice, the Court also recognized the
potential for judges to represent politically-cohesive racial communities. This
means that the Court at least implicitly acknowledged the potential for minor-
ityjudges to "represent" minority communities."'
Nevertheless, in Chisom and Houston Lawyers, the Supreme Court
avoided articulating preciselyhowjudges can "represent." 2 This was apartic-
ularly important question for resolution in Houston Lawyers' Association,
279. See LULAC 11, 914 F.2d at 625-26 (concluding that judiciary serves no representative
function); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293, 308 (5th Cir.
1990) [hereinafter LULAC 1] (determining that trial judges, as single member officers, are not
within scope of Voting Rights Act).
280. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419,426 (1991) (concluding
that state's decision to elect trial judges brings judiciary within scope of Voting Rights Act);
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,399 (1991) (arguing that term "representative" includes more
than only legislative elections). Note that the Supreme Court case of Houston Lawyers'Ass'n
v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991) isLULAC H on review.
281. Strangely enough, however, the Court in Chisom never explicitly engaged the issue
of race and representation. Michael Herz notes that the Court failed to acknowledge the very
reasons why the black plaintiffs in Chisom brought the case - to be able to elect minority
judges. See Michael Herz, Choosing Between Normative and Descriptive Versions of the
Judicial Role, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 725, 749 (1992) (arguing that Chisom Court's hostility to
elected judges shows belief that more representative judiciary would be destructive).
282. In avoiding this discussion, the Court also failed to describe how the "representative"
function of judges should be reconciled with the requirement of judicial impartiality. See
Chisom,501 U.S. at400-01. The Court's failure in this regard left the door open for lower courts
reviewing these cases on remand to deny minority voter challenges to racially dilutive election
schemes for judges on the grounds that the remedy minority voters sought-whether the creation
of majority-minority sub-districts or alternative at-large remedies - would undermine judicial
impartiality. See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text (discussing LULACIV).
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because the Fifth Circuit panel opinion denying the minority voters' claims in
that case had focused on the fact the trial judges exercise their decision-making
function independently. Because of that fact, the panel held that minority
voters could not seek representation of a "single judicial officer."' 3 The panel
contrasted the decision-making function of trial judges with that of appellate
judges, who make decisions as part of a collegial decision-making body. 4 In
effect, the Fifth Circuit panel drew a distinction between the Chisom and
LULAC cases, conceding that judicial representation was possible on an
appellate court but not on the trial court bench. 85 In remanding the case to the
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court left open the question in Houston Lawyers'
Association of whether it was possible to remedythe vote dilution of which the
plaintiffs complained regarding the election oftrial court officers. Latching on
to this opening, the Fifth Circuit ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs' case in
LULAC.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the parties' subsequent efforts to settle the
case." 6 The court found that no settlement was warranted because the plain-
tiffs failed to prove their substantive claim and the relief sought by plaintiffs
would undermine judicial impartiality.28 According to the court; Texas's
need to preserve '"die fact and appearance of judicial fairness" ' outweighed
the injury to minority voters. The court concluded that electing trial judges
from majority black sub-districts within a county, rather than county-wide
would "diminish the appearance if not fact of ... judicial independence,"
because judicial decision-making would be made "by judges representing only
a small fraction of the electorate.1
289
The decision in LULAC effectively subverted the Supreme Court's
decisions in Chisom and Houston Lawyers'Association that judges are repre-
sentatives. By basing its decision onthe need to maintain judicial impartiality,
the Fifth Circuit avoided challenging directly the Supreme Court's decision.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit positioned the representative role of judges that the
Supreme Court identified as being in conflict with judicial impartiality. In so
doing, the Court introduced a balancing test, which weighed the minority
voters' interest in judicial representation against the state's interest in judicial
impartiality into the vote dilution analysis.
283. LUL4CI, 902 F.2d at 308.
284. Id. at 306.
285. Id.
286. See LULAC IV, 999 F.2d 831, 845-47 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing rationale for
rejection of parties' consent decree).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 869.
289. LULAC II, 914 F.2d 620, 650 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nora. Houston Lawyers'
Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
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The presumption implicit in this balancing test, of course, was that the
minority plaintiffs in LULAC were seeking to elect "partial" judges. The court
also presumed that black voters were the only members of the electorate
interested in judicial representation. The court ignored the fact that white
voters, as evidenced by their persistent refusal to support black judicial
candidates favored by black voters, regularly expressed their desire for
particularized representation on the bench.' g In effect, white judges already
had been acting as representatives for the white electorate.
Yet another implication was that minority judges elected by minority
voters could not be impartial judges. In effect, the court imposed a different
standard of impartiality on black judges elected by black voters than it was
prepared to apply to white judges elected by white voters. The judges elected
under the new election system sought by black plaintiffs would, according to
the court, feel compelled to exhibit "bias or favoritism" towards the black
voters who elected them."9  But, under the existing at-large countywide
election system that the Fifth Circuit upheld, white judges in Harris County
routinely win election without the electoral support of African American
voters. These white judges, however, could be trusted to "remain accountable
to all voters" in the county.29 At bottom, the court's expectation was that
black judges elected by black voters would be incapable of impartial decision-
making. At the same time the court assumed the impartiality of white judges,
who were and often are elected solely by white voters in Harris County.
In effect, the Fiftfh Circuit's analysis imposed a stricter standard of
impartiality on black and Mexican American judges, whom minority voters
potentially would elect, than it was prepared to impose on white judges whom
white voters elected. This double standard exposes the way in which impar-
tiality and the appearance of impartiality can operate differently for black
judges than for white judges. Other courts have relied upon the reasoning in
LULAC on this issue to guide their decisions rejecting minority voter chal-
lenges to discriminatory judicial election schemes.3
1V Judges as Impartial Representatives
The Fifth Circuit's troubling analysis inLULAC andthe challenges black
judges experience from white litigants in cases involving racial issues illus-
290. White voters' refusal to support black judicial candidates was consistent even when
one controlled for political party affiliation. League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Mattox,, MO-88-CA-154, slip op. at 29-30 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 1989).
291. LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 869 (concluding that judges would be partisan decision-
makers).
292. See id. at 873 (recognizing government's interest in maintaining broad accountability
for elected judges).
293. See supra note 274 (citing voting rights cases relying onLULAC).
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trate why the role model argument cannot justify judicial diversity efforts.
Premising the need for minority judges on the development of role models is
both dishonest and dissembling. It denies the fact that minorities often seek
representation on the bench, and it avoids or delays the inevitable confronta-
tion between judicial impartiality and representation. The majority in LULAC
recognized that the minority plaintiffs in that case were not attempting to
change the method of electing judges merely in order to elect "role models. " 4
The LULAC plaintiffs' claims were premised on the demand that minority
voters have the same opportunity as white voters to elect representatives to the
bench.29 The minority voters' claims were a demand for inclusion in the
justice system. They sought to elect judges who could represent their commu-
nities on the bench. 6 They expected that diversity on the bench would bring
more than cosmetic change, but would affect the nature and substance of
judicial decision-making on the trial bench. Although this demand for inclu-
sion injudicial decision-making was an implicit, rather than an explicit prayer
for relief, the Fifth Circuit recognized the focus of the minority plaintiffs'
demand for inclusion and for substantive representation on the bench. In this
sense, the Fifth Circuit's decisions in LULAC can be read as a challenge to
diversity advocates to abandon the role model rhetoric and to address how
racial diversity promotes or is consistent with judicial impartiality.
A. The Boundaries ofJudicial Representation
Judges can serve as impartial representatives. They can do this by ensur-
ing that the perspectives and values of disparate elements in the community
are heard and included in judicial decision-making. Contrary to the majority's
view in LULAC, this does not mean that judges must decide cases in accor-
dance with the wishes of particularized constituents in the community.
To conceive ofjudges as representatives does not mean that judges must
adhere to the views of the public in judicial decisions. Instead, a representa-
tive - even a legislative representative - need only offer her constituents the
294. But see LULACII, 914 F.2d at 659 n.14 (Johnson J., dissenting) (noting that "Black
and Hispanic judges serve as role models for other minority group members."), rev'd sub
nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991). Judge Johnson was
the only Fifth Circuit judge to dissent from the en bane court's decision that judges are not
representatives - a decision the Supreme Court later reversed in Houston Lawyers' Associa-
lion. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court reversal of
L ULA C II).
295. See Voting RightsAct of 1965 § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1986) (protecting black
voters' rights "to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice").
296. The plaintiffs demonstrated that the existing judiciary was distinctly unrepresentative.
In addition to being all-white, judges on the trial bench resided in largely the same neighbor-
hoods.
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opportunity to have their views translated into public policy."9 Although the
ability to translate the wishes or views of a constituency is without question
an important component of representation, it is not always essential to the act
of representing." Even in the legislative arena, the act of representation is
often a more complex and textured exercise than simply transmitting constitu-
ent viewpoints to a deliberative body.
Representation also requires leadership. In the exercise of leadership,
deciding issues contrary to the will of one's constituency is sometimes an
effective and critical function of representation: 9 Representatives need not
guarantee strict adherence to constituent views. This is more true for judges
than for other kinds of representatives. Judges represent more than just the
constituents in their district. They serve the multiple constituencies of the
justice system, the legal profession, the community, and the bench itself.3"
As a result judges must exercise a more disciplined form of representation
than legislators.
Concern that conceiving of judges as representatives will result in a
special interest free-for-all on the bench can ignore the reality that judges are
institutional actors."' Judges have unique obligations which restrain them
from exercising a pure legislative model of representation. For example,
judges - all judges - are bound by legal and ethical obligations, as well as
297. In this regard, I agree with the 19th-century British parliamentarian Edmund Burke's
conception of the representative function. He denounced those who believed that a representa-
tive must sacrifice "his unbiased opinion[,] ... [his] mature judgment[,]... [and] his enlight-
ened conscience" to the will of his constituents. EDMIUND BURKE, BURKE'S POLTICS: SE-
LECTED WRINGs AmD SPEECHES 115 (Ross Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1949) (1774). In Burke's view, although a representative should "most seriously ...
consider" the opinion of his constituents, those views should not serve as "authoritative
instructions" which outweigh the "conviction of... [a representative's] judgment and con-
science." Id. at 116.
298. Nevertheless, representation requires at the very least a strong consideration of the
views of one's constituents. Persistent dismissal or denigration of the well-considered views
of one's constituency, or refusal to hear those views, is inconsistent with the act of representa-
tion.
299. Legislators, who exercise representation in its purest form, must, therefore, in some
instances vote in ways that are at odds with the popular will of their constituents. In the recent
vote to impeach President Clinton, for example, several legislators voted for or against impeach-
ment despite their constituents' views to the contrary.
300. SeeHANAPnNTHECONCEPToFREPRESENTATiONI 17-18(1967) (discussingrole
ofjudiciary as representative of both public and legal system).
301. See Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as an
Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 277 (1997) (analyzing judiciary as ordinary government
institution). Rubin points out that "[m]ost judges, by accepting their appointment, have already
made certain normative choices: one of the most notable of these is that they will uphold the
existing social order." Id. See generally Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983) (describing judges as committed to process that defers to violence of state).
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standards of professionalism that govern their behavior. Other institutional
pressures also circumscribe judges. Judges are trained as lawyers, bound by
precedent, and checked by appeal. Indeed, adherence to precedent is a critical
influence on judicial decision-making, although it may not matter at all to the
public. Judges often must present their judgments in written decisions. 2
Judges must respond to these influences whether they are elected or ap-
pointed. The due process requirement of impartiality compels judges to
refrain from "pre-judging" issues in advance of hearing the facts of a case and
restricts judges to deciding issues based on facts in evidence in a particular
case. All ofthese factors constrict the parameters ofjudicial decision-making.
B. Impartial Representation on the Bench
Put simply, judges can be impartial representatives. This means that in
approaching, analyzing, and deciding legal and factual issues, judges can at
once decide cases without prejudgment and yet represent values and perspec-
tives. The representative function does not run afoul ofthe need for impartial-
ity because the representation function expresses itself in the process of
decision-making, rather than in a judge's ultimate decision about criminal
guilt or innocence, sentencing, or the civil liability of a litigant.
A judge can represent by expressly including alternative perspectives in
the deliberative process. Justice Thurgood Marshall is the prime example of
this kind of judicial representation. He often represented the perspectives of
African Americans, women, prisoners, and other marginalized groups by
bringing the stories of these groups to Supreme Court deliberations. In so
doing, Marshall enriched the Court's process of judicial decision-making by.
insisting that the Justices consider "outsider" narratives and perspectives in
their deliberations. Judges can represent impartially by affirmatively includ-
ing and engaging the perspective of constituent communities in judicial
decision-making.
An important step in accepting this exercise of judicial representation lies
in acknowledging that white judges also function as representatives. They
302. Requiring judges to issue written opinions is one way of encouraging judges to justify
their decision-making to the profession and to the public. For example, Colorado law requires
that three judge panels convened to determine sentencing in capital cases make "specific written
findings" supporting the sentence- whether death or life imprisonment See CoLO. REv. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(2)(b)(11) (1997) (describing process for imposing sentence in class I felonies under
Colorado law); FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (requiring trial judges to make written findings of fact and
conclusions of law). But see W=lliam M. Richman & VWtlliam L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency,
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273,
282 (1996) (noting that federal appellate judges write and publish opinions in less than one-
third of cases of which they dispose). Professors Richman and Reynolds argue that this trend
may compromise judicial accountability and the quality of judicial decision-making on federal
appellate courts. Id. at 284.
468
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articulate, engage and affirm narratives with which they are familiar and with
which they share with their constituent communities. Certainly some data
suggests that this is true in discrimination cases. This does not mean that
white judges are "biased' or "partial;" instead, they are "situated." They are
steeped in and bound by narratives which appear not to be narratives at all
because they are cloaked in the transparency of whiteness.
But as the data above illustrates, race affects how all judges - black and
white - see the world. The "transparency" of whiteness permits the racially
situated responses of white judges to go undetected by traditional impartiality
discourse. But white judges may hear, assess, and analyze discrimination
oases differently than blackjudges. The significance of the difference between
the way white and black judges may be deciding discrimination cases does not
lie in determining whether white or black judges are correctly deciding these
cases. 3 For purposes of diversity discourse, the significance of the disparity
between the way white and black judges decide discrimination cases is the
disparity itself It is the apparent reality that white and black judges hear and
decide these cases differently that challenges the conception of "impartiality"
that results in closer scrutiny of black judicial decision-makers than of white
decision-makers. Unless we are prepared to condemn wholesale black judges
as biased, or condemn wholesale white judges as racist, we must be prepared
to acknowledge that race makes a difference in how judges develop a "sense
of justice," and we must look for opportunities for judges with disparate
"senses" to interact with one another in judicial decision-making.
Ironically, because African American judges, like most middle-class
African Americans, will tend to be exposed to more varied experiences across
race and class lines than their white counterparts, they may be better equipped
than white judges to draw on and utilize a range ofperspectives and values from
communities throughout the society.3 African American judges are likely to
be familiar with the dominant cultural, political, and social perspectives.0"
303. It would be a mistake to romanticize the narratives familiar to black judges or to
demonize the perspectives and values familiar to white judges. The mere fact that a judge is a
minority does not automatically mean that the voice heard is morally superior to other voices.
Minority group members can adopt views that are racist, sexist, or that otherwise reflect
adherence to oppressive master narratives, including oppressive or negative social roles or
relationships. See West, supra note 149, at 55-58.
304. Justice Thurgood Marshall reportedly remarked that the problem with the approach
of his colleagues on the Court to race cases lay in their lack of exposure to African Americans.
See WHILAMS, supra note 46, at 389 (quoting Marshall, in discussion about fiture equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, as saying, "[yL]ou can't name one member of this Court who knows anything
about Negroes before he came to this Court. Name me one.").
305. African Americans, like other traditionally subordinated groups, often are able to ob-
serve whites more readily than whites can observe African Americans. Many African Ameri-
cans continue to clean or care for children in the homes of white families, work in businesses
that whites own and control, and live in a culture in which images of white, middle-class norms
469
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 405 (2000)
While African American perspectives are often unfamiliar to many white
judges," 6 an African American judge regardless of his or her background will
have had to confront and engage white community perspectives in order to
successfully navigate their professional lives as lawyers and often politicians.
In contrast, white judges rarely face the obligation to be familiar with African
American perspectives and values in order to ascend to the bench. In this sense
the all-white bench needs the presence of African American judges in order to
balance the "systemic blindspot" created by a racially homogenous bench.
Obviously appellate judges interact in deliberations to a greater degree
than trial judges. But trial judges also interact in ways sufficient to reap the
rewards of diversity. Judge Jack Weinstein has described the myriad ways that
trial judges interact on the bench in the Eastern District of New York." 7 Prior
to the imposition of Sentencing Guidelines, judges in the Eastern District used
a procedure for sentencing in which a sentencing judge would meet with two
other district judges and the probation officer in charge. 30 All of the judges
would discuss the sentence, although the sentencing judge ultimately imposed
the final judgment. According to Judge Weinstein, federal trial judges handling
asbestos cases also met informally "to discuss substantive and precedential
issues."3 9 Weinstein also points out that trial judges routinely work closely
with magistrate judges on resolving procedural issues and setting the parame-
ters oflitigation.310 Moreover, the informal opportunities for interaction among
dominate. This exposure may permit blacks to know more about the lifestyle and perspective
of whites than whites do about blacks. And because blacks tend to identify, discuss and openly
address racial issues from an early age, blacks may be particularly adept at understanding white
racism. See Dalton, supra note 141, at 439-40 n.1 (discussing role of minority scholars in
critical jurisprudence "circles"); see also Roediger, supra note 54, at 4 (observing that "African
Americans have been among the nation's keenest students of white consciousness and white
behavior"). Mystery novelist Barbara Neely has made this theory the centerpiece of her fictional
books featuring African American domestic worker, Blanche. Blanche is a reluctant mystery
heroine whose pdsition as a domestic worker among wealthy white families gives her a special
and useful insight into the practicalities and motivations of her often murderous employers. See
generally, e.g., BARBARA NEELY, BLANCHE AMONG THE TALENTED TENTH (1994); BARBARA
NEELY, BLANcHE ON THE LAM (1992).
306. See White, supra note 9, at 1216 (noting value of Justice Marshall's perspective in
judicial conferences because, as Justice White stated, Marshall could impart "that which we did
not know due to the limitations of our own experience"). White judges also may unconsciously
deny the reality of African American experiences. Justice White noted that Justice Marshall
"would tell us things that we knew but would rather forget." Id.
307. See JackWeinstein,Limits onJudges'Learning, Speaking andActing: Partff Speak-
ing and Part lllActing, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1994) (discussing methods ofjudicial
consultation in criminal and civil cases).
308. Id. at 15.
309. Id. at 15 n.74. Judge Weinstein also points out that state judges formed the Mass
Torts Litigation Committee.
310. See id. at 17 (discussing interaction between trial and magistrate judges on discovery
issues).
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trial court judges - on specialized judicial committees, in administrative
meetings, and even in social interactions - may provide opportunities for
diversity to effect judicial decision-making.3 ' Given the role of race in influ-
encing judicial decision-making, the most compelling project may be to devise
more opportunities for judges to interact with one another in judicial decision-
making. If impartiality and informed legal decision-making are achieved best
by the interaction of diverse viewpoints - "a balancing of eccentricities" in
Justice Cardozo's words"' - then promoting greater interaction among judges
with diverse perspectives may be a better method for improving fairness in
judicial decision-making rather than seeking individual judges who are men-
tally "stripped" of their connection with the values of the communities they
represent, or branding judges who articulate "outsider" voices as biased.313
C. Constituent Expression and Policymaking in
Judicial Decision-Making
Advancing judges as impartial representatives also will require that we
rethink traditional conceptions of the limits of the judicial branch and the
judicial function. Without question the Fifth Circuit's resistance to the
plaintiffs efforts in LULAC was based in part on the court's traditional con-
ception of the judicial branch of government as restrained, limited in power
and detached from the community.314 Because the judicial branch has rarely
311. Moreover, trial judges exercise authority in other ways which provide opportunities
to represent communities. See Mf11, supra note 12, at 137-41 (noting that in areas of political
patronage, hiring of court personnel, appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, law clerk
hiring, and judicial training, judges represent perspectives and interests of their constituencies).
There is no question that the hiring of black court personnel including secretaries, bailiffs and
judicial clerks, correlates positively with the number of black judges on the bench. By provid-
ing opportunities for excluded groups to work in the courthouse, blackjudges provide commu-
nities with opportunities to participate more fully in the judicial system. Id. at 139. Similarly,
black judges help bring black lawyers into the mainstream by recognizing them in the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants and in recommending minority lawyers for service on
important bar association and other professional development committees. Id at 140.
312. CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 177.
313. Judith Resnick has suggested that perhaps judging should abandon the single judge
model. See Resnick, supra note 120, at 1924-35 (advocating greater representation of feminist
perspective on bench). Instead, Professor Resnick suggests that we should promote "more
communal modes of decision-making, insisting upon groups of two, three, or four judges to
share the honor, the obligation, and the pain of decision." Id. at 1924-25; see also Martha
Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of
Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1209 (1992) (arguing that "a collaborative
decision-making process involving people reflecting . . . multiple perspectives exhibits the
special virtue of ajury or multi-judge panel compared with a single judge").
314. Alexander Hamilton's description of the judiciary as "the least dangerous" branch of
government was premised on the idea that judges have "neither force, nor will, but merely
judgment." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948).
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been regarded as a locus for community expression and representation, courts
may be at a loss to envision how minority judges can engage minority commu-
nity perspectives and values in judicial decision-making. Thus, conceiving of
judges as representatives also requires that we recognize the judicial branch
of government as an appropriate forum for community expression.
As discussed above, Sylvia Lazos Vargas in "Democracy and Inclusion"
offers a compelling analysis of the role judges can play in recognizing, includ-
ing, and legitimizing "the multitude of views and perspectives that exist in our
society."31 Lazos Vargas contemplates the judiciary as playing a key role in
"emphasizing pluralist democratic values of inclusiveness and participatory co-
equality" in addressing cases involving intergroup conflict. 16 Judges can do
this by explicitly recognizing and addressing conflicting minority and majority
"epistemologist.0 17
Lazos Vargas's vision ofjudges engaging and utilizing multiple perspec-
tives in judicial decision-making implicitly recognizes why diversity can con-
tribute to richjudicial decision-making. As representatives, judges should seek
out opportunities to infuse judicial decision-making with expression and dia-
logue. In so doing, judges can exercise an "expressive" form of representa-
tion - one which values the expression of conflicting views over the suppres-
sion of competing voices. MelissaWilson, in her excellent work on representa-
tion and race, describes the theory of "expressive representation" as premised
on the idea that "the expression ofgroup interests [is] a valuable and indispens-
able part of the process of good government"31 By contrast, "suppressive rep-
resentation" views "intergroup differences as dangerous and destabilizing.n
319
Traditionally, judicial decision-making has reflected a suppressive form
of representation. Unanimous opinions - which purport to speak in a unified
voice oftruth - carry greater weight and authority, particularly where contro-
versial public policy issues are at stake.32" Acknowledging the representative
315. LazosVargas, supra note 211, at 154.
316. Id. at 154-55.
317. Lazos Vargas uses the word epistemology to describe "the conflict in perspective
between majorities and minorities that are reflected on constitutional law." Id. at 155 n.13.
318. WLUIAMS,supra note 171,at 51. Melissa Williams explores expressive and suppres-
sive representation theories in her analysis of the representation theories of Edmund Burke,
John Stuart Mill, J.C. Calhoun, and James Madison. Id.
319. Id. at 9.
320. Justice Holmes once described dissents as "useless and undesirable." Northern See.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also LEARNED
HAND, THE BilL OF RIGHTs 72 (1958). ChiefJustice Earl Warren is known to have made great
efforts to secure a unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See RICHARD KLuGER, SiMPI JusTicE 693-99 (Alfred A- Knopt Inc. 1994) (1976) (discussing
process of drafting unanimous opinion in Brown). In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), all
nine Justices of the Supreme Court signed the opinion ordering Arkansas high schools to
desegregate, signaling recalcitrant state officials of the Court's unity and resolve that Arkansas
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role of judges invites us to reconsider the value of monologue in judicial
decision-making 2' and encourages us to value judicial decision-making which
expresses multiple or even disparate perspectives.3" Seeking diversity among
judges positions judges as "expressive" representatives, capable of engaging
multiple and competing perspectives in the exercise of the judicial function.
Rather than pronouncements of obvious and absolute truths, judicial
decisions articulate "at most, a hypothesis about meaning at one point in time
situated in a continuing dialogue."3" As such, we should value dissents as
evidence that the judiciary is impartial, balanced, and engaged in a rigorous
analysis of important questions.324 Concurring opinions should be encouraged
when they introduce alternative perspectives and analyses of complex prob-
lems. 3" In surn, the value of uniformity in judicial decision-making should be
tempered with the need for the judiciary to create opportunities for expressive
representation.
Likewise the courtroom has long been viewed as "a forum with strictly
defined limits for discussion." '26 Manyjudges still adhere to Justice Douglas's
description of the courtroom as "a hallowed place of quiet dignity as far
officials obey its desegregation order. See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(finding state officials to the dictates of the Brown decision). See also Deborah Hellman, The
Importance ofAppearing Pincipled, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1107, 1143 n.162 (1995) (citing Kent
Greenwalt and other scholars who contend that there are reasons for Justices "not to write
separately in cases dealing with important issues").
321. See Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom, 101 DICKINSON L. REV. 1, 18
(1996) (criticizing judicial opinions which "typically act like a monologic crucible combining
multiple perspectives into a 'unified accent"'). In this way, Rubinson argues, most judicial
opinions "subordinate not only the perspectives of the litigants, but the perspectives of other
judges." Id. at 18.
322. As Hanna Pitkin observes, "This kind of argument can be made only if we ascribe to
the courts ... a good deal of freedom to act and to choose. If we adhere to the older jurispru-
dential doctrine, that the judge merely discovers and expounds the law, we cannot regard him
as the representative of group pressures." Pr=N, supra note 300, at 117.
323. Rubinson, supra note 321, at 39.
324. See Weinstein, supra note 307, at 29-30 (recognizing that dissents may reduce public
respect for judicial institutions but acknowledging value of dissents as "a wake-up call to
legislators" or as "precursor for [en bane] review"). Weinstein cites the dissents in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), as
instances in which dissents have formed the basis for future majority opinions or expressions
of constitutional interpretation. See Weinstein, supra note 307, at 29 n.143.
325. Judges should explicitly acknowledge that alternative voices speak in litigation. As
David Luban has commented, there are many possible views of "justice within the system" -
otherwise every appellate judicial opinion would be unanimous. David Luban, The Quality of
Justice, 66 DENy. U. L. REv. 381, 384 (1989) (detailing two senses ofjustice - "justice within
the system" and "revisionary justice").
326. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(explaining how Constitution, laws, and tradition demand judicial restraint in application of
First Amendment protections).
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removed as possible fromthe emotions ofthe street." '27 But Justice Thurgood
Marshall once described courtrooms as "perhaps the most accurate barometer
of the extent to which we've succeeded in building a just society."3rs The
"outsider" communication style of many minority litigants frequently puts
them at a disadvantage inthe courtroom.329 Assigning greater value to expres-
sion in courtroom proceedings also may be an important part of the process
of reconceptualizing the opportunity for expression and representation in the
judicial branch. Judges, who enjoy virtually unfettered power to control the
parameters of litigant and witness expression in the courtroom, can play a
crucial role in bringing greater expressive opportunities to litigation.
Accepting judges as representatives also requires acknowledging the
policymaking function ofjudging. In Gregory v. Ashcrof,330 decided the same
day as Chisom33 and Houston Lawyers'Association,332 the Supreme Court
held that state judges are policymakers, because judges "exercise... discre-
tion concerning issues of public importance." '333 According to the Court in
Ashcroft, the common-law judges at bottom exercise "a well-considered
judgment of what is best for the community.""' Determining "what is best for
the community" remains the essential policymaking function of judging.
327. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 457 (1971) (asserting that petitioner's
contemptuous conduct would shock "those raised in the Western tradition").
328. Remarks of the Hon. Thurgood Marshall Upon the Occasion of his Acceptance of
Honorary Membership in the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 20, 1973),
in 29 REC. ASS'N BAR CrIY N.Y. 15, 16 (1974); see also Yamamoto, supra note 156, at 6
(describing courts as "integral parts... of a larger communicative process" for indigenous
people's claims).
329. See generallyBarbaraBezdek, Silence in the Courtroom: Participation and Subordi-
nation ofPoor Tenants' Votes in the Legal Process, 20 HoFsTRAL. REv. 533 (1992) (describ-
ing judges' reactions to presentation style of African American tenants appearing in Baltimore
City rent court). See Moore, supra 185, at 297-305 (explaining how African American
women's chances of asserting battered woman's syndrome defenses suffer because of unsympa-
thetic stereotype of the "nagging" and "angry" African American woman); see also John M.
Conley et al., The Power ofLanguage: PresentationalStyle in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1375, 1392-97 (evaluating effectiveness of courtroom speaking styles common to those with
little social power versus those in upper classes).
330. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
331. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 398-404 (1991) (holding that judges are
"representatives" for purposes of § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965).
332. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419,426 (1991) (holding
that § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965 covers even those judges "whose responsibilities are
exercised independently in an area coextensive with the districts from which they are elected").
333. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (holding that state's mandatory
retirement provision for judges did not violate Age Discrimination in Employment Act because
Act excluded from coverage "appointee[s] on the policymaking level").
334. Id. at 466. The Court echoed Justice Holmes's view that in describing the sources of
their judicial decision-making, the "considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always
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The traditional view that judges simply interpret the will of legislators
fails to account for the complexity of the judicial task. Judges are at once
interpreters, fact-finders, and policy-makers. In each of these areas, judges
exercise discretion. 35 The fact-finding role of trial judges is well-known.
In this capacity, judges exercise the awesome and virtually "uncontrollable
power ('discretion') to choose the facts - that is, to choose to believe one
witness rather than another." '36 This fact-finding power is perhaps the prin-
cipal area in which judges exercise discretion and perform the complex
task of judicial decision-making. 7 As one judge put it "the art of judging
begins with the portrayal of the facts."33 Even the act of interpretation is
not free from discretion. "[T]he judge who relies on plain language, like
the one who looks to legislative history or statutory purpose, makes value
judgments.
3 39
with an apology" are "considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned."
OhRWPENDRELHOLMEs, THE COMMONLAW 35 (MarkDeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1923).
335. The traditional view that judges only exercise discretion within a very limited and
narrow set of cases is belied by the reality of modem-day judicial decision-making. See Ifill,
supra note 12, at 141-48 (describing the broad discretionary power of judges in family law,
criminal law, and trial procedure).
336. FRANK, supra note 131, at xiii (noting appellate courts' unavoidable reliance upon
trial courts' inaccurate versions of facts).
337. See id. at 116 (citing with approval commentators who make this argument). In
making this observation, Frank was again focused on the work of trial judges. But as Frank
himself observed, it is not always possible to draw a bright-line distinction between fact and
law. Instead, Judge Frank has argued that legal and factual considerations "are not distinct" in
judicial decision-making "but intertwin[ed] in the thought processes" of the trial judge. Id. at
xi. For this reason, appellate judges also exercise discretion in their use of the facts.
338. Stewart G. Pollack, The Art of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 594 (1996) (citing
RICHARD A. PosNER, OVERCoMING LAW 195 (1995)). While the discretionary authority "to
choose the facts" is perceived to be distinctly a trial judge's power, strong evidence attests to
the fact that appellate judges increasingly are exercising broad discretionary power in reviewing
factual determinations made by trial courts. See Eric Schnapper, JudgesAgainst Juries-Appel-
late Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 237,248 (showing that reversal
rate of jury verdicts and awards in civil cases depends in large part on background of judges
sitting on appellate panels). Indeed, appellate judges increasingly may be usurping the tradi-
tional "fact-finding" role of both juries and trial judges. This trend is particularly disturbing
because according to Schnapper's study, judges in general, and appellate judges in particular,
tend to demonstrate bias in favor of defendants and governmental entities in civil cases. Id. at
354 (offering statistics to show that appeals of civil defendants succeed more than twice as often
as plaintiffs' appeals). When appellate judges routinely reduce or reverse jury awards to
plaintiffs, or reverse the fact-based decisions of trial judges, they often express values or
legitimize narratives directly contradictory to those of the jury. See Kenneth S. Klein, Unpack-
ing the Jury Box, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1355 (1996) (noting that "appellate reversals ofjury
fact-finding, once a rare event, have occurred in almost half of federal civil jury trials when
appellants raised a sufficiency of evidence point").
339. Pollack, supra note 338, at 597.
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Polieymaking is a distinct and important aspect of whatjudges do. While
the policymaking function of judging is often perceived of and critiqued as a
product of modem-day judicial decision-making, policymaking is an intrinsic
aspect of the judicial function. 40 Both Justices Holmes and Cardozo openly
described the polieymaking or "legislative" aspect of judging. 41  Holmes
contended that "every important principle which is developed by litigation is
in fact and at bottom the result of public policy." 2
Critics ofjudicialpolicymaking suggestthatpolicymaking falls outsidethe
judicial function."' In their view, judges who make "policy" decisions, there-
fore, usurp the power ofthe legislative and executive branches."M But it is not
clear that we can draw strict and recognizable lines between judicial "policy-
making" and "interpretation." Very often judges advance public policy under
the guise of interpretation or fact-finding. 4 In these instances "interpreta-
tion" and "fact-finding" are tools which serve the policymaking function of
judging 4 , A federal court's departure from established precedent, for exam-
340. Indeed, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin argue that modem government is so
different in its configuration and function from the conception of government at the formation
of the republic, that the traditional rationale for resisting a policymaking role for judges no
longer exists. See MALCOLM M. FE= & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKNG AND
THEMODERNSTATE: HOWTBECOUJRTSREFORMEDAMERCA'SPRISONS 20-21 (1998) (arguing
that modem administrative state has diminished importance of separation of powers and
federalism, concepts long-regarded as strongest barriers to judicial policymaking).
341. See HOLMES, supra note 334, at 32 (recognizing courts' unconscious yet pervasive
legislative function); CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 115-20 (reasoning that history forces judge
to "shape his judgment of the law in obedience to the same aims which would be those of a
legislator who was proposing himselfto regulate the question").
342. HoLMES, supra note 334, at 35.
343. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) (calling for "principled" decision-making based on reasons that "transcend
any immediate result that is involved"). See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1057 (1975) (suggesting that judges base their decisions on principle arguments rather
than on their own discretion).
344. For an analysis and critique of this view, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMmICAN LAW 356-62 (1990) (questioning
existence of clear boundaries between branches of government).
345. See FE2= & RUBIN, supra note 340, at 7-11 (postulating that society recognize
policymaking as distinct aspect of'judicial function, existing independently of "interpretive" or
fact-finding function ofjudges).
346. Judge Weinstein has described the "nullification" practices of some Northern judges
who used "the standard interpretive practices and the distinguishing of cases" to avoid applying
the Dred Scott decision. Weinstein, supra note 307, at 27 (citation omitted). Judge Weinstein
reminds us that "ft]he Nazi judges' silence, acquiescence, and active participation in the gravest
injustices serves as a reminder that the duty to decide cases in accordance with statutes or
precedent is not absolute." Id. at 25 (citing Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and
Hitler's Injustice, 93 CoLuM. L. REv. 1807 (1993)). Justice Holmes expressed confidence in
the fact that "the law is administered by able and experienced men who know too much to
sacrifice good sense for a syllogism." HOLMES, supra note 334, at 36.
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pie, is often a recognition of new, different, and compelling public policy
considerations which demand a different interpretation of legal precepts. For
example, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment did not change between 1896,
whenPlessyv. Fergusone7 was decided, and 1954, whenthe Court reversed the
decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation.34 Yet the post-World War I reality
of American life, combined with the United States position as the pre-eminent
democratic world power, compelled a departure from the Jim Crow interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Plessy majority had endorsed. 49
The policymaking function ofjudges reminds us that judges do not exist
outside of the community and are not immune to the public discourse that
takes place within communities.350 Judges are key participants in our public
discourse about critical issues. In fact, the leadership function of judicial
representation makes it entirely appropriate for the judicial branch to contrib-
ute to, or in some instances, lead our national, state or local community dis-
course about issues of public importance. The language of the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown, for example, describing the effect of racial segre-
gation on the "hearts and minds" of black children,35 shaped our national dis-
cussion about racism for decades. Similarly, prison condition cases brought
347. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (determining that forced segregation did not violate Thirteenth
or Fourteenth amendments).
348. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (concluding that "separate but equal" public schools violated
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause).
349. See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (contending that America's domestic image of
equality and inclusion served nation's foreign policy objectives). The same transformation
occurred in the federal courts' interpretation of prison condition cases brought under the Eighth
Amendment In their study ofjudicial policymaking, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin note
that from the 1930s through the mid-1960s, when prisoners challenged prison conditions as
violative of the Eighth Amendment, courts routinely held those claims non-justiciable. See
generally FE= & RUBIN, supra note 340. Beginning in 1965, however, federal courts began
to uphold prison condition challenges brought under the Eighth Amendment. For the next 20
years federal courts, which had previously found no authority for federal courts to enjoin state
prison practices under the Eighth Amendment, aggressively entered the area of prison reform,
and interpreted the Eighth Amendment as authorizing federal courts to monitor and supervise
"the square footage of the cells, the nutritional content of [prisoner] meals, the number of times
each prisoner could shower, and the wattage of light bulbs in prisoner's cells." Id. at 13.
350. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,466 (1897)
(remarking that "we do not realize how large a part our law is open to reconsideration upon a
slight change in the habit of the public mind"). For example, the Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was, without question, strongly affected by a post-
World War II understanding of oppression and freedom. America's nearly solidified role as the
leader of the "free world" during this period increased the expectation that America's interna-
tional rhetoric match its domestic practices. The Justices on the Court could not and should not
have been immune to the national and international discourse that was developing about the
meaning of equality and freedom.
351. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (discussing segregation's effect on childhood develop-
ment).
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duringthe 1960s and 1970s emerged withinthe context ofanational discourse
about civil rights. That discourse highlighted the racialized nature of infa-
mous prison plantations such as Cummins Farm in Arkansas and Parchman in
Mississippi which maintained black prisoners in conditions described as
"worse than slavery." '352 The action of federal judges in the prison condition
cases created a framework within which the nation could begin a discourse
about the inherent humanity of prisoners."'
Finally, judges also advance public policy through their procedural and
administrative decisions. Judges collectively act as policymakers through
collegial administrative bodies. The federal United States Judicial Confer-
ence, which advises Congress on judicial administration, has issued state-
ments expressing disapproval of mandatory sentencing and the federalization
of traditional state crimes. 4 Judicial administrative and procedural policies
favoring settlement, alternative dispute resolution, and mediation constitute
expressions of policy. Like new federal rules that compel opposing counsel
to serve one another with unrequested discovery disclosures,15 these rules
contemplate a more limited role for judges in adjudication and endorse a move
away from adversarial litigation and toward consensus resolution of legal
conflict.356 The Supreme Court's decision to reduce dramatically the number
of cases heard on writs of certiorari is ostensibly an internal administrative
decision, but remains one that has enormous public policy effect.35 Proce-
352. See DAvID M. OsniNsKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHmAN FARM AND THE
ORDEAL OF JIM CRow Jusioi 135-55 (1996) (detailing daily operations of Mississippi State
Penitentiary).
353. Feeley and Rubin discuss one of the most famous cases of this time in which Judge
Henley of Arkansas wrote:
For the ordinary convict a sentence to the Arkansas Penitentiary today amounts to
a banishment from civilized society to a dark and evil world completely alien to the
free world, a world that is administered by criminals under unwritten rules and
customs completely foreign to free world culture.
FE=Y & RuBIN, supra note 340, at 64 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381-82 (ED.
Ark. 1970)).
354. See Weinstein, supra note 307, at 11 & n.51 (citing statements by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Administrative Office of Courts in 1993 and 1994). Weinstein is one of several
senior federal judges who, in protest of draconian mandatory sentencing requirements, has
refused to hear drug cases. Id. at 11-12 (citing Joseph B. Treaster, Two Judges Decline Drug
Cases, Protesting SentencingRules, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 17,1993, §1 at 1); see also Jonathan M.
Moses, Many Judges Skirt Sentencing Guidelines, WAIL ST. J., May 7, 1993, at B12 (noting
that fifty senior federal district court judges refuse to hear drug cases).
355. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (detailing mandatory disclosures parties must provide "with-
out awaiting a discovery request").
356. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (noting that
moving toward more consensus oriented resolution may result in need for fewer judges).
357. See generally David 0. Stewart, Quiet Times: The Supreme Court Is Reducing Its
Workload - But ,rhy?, 80 A.BAJ. 40 (Oct 1994) (describing Supreme Court's dramatic
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dural decisions are sometimes explicitly reflective of public policy consider-
ations. Recently federal appellate courts have premised opinions reversing
trial judge grants of class certification in major products liability cases, for
example, on the appellate courts' concernthat class certification in those cases
could affect public policy.35 In sum, recognizing the policymaking function
ofjudging helps us begin to see how judges serve a representative function.
V Seeking Diversity in the Judicial Decision-Making:
Focusing on the Community's Perspective Rather Than the Judge's
A. Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence
As reflected in the preceding discussion, regarding minority judges as role
models discourages an examination of the potential for the minority judges to
include, to engage and to represent "outsider" voices in judicial decision-
making.359 By their very nature, role models promote the legitimacy of the
status quo. They serve as examples of those who have successfully navigated
their way through the existing system to attain success.3"o While this message
has obvious appeal and value, the image of a minority role model judge
ignores the unique and transformative contribution minority judges can make
to judicial decision-making. 61
reduction in cases heard by Court). Stewart notes that "because a certiorari petition requires the
votes of four justices to be granted, the wholesale decline in the Court's docket must be the
result of a consensus among the [J]ustices that they should decide fewer cases." Id.
358. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,740-52 (5th Cir. 1996) (decerti-
fying class of nicotine dependent persons because of variations in state law and individual
nature of each plaintiff's claim); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-99 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that class certification of hemophiliacs infected with AIDS was improper
at least in part because of distrust ofjury's capabilities).
359. See Man J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH L. REV. 2320,2323-26 (1989) (describing growth of"outsider" jurisprudence);
Delgado, supra note 28, at 2412-13 & n. 8 (describing different effects of stories of member of
"outgroup," which includes any group whose consciousness differs from that of dominant
group).
360. See LULAC I, 914 F.2d 620, 659 n.14 (5th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(hypothesizing that minority electoral victories encourage minority voting participation because
"Black and Hispanic judges serve as role models for other minority group members, who may
not have envisioned a legal or judicial career as a real possibility in the past"). At the confirma-
tion hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court, Wyoming Senator Alan
Simpson praised the nominee stating "[y]ou exemplify what all of us might be able to accom-
plish... if we were to stop making excuses .... So, you are an inspiration to us all." The
Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 62 (1991) (Opening
Statement of Hon. Alan K. Simpson, U.S. Senator from State of Wyoming).
361. The current role-model image also masks the reality of what it takes to become a judge
for most black lawyers. Most Africans American lawyers need much more than moxie, smarts
and determination to become judges. The use of at-large election districts to elect judges, the
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By obscuring the potential for minority judges to transform judicial
decision-making, the role model argument positions black judges as cosmetic
symbols, rather than as democratic representatives. This emphasis draws
attention to the racial "face" of the judge, rather than to the substance of a
judge's decision-making or contribution to broadening the scope of judicial
decision-making. A black "role model" judge is credited solely for being
black and inspiring others, rather than assessed for his competence, perfor-
mance or effectiveness as a representative.3 62 By contrast, connecting diver-
influence of financial contributions from large firms to favored judicial candidates, and the use
of judicial appointments as political patronage, are only a few examples of barriers that exist in
many states, frustrating the efforts of qualified minority judicial candidates. For example, in
many jurisdictions a judicial candidate must amass a "war chest" in order to have a realistic
chance of winning a judicial seat. Furthermore, campaign contributions for judicial elections
often rival or exceed contributions for other elected offices. See Bradley A. Siciliano, Note,
Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: Creating the Appearance ofImpropriety, 20
HoFsTRA L. REv. 217, 218-28 (1991) (discussing dangers of judicial campaign contributions
from attorneys in context of Model Code of Judicial Conduct); Richard Woodbury, Is Texas
Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74 (noting Pennzoil counsel's $248,000 donation
during its multi-million court battle with Texaco); "60 Minutes" Examines Controversy Over
Donations to Judges, Hous. POST, Dec. 7, 1987, at 2A (same). In this sense the job of black
role model judge, like other racial role models, requires that you lie. See Richard Delgado,
Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?,
89 MIca L. REv. 1222,1228 (1991) (discussing five reasons why minority would not wantjob
of "role model" in today's society). As Professor Delgado has argued, "[S]uppose I am sent to
an inner city school to talk to the kids and serve as role model of the mohth. I am expected to
tell the kids that if they study hard and stay out of trouble, they can be a law professor like me.
That, however, is a very big lie: a whopper." Id.
362. Nowhere is the danger of cosmetic judicial diversity more apparent than in the enter-
tainment industry's fascination with the black role model judge. Black judges are over-
represented in fictionalized television and film portrayals of courtroom proceedings. Actors
Morgan Freeman, Alfre Woodard, and other black performers regularly portray straight-talking,
no nonsense black judges in films such as The Bonfire of the Vanities (Warner Brothers 1990),
PrimalFear (Paramount Pictures 1996), and television programs such as The PracticeLaw and
Order, One Life to Live, and General Hospital. Leonard Steinhorn and Barbara Diggs-Brown
refer to this phenomenon as "virtual integration." LEONARD Sn ORN & BARBARA DIGGS-
BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR SKIN: THE ILLUSION OF INTEGRATION AND TiE REALUTY OF
RAC E 146 (1999). Steinhorn and Diggs-Brown contend that the "virtual integration" presented
on television and in films makes it easier for whites to accept the "racial reality," of segregation,
by "giv[ing] white Americans the sensation of having meaningful, repeated contact with blacks
without actually having it." Id. This over-representation of fictional black judges in films and
TV imperils public support of judicial diversity efforts. It sends the message that blacks have
attained judicial office at higher rates than is borne out by reality. By conveying this message,
TV and film portrayals of black judges may undermine popular support for increased racial
diversity on the bench by suggesting that our nation's benches are already racially diverse or
that blacks have "taken over" the courts. In this way, distortions of race in our visual media can
cause "the project of inclusion [to be] felt as one of takeover... [and] the goal of equality...
as favoritism." WLLhAMS, supra note 22, at 29. As Professor Patricia Williams has cautioned,
"racial representations in popular culture present a[n] . . . urgent concern in a society as
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sity efforts to increasing cultural pluralism in judicial decision-making com-
pels a deeper and closer look at a minority judge's potential to contribute to
and enrich judicial decision-making. Acknowledging the unique contribution
that minority judges can make to judicial decision-making also compels us to
examine the impoverished nature ofjudicial discourse which excludes minor-
ity voices.
Likewise, the "public confidence" rationale fails as a sufficiently persua-
sive basis for mandating racial diversity on the bench. The public confidence
rationale is, in fact, a distinctly disempowering justification for racial inclu-
sion on the bench. It bases the value of diversity on the questionable aim of
strengthening the appearance ofjustice, rather than on the goal of increasing
actual fairness in the administration of'justice. Given the wealth of evidence
demonstrating that racial discrimination pervades the justice system in most
states,363 prescribing "the appearance of justice" as a palliative to the African
American community without the promise of actual fairness, invites rather
than ameliorates a deepening crisis of confidence in our judicial system. It
suggests that the appearance ofjustice is the best we can achieve.
B. The Challenge of the Clarence Thomas Nomination
The 1992 nomination and confirmation battle of Clarence Thomas for a
seat on the United States Supreme Court revealed the urgent need for a
reassessment of our judicial diversity discourse. Thomas was the first Su-
preme Court nominee who came to the nomination proceedings almost exclu-
sively as a role model. Distinguishing himself in neither the world of big law
firm practice nor academia prior to becoming a judge on the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, Thomas's supporters advanced his race and his
perseverance in overcoming childhood poverty and racism to the public as his
principal qualifications for service on the Court. In what U.S. Civil Rights
Commissioner Mary Frances Berry calls an "up from Southern poverty" strat-
egy,3" Thomas and his backers used Thomas's race and his experience with
poverty to create an image of Thomas as the ultimate role model. The re-
peated references to Thomas's impoverished childhood, along with his seem-
relentlessly bombarded with visual images as ours." Id. at 28; see also Benjamin DeMott, Put
on a Happy Face: Masking theDifferencesBetween Blacks and Whites, HARPER's MAO., Sept
1995, at 31-38 (critiquing misleading film portrayals of friendship between blacks and whites).
363. A majority of states have undertaken studies of gender and race bias in the courts.
The findings of these states provide startling and overwhelming evidence that the justice system
continues to be infected with bias. See, e.g., Report and Recommendations of the Florida
Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission Final Report (Dec. 11, 1991);
Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System Final Report (May
1993); New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns Final Report (June 1992);
Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities (Apr. 1991).
364. SeeBERRY, supra note 163, at 18.
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ing lack of bitterness about his humble beginnings and about racism, conveyed
the image of Thomas as a quintessentially American figure - strong, simple,
humble, an everyman.365 But as a role model, Thomas presented an alluring
image to many white Americans. Thomas offered the promise that if other
blacks simply would persevere, and leave behind concerns about racism, they
could go as far as Thomas had gone is his meteoric rise to High Court nomi-
nee. In short, Thomas offered a kind of white fantasy of what blacks could be
like if they would only put race issues behind them."
While Thomas's backers viewed him as a black role model, to many
blacks, Thomas was not a role model.367 In fact, given his record at the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his political views, his public
taunting of his sister as a "welfare queen," " and his disparaging remarks
about well-regarded black leaders, most blacks would have considered
Thomas the very opposite of a role model.
Thomas's nominationthrew manyblack leaders and civil rights organiza-
tions into turmoil in deciding whether or not to oppose his nomination to the
High Court.369 Despite their disagreement with nearly all of Thomas's posi-
365. While these qualities might be valuable in a generic role model, these were not the
qualities one would tend to associate with service on the nation's highest court - a job widely
viewed as among the most intellectually challenging in the nation.
366. Wyoming Senator Alan Simpson essentially said this out-right when he remarked
during the first hearings:
[T]here are too many people giving groups excuses for various things that happened
in their lives .... But I think that the last thing anyone needs right now in this
country, white, brown, yellow, or black is more excuses for everything. Excuse
time is over.... You exemplify what all of us might be able to accomplish... if
we were to stop making excuses.... So, you are an inspiration to us all.
The Nomination of Clarence Thomas, supra note 360, 102d Cong. at 61-62.
367. The presentation of Thomas in the first set of confirmation hearings reveals yet
another fundamental flaw with the role model justification for judicial diversity. Whose con-
ception of a role model governs? See, e.g., Trevor W. Coleman, Doubting Thomas, EMERGE,
Nov. 1993, at40.
368. See Nell Irvin Painter, Hill, Thomas, and the Use of Racial Stereotype, in RACE-ING
JUSTCE, EN-GENDER]NG POWER: ESSAYS ON ANtrA HIL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALTiY 201-03 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (describing Thomas's
sister more completely as "two-job-holding, minimum-wage-earning mother of four"); Clarence
Page, Thomas Lied: Sister Isn't Welfare Queen, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 1991, at
3C (explaining that sister spent four years on welfare to take care of elderly aunt).
369. See Stuart Alan Clarke, Fear of a Black Planet, SOCIALIST REV. 37, 42-43 (1992)
(explaining that if black groups had supported Thomas's nomination, it could isolate them from
allies on left and could aid attacks on affirmative action as well as confuse some of their black
constituency); Dele Olojede, Quandary for Black Leaders, NEWSDAY, Aug. 1, 1991, at 4
(stating that NAACP's position against Thomas's nomination has failed to close divisions in
black community); Gaiy Lee, Nominee Thomas Finds No Middle Ground; In Behind-Scenes
Campaign, Black Legal Community Exhibits Extremes ofMind," WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1991,
at A4 (stating that black lawyers' attitudes about Thomas were very divisive).
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tions on civil rights issues, a majority of blacks supported Thomas at the time
of his confirmation. Some advocated supporting Thomas because they feared
that if Thomas were not confirmed, President Bush would appoint a white
candidate to fill the position. ° Others believed that as a black man Thomas
ultimately would prove himself committed to the advancement of civil rights
in his decision-making on the Court.37' Other blacks and civil rights leaders
and organizations, however, opposed Thomas's nomination.372 They explic-
itly recognized that the value of diversity is inextricably connected to the
willingness of a racial representative to advance the viewpoints and values of
the excluded group he represents. To these diversity advocates, the open seat
on the Court was not merely "a black seat." That seat had been held by a
particular black man - Thurgood Marshall.373
Marshall's role on the court was not defined solely by his being black.
Instead, Marshall's contribution to the Court was measured by his willingness
to forcefully advance the perspective and values of blacks in interpreting legal
doctrine - a perspective that had theretofore been absent from Supreme Court
deliberations. 74 Justice Marshall's willingness to share these perspectives
and to use them to persuade his court colleagues to rethink legal doctrine in
the context of the lives of marginalized people, is an example of the power of
370. See Robert A. Jordan, After Marshall, A Dilemmafor Blacks, BOSTON GLOBE, June
30, 1991, at 61 (noting that "Bush can easily nominate a white conservative and not be con-
erned about political ramifications from black leadership or electorate").
371. See, e.g., Maya Angelou, I Dare to Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, at A15
(remarking that "[b]ecause Clarence Thomas has been poor, has been nearly suffocated by the
acrid odor of racial discrimination, is intelligent, well trained, black and young enough to be
won over again, I support him."). Many blacks who initially supported Thomas have since
denounced him in light of his hostile record on civil rights issues. See Coleman, supra note
367, at 38,39.
372. See, e.g.,MALDEF Extremely Disappointed with Supreme Court Nominee, Mexican
American Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (July 1, 1991) (on file with author); Statement of Julius L.
Chambers on Behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. Regarding the
Nomination of Clarence Thomas (Aug. 15, 1991) (on file with author); Haywood Bums,
Clarence Thomas, A Counterfeit Hero, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1991, at A19 (stating opposition to
Thomas's nomination); Christopher Edley, Jr.,Doubting Thomas: Law, Politics andHypocrisy,
WASH. POST, July 7,1991, at BI (expressing disdain for nomination of Thomas).
373. A number of Senators made explicit reference to Justice Marshall's legacy at
Thomas's hearing. See generally The Nomination of Clarence Thomas, supra note 360. But
see William Raspberry, Best for County: Bush Should Appoint a Black Justice, WASH. POST,
July 1, 1991, at A19 (arguing after Justice Marshall's retirement that while "Blackness is...
not sufficient qualification for the next Supreme Court nominee [but]... it comes close to being
a necessary one.").
374. For a powerful analysis of Thurgood Marshall's contribution to the Court and a
persuasive argument that Justice Thomas should see his judicial role in historical context, see
generally Judge A. Leon I-Igginbotham Jr., An Open Letter to Clarence Thomas, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1005 (1992), and see also LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 32, at 123-24 (criticizing
Justice Thomas for undeserved self-comparison to Justice Thurgood Marshall).
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diversity to enhance judicial decision-making.375 Thus, Marshall functioned
as more than a role model or symbol on the Court. Marshall functioned as a
representative for blacks and other marginalized groups.
Thus, while President Bush and Thomas's supporters were promoting
Thomas as a role model, many African Americans were clamoring for some-
thing different. They sought a "representative" on the Court, someone like
Thurgood Marshall, who could tell and include the stories of black people and
other marginalized groups in the work of the Court. Blacks, in particular,
sought a judge who could represent the perspectives shared by most black
people on issues related to race, poverty and inclusion. These issues might
have included recognizing the continuing power and effect of discrimination
in the lives of blacks," 6 favoring affirmative action,377 and supporting the role
of the government in alleviating societal inequity.37 In desiring a black rather
than a white nominee who could advance those views on the Court, blacks also
may have legitimately sought a Justice whose adherence to these views would
derive from a common racial connection, understanding, and experience. In
essence, blacks sought substantive diversity rather than just cosmetic diversity.
Based on the views that Thomas had espoused in the years prior to his
nomination to the Court,37 9 it was evident that Thomas was unlikely to fulfill
the representative function that most blacks envisioned.380 Even if Thomas
375. See Byron R. Wite,A Tribute to Justice ThurgoodMarshall,44 STAN. L. REV. 1215,
1216 (1992) (remembering that Marshall "brought to the conference table years of experience in
an rea thatwas ofvital importanceto ourwork, experienethatnone ofus could claim to match").
376. Compare James Bock, Polls Find Big Divide in Views on Race: Blacks and Whites
Reported Far Apart in Perceptions, BALT. SUN, June 11, 1997, at IA (reporting that vast
majority of blacks believe discrimination is common) with Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (reflecting Thomas's acceptance of majority decision that reasonableness of traffic stop
does not depend on actual motivation of individual officer). Given the frequency that blacks
are pulled over for being black, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, this decision perpetu-
ates the daily discrimination in the lives of black people.
377. Compare Bock, supra note 376 (stating that 59% of African Americans support
federal action to improve position of non-whites) with Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that "'benign' discrimination teaches many that
because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence").
378. Compare Book, supra note 376 (stating that majority of African Americans think
government has responsibility to alleviate societal inequities) with M.LB. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 129 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that state may charge poor claimant for trial
transcript needed for appeal).
379. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., AN ANALYSIS OF THE ViEWs OF
JUDGE CLARENCE THOMAS (Aug. 13, 1991) (examining Thomas's views on law and politics)
(on file with author); Erwin Chemerinsky, Clarence Thomas' Natural Law Philosophy,
prepared for People for the American Way (Aug. 1991) (on file with author).
380. Since his confirmation, Thomas has demonstrated his unwillingness and/or inability
to serve the representative function envisioned by many blacks. This is evident not only because
his decisions are persistently at odds with the views of most blacks, but most importantly because
RACIAL DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
could be held out as "representing" the small fraction of the African American
population that shares his views,38 the idea that this subset of the African
American population should be represented on the Court, while a majority of
African Americans remain unrepresented, turns the concepts of both diversity
and representation on its head.
Thomas's performance shows that linking diversity to the creation of
role models invites the "personalization" of diversity efforts. The personal
story of the judicial nominee, becomes more important than the connection of
the nominee to a community or constituency. Thomas's personal accomplish-
ments and struggles, for example, were lauded without regard to how those
experiences connected him with, or disconnected him from, most African
Americans. This "personalized" sense of his qualification for service on the
Court permitted Thomas to be held up as a role model for a community with
which he is fundamentally at odds on almost every critical legal issue affect-
ing race."' By contrast, assessing Thomas as a potential "representative"
rather than role model, would have necessitated a very different presentation
and confirmation process than the one undertaken by President Bush, Thomas,
and the Judiciary Committee. Such a process would have required Thomas
to answer coherently the tough questions about the basis for his positions on
racial issues with greater clarity.3 It would have required that Thomas
Thomas appears unwilling to seriously consider and engage the perspective of most blacks in his
judicial decision-making on race issues. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that Voting Rights Act will not provide basis for claim of a
"dillutive practice"); Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with "pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our
society"). Indeed, Thomas's posture has been one of contempt for the views ofmost blacks. See,
e.g., Justice Clarence Thomas, Remarks to the National Bar Association (July 29, 1998)
(explaining that critics take issue not with his opinions, but rather "the principle problem seems
to be a deeper, antecedent offense: I have no right to think the way I do because I am black").
381. Indeed both before and after joining the Court, Thomas has demonstrated contempt
for the views and positions of most African Americans around issues related to race and the law.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 380. This is yet another reason why Clarence Thomas cannot
serve as a representative on the Court. As discussed earlier, a representative cannot persistently
dismiss or denigrate the well-considered views of his constituency. See supra notes 298-300
and accompanying text (discussing need for representative to give voice to constituent's views).
382. For Thomas's views in his own words, see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating: "[g]overnment cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and
protect us as equal before the law"); Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Time-
tables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 402 (1987); Clarence
Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution: The Declaration ofIndependence in
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 30 HOWARD L.J. 983,985-87(1987).
383. In response to the questions that were asked of him in this regard, Thomas's answers
were often simplistic, opaque, or incoherent. Often, the committee permitted Thomas to loop
his answers to substantive questions back around to tales about his personal life. No other
nominee to the Court, including Thurgood Marshall and Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman
Justice on the Court; relied upon his or her compelling personal story in their confirmation
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explain how he had gone about "stripping down like a runner" and might have
demanded that he identify which qualities, perspectives, and values he had
stripped from himself in his ostensible pursuit of impartiality.
Instead, Thomas was able to manipulate the desire of many for judicial
diversity by simultaneously promising both impartiality and racial empathy.
Recognizing the value of his race to conveying the appearance of diversity on
the Court, Thomas needed to assure the Senate Judiciary Committee that he
would be sensitive to minorities on race and poverty issues. To do so,
Thomas needed to pull back from his "stripped down" stance to suggest that
he "had not forgotten where he came from." In so doing, Thomas's message
to the Judiciary Committee amounted to an indication that he would be
entirely impartial and detached from the political agenda he had supported as
an appointee of President Reagan, but that the nation nevertheless could count
on him to demonstrate racial sensitivity. Thus, on the one hand Thomas
would be "stripped down like a runner" from the conservative political views
he had espoused in speeches and writings, while on the other hand Thomas
would empathize with the poor and with minorities. 8" For example, Thomas
offered descriptions of his boyhood experiences encountering racism and
living in poverty in order to convey a sense of racial empathy. To suggest his
continued sense of racial empathy, Thomas described his reaction to seeing
busloads of undoubtedly mostly black prisoners outside the window of his
judicial chambers inWashington, D.C. as: "but for the grace of God, there go
1. 0 85 Thomas thus signaled to the committee that he had not "stripped down"
his sense of racial connection. 6
process to the extent Thomas did. Indeed, by contrast, Thurgood Marshall, during his confirma-
tion hearings to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was grilled over months almost
entirely on his record of work as a civil rights lawyer with the NAACP. He spent hours before
the Judiciary Committee refuting accusations that he was a Communist or affiliated with the
Communist Party. For an account of the Senate hearings on Marshall's confirmation to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, see WnIUAMS, supra note 46, at 298-303.
384. Minow, supra note 313, at 1201 (describing Thomas's efforts to convey empathy for
poor and for blacks while promising that he had no political agenda).
385. The Nomination of Clarence Thomas, supra note 360, at 260.
386. And by strategically flashing his race and class credentials to the all-white, wealthy
members of the Judiciary Committee, Thomas avoided coherently answering direct questions
about his views and silenced many of his white Congressional critics. Utah Senator Orrin
Hatch, the ranking Republican member of the Judiciary Committee, reportedly remarked,
"Anybody who takes [Thomas] on in the area of civil rights is taking on the grandson of a
sharecropper." Stephen Wermiel & Paul M. Barrett, The Marshall Seat: Bush's Court
Nominee, A BlackRepublican, IsDeft Political Choice, WAIL ST. 3., July 2,1991, at Al. Some
blacks were not similarly intimidated by Thomas's humble background. See, e.g., Mary
McGroiy, Scenarios for Thomas, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1991, at A2 (challenging Thomas's
intimidation of Committee in this regard, Elaine Jones, then Deputy Director-Counsel of
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. was quoted as saying, "[a]ll of us who grew
up in the South have an outdoor privy in our background not too far back").
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The post-mortemn on Thomas's confirmation performance is sobering.
On the Court, Thomas has shown himself to be committed to the conservative
positions he embraced as a policymaker in the Reagan administration but from
which he distanced himself at his confimnation hearings. 3 And he is, appar-
ently, willing to use his racial credentials in furtherance of those positions.
No longer distancing himself from his long-held conservative views, Thomas
now relies on the tactic of Thurgood Marshall - using stories from his past -
to convince members of the Court to take positions directly counter to those
that Thurgood Marshall and a majority of African Americans would have
embraced.388 The irony here is rich.
Yet Thomas's cynical and masterful use of his role model status could
not have been achieved but for the impoverished and timid diversity discourse
that characterizes the value of black judges as role models rather than as
representatives. For this reason, Thomas's nomination, confirmation, and
subsequent jurisprudence on the Court is a wake-up call, reminding us how
easily manipulable the idea of cosmetic racial diversity can be.389
C. Looking Beyond the Race of the Judge
As the work of Sylvia Lazos Vargas suggests, and as the Clarence
Thomas nomination demonstrated, efforts to promote diversity on the bench
are, at their core, attempts to increase cultural pluralism in judicial decision-
making. The goal is to increase not just cosmetic diversity, butto increase the
number ofjudges who can authentically articulate and legitimate the perspec-
fives and values of "outsider voices" in judicial decision-making.31 If this is
indeed the goal, then we must keenly focus our judicial diversity efforts on
387. Thomas's decisions on the Court are among the most hostile towards the civil rights
of racial minorities and the poor. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 129 (1996)
(Thomas, 3., dissenting) (arguing that Mississippi may require indigent mother whose parental
rights have been terminated to pay more than $2,000 for trial transcripts required for appeal);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636, 658 (1993) (reflecting that Justice Thomas joined majority
to overrule proposed North Carolina redistricting plan that would have created two majority
black congressional districts in that state).
388. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6,1996, at 66
(describing reports of Thomas's "personal appeal" to colleagues during the deliberations for the
Adarand v. Pena affirmative action case). Based on interviews with Supreme Court clerks,
Rosen reports that Thomas "talked about his grandfather .... His grandfather had worked hard,
Thomas declared; he never asked for handouts from the State. He hadn't made a great living,
and his business had been restricted to black neighborhoods; but he had not needed affirmative
action to get his contracts." Id.
389. This is yet another reason to reject the "role model" rationale for diversity. It's simply
a poor rhetorical choice. As one critic of the "role model" justification for racial diversity
reminds us "[e]ven a racist can embrace the role model argument." Allen, supra note 8, at 34.
390. Indeed judges should be encouraged to expose themselves to a wide range of ideas
and experiences.
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those candidates who are both capable of and willing to include outsider
narratives to judicial decision-making.
As this paper suggests, African American judicial candidates often are
very qualified to perform these tasks. Some African American judicial candi-
dates, however, may be both unwilling to and/or unable to "represent" outsider
voices. Not every black judicial candidate must serve the purposes of diver-
sity. But when a candidate garners support, even in part, for his or her ability
to bring "diversity" to the bench, then the supporters must define the sub-
stance of that diversity by more than the candidate's racial membership.
When the value of diversity is focused on a candidate's ability and wil-
lingness to represent outsider voices in judicial decision-making, then it
becomes clear that even white judges will, in some instances, be qualified
"diversity" candidates. White judges will not share the common historical
and experiential bonds of racial subordination with blacks. As a result,
white "diversity" candidates cannot replace the need for black judges.
Blacks will continue to seek judicial representatives who share these bonds.
Yet in some instances, white judges will have experienced and internalized
counter-narratives and will be willing to rely on those narratives in their
judicial decision-making. White judicial candidates who are both able to and
prepared to represent outsider voices in judicial decision-making should be
supported as furthering the goals of cultural pluralism in judicial decision-
making. The harsh condemnation confronting white judges when they per-
form such a representative role suggests that the danger of racial homogeneity
on the bench may be less about preserving the bench for white judges than it
is about preserving the dominance of white norms and values in legal
decision-making.
D. The Case ofJudge Harold Baer: Including Outsider Voices in
Judicial Decision-Making
The 1996 highly charged case of Harold Baer, a white federal judge in
the Southern District of New York, whom President Clinton appointed in
1994, dramatizes this phenomenon. In 1996 Judge Baer ruled in favor of an
African American, female defendant who moved to suppress the use at trial
of 34 kilograms of cocaine and 2 kilograms of heroin that police officers
found in the trunk of her car.39' The defendant, Ms. Bayless, contended that
the drugs were found pursuant to an illegal search and that the drugs repre-
sented "fruit of the poisonous tree."" The police supported the legality of
their search, contending that they had a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Bayless
391. See generally United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on
reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
392. Id. at 238 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484-85 (1963)).
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was involved in illegal conduct.3 9 As evidence in support of that suspicion
the police contended that according the police testimony, some young men
placed several duffel bags in the trunk of Ms. Bayless's car and then walked
away from the car. Upon noticing the police scrutiny, the young men spoke
with one another, and several of them began to run. The police cited the fact
that the young men fled as evidence supporting their reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity had taken place.394
Soon after her arrest, Ms. Bayless, described as "a middle-aged black
woman,1395 gave a videotaped confession in which she described in great
detail her role as a drug "mule," traveling between Detroit and New York on
at least twenty occasions to transport drugs and/or large sums of money.
396
Judge Baer found Ms. Bayless's taped confession to be most credible, based
in part on her incrimination of both herself and her son, the fact that she had
been offered "no immunity or even special consideration" in exchange for the
confession, and the detailed nature of her confession.3" Given the credibility
of Ms. Bayless's description ofthe events leading up to the search, in contrast
to the arresting officer's less credible account of the search, Judge Baer found
that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and as such suppressed the
evidence as illegally obtained.39
Less than four months later, Judge Baer had reversed his decision,
apologized for statements he made in his opinion, and removed himself from
further participation in the case."9 Baer's reversal followed a vicious and
highly visible condemnation of his opinion. Presidential candidate Bob Dole,
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, and other Republican political leaders
publicly denounced Judge Baer and suggested that he should be impeached.4"
393. Id. at 235.
394. Id. at 236.
395. Id. at 234.
396. Id. at 236.
397. See id. (finding that defendant Bayless's "candor and the breadth and nature of her
statements give her statements credibility"). Judge Baer also
place[d] considerable weight on the defendant's statements because of how they
incriminate her, her son and others and because at the time the statements were
made, the defendant unlike the Officer, had no reason to color the facts. Further-
more, the defendant's version of the events, recorded twelve hours or less after her
arrest, is likely to be a more accurate statement of what occurred that morning than
an officer's testimony offered more than eight months after the events took place.
Id. at 239.
398. Id. at 243.
399. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying defendant's
Motion to Suppress on reconsideration).
400. R. Eugene Pinkham, Commentary,A New TyrannyAgainstJudiciary, CML TRIB.,May
23, 1996, at 30 (criticizing Bob Dole, Newt Gingrich, and Rudolph Giuliani for threatening to
attempt to impeach Judge Baer).
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President Clinton, who had appointed Judge Baer, called the decision "wrong-
headed" and through his press secretary indicated that the White House would
be closely monitoring the outcome of the Motion for Reconsideration that the
U.S. Attorney filed in the case."
Why did Judge Baer's opinion elicit such a strong public response?
Although it formed a brief part of the opinion, Judge Baer's interpretation of
the actions of the young black men who placed the illegal drugs in the trunk
of Ms. Bayless's car became the focus of the greatest media attention and
political condemnation." In assessing the "reasonableness" of the police
officers' conduct in the context of their articulated reasons for searching Ms.
Bayless's car to a search Judge Baer stated:
Police officers, eventhose traveling inumnarkedvehicles, are easilyrecog-
nized, particularly, in this area of Manhattan. In fact, the same United
States Attorney's Office which brought this prosecution enjoyed more
success intheir prosecution ofa corrupt police officer of an anti-crime unit
operatinginthisveryneighborhood. Evenbefore this prosecution and the
public hearing andfinal report oftheMollen Commission, residents inthis
neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and
violent. After the attendant publicity surrounding the above events, had
the men not run when the cops began to stare at them, it would have been
unusual.403
The power of this finding lies in Judge Baer's decision to analyze the
behavior of these young men from the perspective ofyoung African American
men from the Washington Heights community. From the perspective of these
young men, it would be perfectly logical to flee from the attention of the
police. Judge Baer contextualized the behavior of the young men. He noted
that the Washington Heights neighborhood had become infamous for the
401. Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al
(describing political fall-out from Judge Baer's decision); Allison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing
Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,1996, at Al (same). Judge Baer did receive support from
judicial colleagues on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals who authored a letter decrying the
vilification ofjudges for their opinions. Second Circuit ChiefJudges Criticize Attacks on Judge
Baer, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1996, at 4. The Second Circuit judges were particularly concerned
with political threats to the judicial independence of Article Ilijudges. Id.
402. Although Baer's opinion contains more pointed and explicit criticism of the police
and of racist law enforcement policies, his finding that the decision to run from the police was
a logical and sensible act within the context of the lives of young black men in Washington
Heights received the greatest public condemnation and vitriol. For example, Baer remarks,
"[w]hat I find shattering is that in this day and age blacks in black neighborhoods and blacks
in white neighborhoods can count on little security for their person." United States v. Bayless,
913 F. Supp. 232,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). This comment is among the most inflammatory in the
opinion in part because it is entirely unrelated to any of the facts alleged by either the police or
the defendant in the Bayless case.
403. Id. at 243 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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indictment of corrupt police officers who engaged in corrupt practices, includ-
ing stealing from drug dealers, planting evidence and falsely arresting
persons." The illegal practices of cops in Washington Heights was widely
reported and known to most of all to residents of the neighborhood, most of
whom had lived for years under the occupation of a band of corrupt police
officers.
Judge Baer was well acquainted with the hostile relationship between
police and the Washington Heights community. Judge Baer himself had
served for two years on the very mayoral task force that uncovered the vast
network of police corruption in precincts throughout the city, including
Washington Heights. °" Thus, Judge Baer's recognition of the highly-charged
relationship between the police and residents in Washington Heights shaped
his account of the young men's behavior in the Bayless incident.4" Judge Baer
also emphasized that the tense relationship between the police and young
black and Latino men in Washington Heights was, as a result of the Mollen
Commission, well-known to the public. 7 Certainly the police officers who
patrolled the community should have known the nature of that relationship.
As such, the police officers could not legitimately base their suspicion that the
young men were engaged in illegal activity on the fact that the men fled when
they saw the police watching them.
It is, perhaps, precisely because Judge Baer insisted on including and
articulating an account of "reasonable behavior" and "suspicious activity"
from the perspective of Washington Heights residents that this section of his
opinion raised such concern. Baer's endorsement of the conduct of the young
men who ran from the police is a condemnation of our society's persistent
criminalization of urban black youth. His analysis of the young men's flight
from the police is remarkable simply because it gives voice to the residents
who live in communities policed by corrupt cops. In essence, Baer states the
obvious: Community members respond rationally to police misconduct. By
refusing to credit the police account that the decision of the men to flee was
indicative of criminal conduct, Baer refuses to participate in the criminali-
404. Id. at 242 n.18 (citing Greg B. Smith, NYPD to Get Feds'Info on 34th Pct, DAILY
NEWS, (New York), June 2,1995, at 24).
405. Indeed some of the most shocking revelations of police corruption and brutality came
from the 34th precinct in Washington Heights. Police admitted to drug use by police officers,
confiscation of drugs for resale, stealing money confiscated in arrests and collaboration between
police and neighborhood drug dealers. Incidences of police planting evidence to justify arrests
and numerous accounts of police brutality also emerged from the investigation of police activity
in Washington Heights community.
406. Indeed Judge Baer's original Bayless opinion made specific reference to the informa-
tion revealed by the Mollen Commission. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 242.
407. Joe Sexton, New York Police Oflen Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TMES, Apr.
22,1994, atA1.
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zation of the community's response to corrupt cops. Baer's assessment of the
relationship between the residents of urban minority communities and the
local police force presents a more complex and troubling picture of law
enforcement than the viewpoint most mainstream media outlets and most
politicians offer. Baer's discussion suggests that just as law enforcement
politicians, and the general public have responded to increased levels of urban
criminality with more cops, tougher laws, and stiffer prison sentences, so too
are urban, minority residents responding to criminality among law enforce-
ment personnel with increased suspicion, insularity and self-protection.
Judge Baer did not limit his effort to interpret the facts surrounding the
search and drug seizure from the perspective of the defendant and the Wash-
ington Heights community to his analysis of the relationship between the
police and local residents. Baer's opinion serves as a more generalized
critique of the negative race and class stereotypes which underpin the conduct
of law enforcement officers in New York. In nearly every paragraph of the
opinion, Baer challenges the police account of the search incident by question-
ing the policemen's implicit assumptions about the Washington Heights
neighborhood, African American men and women, and poor, inner city New
York residents. For example, the police officer stated that his initial suspicion
of Ms. Bayless was aroused by the fact that she drove a car with Michigan
license plates at 5 a.m.4 08 The clear implication of the police account is that
the police officer found it unusual for an African American woman to drive
a car with Michigan plates in Washington Heights, especially at 5 a.m. Judge
Baer challenges the police attempt to paint these facts as evidence of "suspi-
cious activity." Judge Baer states:
Here, the defendant was observed in an area allegedly known for its drug
trading. Yet I find nothing unusual about the time at which she was
observed. In New York City, people travel to and from work at all hours
of the day and night.... Officer Carroll puts great stock in the fact that
defendant was driving a car with an out-of-state license plate atthe time of
her arrest and that she double parked on a city street In a city which
considers itself 'The Capital ofthe World' and which is regularly crowded
with out of state and foreign visitors... it is not odd to see a license plate
from another state.
Baer isolates three critical police observations and reinterprets them from
the perspective of a hypothetical black resident of Washington Heights. First,
he positions the Washington Heights neighborhood as part of New York
City - "the Capitol of the World." Baer rejects the attempt by the police to
depict Washington Heights as a generic poor, black and Latino neighborhood.
Baer firmly puts the neighborhood in context, endowing it with its rightful
408. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 236.
409. Id. at 240 (footnotes omitted).
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position as part of the great New York and part of Manhattan. This view is
directly contrary to the manner that police and the media describe most poor,
minority neighborhoods in New York. When the facts the arresting officers
provide are put in the geographic, social, and cultural context of New York,
rather than just Washington Heights, the officers' suspicion that Ms. Bayless
was engaged in illegal behavior becomes less "reasonable."
Second, Baer, by providing the most likely lawful rationale for why Ms.
Bayless might have been double-parked on the street at an early hour, reveals
the proclivity of the police to dismiss the possibility that black residents of
poor neighborhoods lead lives filled with many of the same activities as that
of white New Yorkers in middle-class neighborhoods. Baer imagines, for
example, that Ms. Bayless might have been a Michigan resident on a visit to
New York "returning to her home state and want[ing] to get there before
nightfall."41 By offering this hypothetical explanation, Baer demonstrates
that in the mind of the police, such average stories do not exist for inner city
blacks.
Finally, Judge Baer reveals and condemns what he believes is the funda-
mental premise of the police decision to observe and ultimately to search Ms.
Bayless - that the mere presence of any individual on the street of a neighbor-
hood designated "high crime" is itself suspicious.4" Judge Baer forcefully
reminds the police that "[tihe mere presence of an individual in a neighbor-
hood known for its drug activity... fails to raise a reasonable suspicion that
the person observed is there to purchase drugs." '412 Baer exposes and con-
demns law enforcement's cavalier dismissal of poor minority neighborhoods
as places where only criminals live. Instead Baer, through the image of his
hypothetical traveler from Michigan who seeks to return home early "after
visiting relatives in New York City,"41 envisions the lives of Washington
Heights residents as potentially as familiar as the lives of any average Ameri-
cans. Washington Heights is not just "a hub for the drug trade, 41 4 insists
Judge Baer, but also a place where ordinary people with ordinary families,
relationships, and habits live.
410. Id.
411. In fact, Judge Baer chides the police for failing to offer any evidence that the neigh-
borhood "is a known hub for the drug trade." Id. at n.12.
412. Id. at240.
413. Id. at 242.
414. Id. at 240 n.12. Judge Baer also criticizes the broad net cast by the police in describ-
Ing "the high crime area" and remarks upon the failure of the police to offer "proof to corrobo-
rate their statement that the area surrounding 176th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue is a known
hub for the drug trade." Id. Although few would probably dispute that the drug trade is quite
prevalent in this area, Judge Baer, by requiring proof of this fact again seeks to compel the
police to exercise care in condemning whole neighborhoods simply because they are poor and
minority.
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In effect, Baer offers a counter-narrative of the life of poor blacks and
Latinos living in New York. In so doing, he offers a critique of widely used
law enforcement procedures from the perspective of "outsiders." He exposes
the fact that activity which would be unremarkable in white, middle-class
neighborhoods raises suspicion among white police officers when it occurs in
a poor, minority community."' Baer's analysis returns us to the admonition
he quotes at the outset of his opinion, that "[t]he great enemy of truth is very
often not the lie - deliberate, contrived, and dishonest - but the myth -
persistent, pervasive and realistic."416 The effect of Judge Baer's decision is
potentially powerful. It serves not only as an indictment of the police in this
case, whose testimony he finds "incredible," '417 but it is also an indictment of
the cultural assumptions and racialized perspective that are deeply embedded
in the criminal justice system in New York. But the potential power of Judge
Baer's decision is extinguished by his subsequent reversal and apology for the
very language in the opinion that gave voice to black and Latino Washington
Heights residents.
What the Baer case reveals is that if a white judge explicitly represents
and relies upon perspectives and values from minority communities, he too
may face public denunciation.4"' If this is true, it further suggests that it is
diversity of perspective in judicial decision-making, rather than just the
cosmetic diversity of decision-makers, that remains the real challenge. In
sum, while the race of the judge often will be an appropriate and legitimate
indicator of a judge's potential to bring diverse perspectives to adjudication,
diversity efforts must focus as well on a judicial candidate's ability and
willingness - regardless of his race - to articulate and utilize the perspectives
of marginalized communities in his judicial decision-making. Where a white
judge demonstrates this capacity, then he/she should be supported by diversity
advocates as well.
415. Implicit in his decision to expose the stereotype is Baer's recognition that the use of
such images as a basis for law enforcement decisions gives police virtual free reign within poor
communities of color. It is not surprising then that the most egregious incidences of police
corruption and misconduct often occur in poor communities.
416. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 234 (quoting President John F. Kennedy, Commencement
Speech at Yale University (1962)).
417. Id. at 239-40. Judge Baer refers to Officer Carroll's testimony as "gossamer." Id. at
239.
418. The representation of this perspective may have been particularly unexpected from
Judge Baer who had enjoyed a successful career as a federal criminal prosecutor in the U.S.
Attorney's office. Judge Baer served as Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit
in the U.S. Attorneys' office from 1961-1967 and was First Assistant U.S. Attorney in the
Criminal Division from 1970-1972.
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Conclusion
Ongoing challenges to the impartiality of minority judges, condemnation
of white judges who articulate "outsider" perspectives, and the LULAC line
of cases, together suggest that advocates of judicial diversity no longer can
avoid describing why "race matters" in judging. A public discourse that
challenges prevailing assumptions about judicial impartiality and articulates
the potential contribution of black judges to judicial decision-making must
undergird cases challenging discriminatory judicial election schemes, as well
as other judicial diversity efforts. Arguments advancing judicial diversity
must challenge the idea that the all-white bench is racially impartial. Most
importantly, diversity strategies must focus on the need to include the perspec-
tives and views of blacks and other outsiders in judicial decision-making,
rather than focus on promoting minority role models. This will mean support-
ing and promoting the nomination of more black judges to the bench, and
examining the potential of those judicial aspirants to represent outsider
communities. It will also mean supporting white judges who are capable of
bringing outsider voices to judicial decision-making.
Charges of judicial activism, essentialism, and racism undoubtedly will
surround these efforts. Workable solutions will remain hard to find. Judicial
selections systems which yield diversity and highly qualified judges must be
identified. The creation of mandatory judicial education programs which
engage judges in examining their situated stance and the existence and the
relevance of alternative perspectives will play a key role in meeting the goals
of diversity. All of these tasks will be difficult. But given the continued
exclusion of blacks and other racial minorities from full participation on the
bench, and the vilification of white judges who articulate outsider perspec-
tives, diversity advocates have no choice but to wade through these muddy
waters. Judicial diversity advocates can help explore and promote the poten-
tial for all judges affirmatively to identify and to engage multiple perspectives
in their judicial decision-making. By focusing specifically on the exclusion
of outsider voices from judicial decision-making, ratherthanjust the exclusion
of outsiderfaces from the judiciary, judicial diversity advocates challenge all
judges - not just minority judges - to recognize their situated stance, and to
reach out to engage other realities in judicial decision-making.

